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Guilt, Persecution and Atonement:
Moral Responsibility in Loewald and Lévinas
Gordon Louis Aronoff, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2010
This thesis examines the question, what does it mean to be responsible for choices
that we did not make? The theme ofmoral responsibility is traced through feminist and
postmodern discourses, and through the thought ofpsychoanalyst Hans Loewald and
philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas. An examination of feminist ethics and the so-called
caring perspective situates the (gendered) self within an interpersonal web of competing
caring commitments. Postmodern analysis deconstructs the self and, like the feminist
critique, inquires into the transpersonal, historical and institutional discourses that give
rise to our experiences of interiority and individualism. This placing-in-perspective of the
autonomous self undermines all moral systems that are founded upon a conception of the
reason-centered "I" that conceal the influence of the realm of affect and the (so-called)
irrational. The primacy of this affective realm is taken up in the developmental
psychoanalytic account of Hans Loewald, who elaborates the central and ongoing role of
guilt and atonement in the formation of a responsible self. Guilt and atonement are also
central to the conception of subjectivity advanced by Emmanuel Lévinas. Levinas's
critique of the reason-centered "I" is every bit as radical as the de-centered postmodern
self, and yet he posits an alternative conception that cannot but be ethical. This self is
summoned to a (limitless) responsibility through proximity to the other, and this
obligation is only mitigated by the presence of the third (i.e. a plurality of others). As in
IV
Loewald's account, the ego is torn asunder via an experience of trauma. However,
whereas Loewald (following Freud) seeks to identify the ultimate causes ofthis trauma,
Lévinas traces (literally, as they only exist as traces) their unfolding and assigns their
origins to that which is always directed away from the self and can never be formalized in
a system. In reading Loewald with and against Lévinas, the themes of guilt, persecution
and atonement are thus identified as salient to our understanding ofwhat it means to be
morally responsible.
VAcknowledgements
I would like to thank the many colleagues, friends and family who generously offered
their support and feedback throughout the various stages of this project. In particular, I
wish to express my gratitude to my mentor and friend, Michael Oppenheim, whose own
research into post-Freudian psychoanalysis and Jewish philosophy has served as a source
of great inspiration. This project would not have been possible without his detailed
comments, questions and suggestions.
I would also like to thank Marc Lalonde and Norm Rawin for reading and commenting
on an earlier draft, since the feedback that I received has helped me to clarify important
facets of this examination.
Many of the ideas and questions that I have explored in this project were formulated
while I was doing my coursework in the department of Religion at Concordia. I am
grateful for having had the opportunity to study with some truly excellent educators,
which included Ira Robinson, T.S. Rukmani, Michael Oppenheim, Fred Bird, Michel
Despland, Marc Lalonde, Norm Rawin, and Lynda Clarke. I also received very
important guidance from Norma Joseph and Leslie Orr, and was kept on track by the
expert departmental management of Tina Montandon and Munit Merid.
Finally, this thesis was made possible in part by the generous support of Le Fonds
québécois de la recherche sur la nature et les technologies, the Concordia Institute for
Canadian Jewish Studies, and Concordia University.







Defining the parameters of the project 4
Key Questions 6
Description of chapters 6
Chapter One: Feminism, Gender, and Caring 10
Gender and Biological Sex 1 1
Gendered Philosophical Hierarchies 1 3
Reason and Autonomy 1 5
Kohlberg and the stages of moral development 17
The Care Perspective 1 9
Criticisms of the Caring Perspective 22
Emotions and Relationality 26
The Relational Self and Narrative 28
Feminism and Psychoanalysis 32
Psychoanalysis and the pre-Oedipal period 34
The Feminist critique of Freud 35
Conclusion
Vili
Chapter Two: Postmodernism and the De-Centering
of Reason and the Self 39
Critique of Foundational Claims 43
The Linguistic Turn and the End of Metaphysics 44
Michel Foucault and the Death of the Subject 46
Foucault and Phenomenology 48
Foucault and Psychoanalysis 50
Le Regard and the Care of the Self 5 1
The Psychoanalytic Gaze 53
Foucault and Subjectivity 61
Foucault' s Ethics of Resistance 67
The Narrative Turn and Psychoanalysis 70
Postmodern Feminist Philosophy 72
Chapter Three: Hans Loewald and the (Counter-)
Movements of Primary and Secondary Processes 77
Meaning 78
The Origins of Mental Life 81
Responsibility and Repeating Knowingly 83
The Transference ReIationship 8 6
The Oedipal Complex 88
Agency and the Unconscious 91
Murder, Guilt and Mourning 94
Superego and Conscience 97
IX
Loewald, the Self, and Responsibility 106
Loewald and Feminism 1 1 1
Chapter Four: Emmanuel Lévinas and the
Priority of the Other 118
Emmanuel Lévinas: A Brief Biographical Overview 1 19
The current state of Lévinas scholarship 1 20
Lévinas and Alterity 123
Levinas's critique of philosophy 125
Levinas's account of subjectivity 137
Bad Conscience and Death 140
The Face 142
The Face and Religion 1 44
The Phenomenology and Non-Intentional Consciousness 146
Chapter Five: Comparing and Contrasting Loewald and Lévinas 158
An Apology, or a Reflection on Some Methodological Concerns 158
Chapter Outline 1 60
The Ego is Hateful 160
From Primary to Secondary Process Mentation 161
Murdering the Other to become a Self 162
The Maternal Relation 1 64
This Consciousness that is not mine 166
Feminist Insights 1 69
Lévinas and feminist accounts of the subject 171
Loewald and feminism 173
Postmodern insights 176
The Self-Other relation 1 77
The Face and Le Regard 1 79
The account of the self in Lévinas and Foucault 1 80
Loewald' s proto-postmodern subject 1 8 1
Conclusion 183
The Centrality of the Other 1 84




What does it mean to be morally responsible? In traditional Western philosophy,
responsibility has been regarded as an offshoot of autonomy. To the extent that an agent
is autonomous and thus capable of rational deliberation, she is capable of being morally
responsible. We might think of autonomy in this sense as the ability to abstract one's self-
reflective, deliberative capacity from any desires or appetites that might otherwise impair
our reasoning. On this account, autonomy derives from a first-person account of the
subject.1
We may contrast this first-person account of the human subject with a third-
person account that describes the subject's language or actions in terms that do not
respect the integrity of her self-constitution. Third-person accounts cut across the action
vocabulary of the agent so that her words and actions are determined by forces of which
she is unaware. Whereas the first-person perspective has traditionally been associated
with an agent's Reason (principles, deliberation) the third-person perspective has been
the repository of all things irrational (appetite, inclination, desire, and so forth).
In popular culture, it is also common to present this first- and third-person
dichotomy as a stark, binary choice, between regarding people as agents and regarding
1 Meili Steele, Theorizing Textual Subjects: Agency and Oppression (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997).
2 Hinde Lindemann Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair (Ithaca & New York: Cornell University
Press, 2001). Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals ofThought (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2001).
2them as victims. Our received secular understandings ofmoral agency are largely
informed and distorted by pressure from two truncated depictions ofhuman action. We
might call these the medical-biological (or environmental) model and the economic
model. The former focuses upon what happens to us, either from the outside (that is, in
terms of direct victimization by the environment or other persons) or from inside (for
example, from innate drives or from hormonal or chemical imbalances). This account
traces our motives and our agency to experiences in which we had no agency. Moral
responsibility thus becomes impossible.3 The contrasting economic picture describes the
moral agent as a chooser of goods in the consumerist sense ofthat term, in which all of
our important moral decisions are understood as heroic acts of will that are unconstrained
by desires and appetites. On this account, making important, morally-salient life choices
is no different from choosing a brand of deodorant at the pharmacy.4
If the medical picture seems tilted toward deterministic despair then the economic
picture tends toward nihilistic consumerism, and neither model provides us with a
satisfying account of how human beings actually exercise their moral responsibilities in
everyday life.5
A great deal has been written about moral agents who know what they should do
and do it, and about moral agents who know what they should do and somehow fail to do
it. The academic literature abounds in stories of people who choose to exercise or ignore
their moral responsibilities that they derive on the basis of rational deliberation with
~ David Healy, The Antidepressant Era (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1997). Herb Kutchins
and Stuart A. Kirk {Making Us Crazy, New York: The Free Press, 1997).
Emily Hauptmann, Putting Choice Before Democracy: A Critique ofRational Choice Theory (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1996). Kenneth Shepsle and Mark Bonchek, "Rationality: The Model
of Choice," in Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, Inc., 1 997).
Charles T. Matthewes, "Agency, Nature, Transcendence, and Moralism: A Review of Recent Work in
Moral Psychology/" Journal ofReligious Ethics 28, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 296-328.
reference to clear principles. Very little has been written, comparatively speaking, about
what we might term good moral agents with bad principles, and moral agents who seem
to lack clear principles and yet still manage to act in a morally responsible way.6 A good
account of moral agency and responsibility must be able to evaluate and treat as morally
salient those features of our everyday moral lives (moral actions that are not deliberated
upon, affect and unconscious motivation) that have been overlooked or deliberately
ignored in the existing literature. In particular, the role of emotions such as guilt and the
desire to atone (both ofwhich have strong moral overtones) require elaboration.
The method
The objective of this project is to bring together feminist theory, postmodernism,
modern Jewish philosophy, and post-Freudian psychoanalysis in order to reconfigure our
understanding of what it means to be morally responsible. These distinct discourses have
not been selected arbitrarily. Rather, they each challenge the traditional philosophical
account that posits an autonomous "I" as the sole locus of meaning and the basis of our
moral responsibility. This project is therefore framed as an interdisciplinary conversation
among these theoretical perspectives, and each discipline will be read critically against
the others. My reading of these distinct discourses will be strategically focused on the
theme of moral responsibility, and this will facilitate the identification of common ground
as well as questions and concerns that are not shared. The project is thus critically
6 Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency (New York: Oxford University Press,
2003).
4comparative in its method, but it is also reconstructive in the sense that it will not merely
take stock of the shortcomings identified with each discipline. Once these shortcomings
have been identified, a model of moral agency and responsibility will be advanced that
overcomes the false, binary dichotomy of the agent and the victim.
Outline
The traditional philosophical account of the autonomous "I" as the sole locus of
meaning and basis for moral responsibility has come under assault from a number of
quarters, and this project is structured in such a way as to evaluate and, ultimately, offer a
coherent response to these various critiques. Once the research problem, method, and
parameters of the project have been addressed in the introduction, there will be a chapter
on the feminist critique ofphilosophy and feminist ethics; a chapter on postmodernism; a
chapter on Hans Loewald and post-Freudian psychoanalysis; a chapter on Emmanuel
Lévinas and modern Jewish philosophy; and a concluding chapter in which these
different disciplines are read critically against each other.
Defining the Parameters of the Project
The goal of this project is to broaden our understanding of what it means to be a
morally responsible self. However, in order to achieve this objective, the scope of the
5examination has been pragmatically circumscribed via engagement with a select group of
important thinkers. These thinkers were not selected haphazardly. Rather, I sought to
identify and engage with thinkers who were influential within their respective disciplines,
and who were representative ofboth the historical developments as well as the
contemporary debates within these discourses. Although specific thinkers have been
privileged, an effort has thus been made to situate them within the larger set of voices and
concerns within each discipline.
Within feminist discourse, the ethics of care represents the most significant
challenge and contribution to contemporary theorizing about what it means to be morally
responsible, and I have therefore focused on the thought of Carol Gilligan and Nel
Noddings. Luce Irigaray and Jane Flax have also been cited extensively, since both have
made productive use ofpsychoanalytic (and, in the case of Flax, postmodem) insights in
their respective feminist critiques. More than twenty years after his death, Michel
Foucault continues to be among the most widely cited and influential post-modern (or
perhaps "post-structuralist") thinker, and his radical critique of the self and of the ethical
made him an obvious choice for inclusion in this project. Within psychoanalytic
discourse, the choice of Hans Loewald is, at first glance, less obvious. I selected
Loewald not only because his thought is incredibly rich and subtle, but also because he
deals explicitly with the theme ofmoral responsibility in his work. Furthermore, he is not
well known outside of psychoanalytic circles (although this is starting to change), and he
therefore remains a largely untapped resource for theorizing about what it means to be a
morally responsible self. Like Michel Foucault, Emmanuel Lévinas remains incredibly
influential more than a decade after his death, and his examination of what it means to be
6responsible has redrawn the parameters of inquiry concerning subjectivity and ethics.
Levinas's inclusion in this project is therefore essential.
Key Questions
This project is structured around a number of key questions. Broadly speaking, I
am inquiring into what it means to be a responsible moral agent. More specifically, I am
examining the role of affect and the unconscious in the development of a responsible self.
In juxtaposing the thought of Lévinas and Loewald on the question of responsibility, I am
seeking to elaborate the role of guilt and atonement, which both figure very prominently
in their respective accounts. In this light, and with reference to Lévinas, I am also seeking
to clarify what he means when he states that we are responsible even for the persecution
that we undergo at the hands of the Other.
Description of Chapters
Chapter: Feminist ethics
In reading for gender bias, the feminist critique has exposed the extent to which
the human ideal in Western philosophy is merely a repository for those values that have
traditionally been associated with the masculine. This includes the ideal of a deliberating,
autonomous agent as a locus for moral agency and responsibility. In a similar vein,
feminist critiques have identified false, hierarchically-arranged dichotomies in
philosophy in which a stereotypically male quality (Mind, Reason, Universal, Reality) is
7juxtaposed with a (derivative or secondary) stereotypically female quality (Body,
Emotion, Particular, Appearance). Feminist theory exposes the lacunae in traditional
philosophy and posits a gender-conscious grounding for an ethics of responsibility. The
autonomous "I" of traditional philosophy is de-centered in favor of a conception of a self
that is situated within and responsive to a relational web of mutual obligations.
Chapter: Postmodernism
The moral agent of traditional philosophy has come under an even fiercer assault
from postmodernism. The post-modern critique also entails a radical de-centering of the
first-person account of the self upon which the autonomous moral agent ofphilosophy is
grounded. According to this critique, there is no self as such, and what is mistaken as a
self is nothing more than an effect or by-product of the prevailing linguistic and power-
structures in a given social and historical context. On this reading, ethics and moral
responsibility are illusory. The best that one can do is to resist complicity with the
oppressive power structures and gesture towards some (as yet) inarticulate future.
Both the feminist and postmodern critiques of moral agency are important and
must be addressed in any coherent discussion concerning the meaning of moral
responsibility. However, both critiques present truncated accounts of moral agency. In
order to complete the picture, it is necessary to introduce two additional accounts of
responsibility and bring them into a constructive dialogue with feminism and
postmodernism.
8Chapter: Hans Loewald and Post-Freudian psychoanalysis
The post-Freudian psychoanalytic thought of Hans Loewald offers a very rich and
largely unexplored account of moral agency and responsibility. Loewald's elaboration of
Freud's conceptual framework allows us to discuss, in a meaningful way, the affective
sources of moral agency and responsibility. Of particular importance in Loewald's
account is the centrality of guilt and atonement in the development of a responsible self.
Loewald articulates a human moral agency that derives from both first-person and third-
person sources, thus addressing an important feature of the feminist critique of traditional
philosophy. At the same time, Loewald provides a compelling account of the creative
interplay between the first- and third-person accounts that is missing in feminist ethics. It
is this interplay that infuses a life with a sense of meaning, and it is only through owning
up to those third-person accounts that we did not choose in the usual sense of the term,
that one becomes morally responsible. Loewald regarded consciousness as a
developmental achievement, in which the individual gradually differentiated herself from
an original (and undifferentiated) infant-mother matrix, and subjectivity is constituted by
the ongoing interplay between these differentiated and undifferentiated ways of
experiencing reality. Loewald's insistence on the continuing importance of this
undifferentiated (i.e. transpersonal) source of subjectivity situates him as a transitional
figure between modern and postmodern thought. Moral agency is not illusory for
Loewald. Rather, the self is a fluid structure that must continuously revitalize itself
through renewed contact with the transpersonal, undifferentiated context from which it
arises.
9Chapter: Emanuel Lévinas and modern Jewish philosophy
The thought of the modern Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas is an important
well-spring for any examination of moral agency and responsibility. In positing ethics as
first philosophy, Lévinas articulates an account of the self that is every bit as radical as
the postmodern critique of the same. However, Lévinas' s agent is constituted by the
extent to which she meets the responsibilities that precede and call-forth her existence. As
such, and in contrast to the de-centered self of post-modernism, she is inescapably ethical
(although she may evade her responsibilities). According to Lévinas, merely saying "I"
(i.e. asserting my freedom and autonomy) already entails doing violence to the other, and
his phenomenology of the face-to-face relation reveals, as it were, the affective traces that
this violent act leaves behind in our consciousness. Reading Lévinas for what he has to
say about responsibility thus brings into sharp relief the importance of guilt, persecution
and atonement in his account of subjectivity. Examining Lévinas with and against
Loewald, thus highlights important and difficult aspects of their accounts of what it
means to be a morally responsible self. Lévinas' s thought also articulates the inherent
difficulties when one attempts to discuss ethics using the language of being. This is one
of the areas in which Levinas's account can expose difficulties in Loewald's model. Any
systematic account of what Loewald terms "primary process" (the third-person
perspective) is going to have to rely on a vocabulary that derives from the "secondary
process" (or first-person perspective). Reading Lévinas and Loewald for what they have
to say about the themes of moral agency and responsibility, bring important insights into
focus that might otherwise remain obscured.
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Chapter One: Feminism, Gender, and Caring
This chapter examines feminist conceptions of moral responsibility. There are
many different types of feminism, and they are often differentiated from each other on
the basis oftheir approach towards contemporary Western culture. For example, liberal
feminists seek to recover Enlightenment ideals and apply them with the aim of reforming
society along more egalitarian lines. Radical (Marxist and non-Marxist) feminists tend to
reject reform in favor of a complete restructuring of society, since they feel that
patriarchal norms are too deeply embedded to be removed without, killing the patient.
There are further divisions within Liberal and Radical feminisms, as well as an entire
constellation of distinct "feminisms" between these two poles.7 However, all feminisms
are concerned with praxis, i.e. with effecting real political change in order to overturn
oppressive patriarchal norms, and it is this overarching concern that unites feminists of
different stripes and allows us to speak of "feminism" as a unitary theoretical and
political project.
Given the enormous scope of feminist theory, I will begin by summarizing some
of the central concerns that have shaped feminist criticism as a whole. As these concerns
have typically been framed in terms of a critique of Western Philosophy, I will
summarize those assumptions (for instance, gendered philosophical hierarchies) that have
been the target of feminist criticism. Then I will proceed to a consideration of selective
(representative, influential) feminist conceptions of moral agency and responsibility. In
7 Feminists are also divided in relation to the various theoretical perspectives within the academy, so that
one may find modernist and postmodernist feminists; feminists who reject religion and those who embrace
it; and so forth. Each of these groups can be further sub-divided in terms of their stances on particular
issues relevant to their field, such as (among religious feminists) the status of revelation and the traditional
(almost always male) authority figures within their religion.
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particular, I will elaborate the so-called ethics of care, which has become closely linked
with feminist philosophy as a whole. As Annette Baier has argued, "'Care' is the new
buzzword," and by advancing a conception of the human that is inherently relational, the
ethics ofcare has profound implications for how we think about moral responsibility.8
Gender and Biological Sex
Perhaps the single most important idea that has come out of feminist thought is
the identification of gender as a distinct category for analysis and critique. We say
distinct because gender is not the same thing as sex. Sex refers to biology, or the
anatomical features with which one is born that (usually, but not always) identifies a
person as either female or male. Of course there are important exceptions,9 but when a
child is born that child usually has either exclusively female or exclusively male genitalia
or a chromosomal structure that identify him or her as female or male. The critique of
gender has been extended to include the physical body as well, in the sense that the body
itself is now regarded by many as a construct, at least insofar as the meaning assigned to
its functioning varies from culture to culture and in different historical periods.10
Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 19.
9 The recent case of a female South African runner who was subjected to humiliating and invasive gender
testing after winning a gold medal at an international track meet, underscores the extent to which gender
and biological sex are fuzzy concepts.
10 One thinks in this connection of Artistotle's assignation of specific purposes to the various parts of the
human body, which would eventually come to form the basis of the Catholic Church's Theory of Natural
Law. Today, this theory has few advocates outside of the Church, in part because of its conflation of the
logically distinct notions of what is the case and what ought to be the case.
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Gender is different, in the sense that one is not born with a distinct gender. Rather,
gender is a social construct." That means that gender is a product of a particular culture
in a particular location and at a particular period in history. In other words, gender refers
to what a particular society thinks about what it means to be female or male, how women
and men are expected to behave, what kinds of activities and roles are appropriate to
them, and so forth. Of course, there are feminists (such as Jane Flax) who question the
sex/gender division, and who seek to elaborate the influences of biological forces on the
formation of gender identity. Nevertheless, analyzing gender remains among the most
significant philosophical advances of the last century.12
Who gets to define gender roles? In male-dominated (Patriarchal) societies, it is
the men who have assigned the gender roles for men and women. As we shall see, in
many contemporary patriarchal societies (and I include North American societies within
this definition, even if we are moving toward more egalitarian models) women have been
re-defining gender roles for themselves. Feminist criticism has revealed the extent to
which these gender roles in patriarchal systems reflect an imbalance in power between
the sexes, as well as a truncation and (hence) distortion of what it means to be human. As
women have redefined gender roles along more egalitarians lines, many men have also
sought (and embraced) masculine gender roles that are more flexible and inclusive, and
less aggressive and domineering.
Contemporary theorizing about gender within the disciplines of Gender and Queer studies, identify a
number of distinct sex/gender categories, represented by the acronym LGBTTIQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Transgendered, Transsexual, Intersex, Queer).
This remains the case even when such analysis is overlooked or deliberately avoided in philosophy
departments throughout the world.
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Gendered Philosophical Hierarchies
In the discipline ofphilosophy, feminist critique has exposed the theoretical
biases and divisions that have traditionally been defended as natural. This is important,
because philosophy has - until very recently- claimed to be about the search for truth, for
what it means to be a human being, for the reality that underlies appearances - in short,
for (supposedly) objective knowledge. These assumptions in philosophy have also been
extremely influential in Western society and the roles that have been assigned to women
and men.
The feminist critique has revealed a number of significant dichotomies or
divisions that philosophers have, at least since Plato— defended as natural.







The first member of each of these pairs has traditionally been associated with the
male and the second with the female. The relation between the members of each
dichotomy is hierarchical: The first member of each pair was deemed superior and thus
dominant over the second. The feminist critique has exposed the misogynist bias of
Western philosophy, and feminists have shown that when western male philosophers
14
talked about the most desirable generic human traits, they were really just presenting a
composite of those traits that have historically been associated with the male.
For the purposes of this examination, it is the dichotomy between reason and
emotion (or irrationality) that is most significant. Western philosophy has traditionally
championed reason as the basis for good philosophizing. According to this perspective, it
is through the cultivation and employment of reason that one discerns the truth behind
mere appearances; determines how one ought to live; uncovers the beautiful; and
determines legitimate ways of knowing. Furthermore, it is our rational nature that
distinguishes us from non-human creatures and serves as the basis for an inherent human
dignity. In the contemporary West, there is a related liberal tradition of the morality of
rights and formal reasoning associated with John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and (more
recently) John Rawls that has come to be known as the "justice perspective." This
approach posits an autonomous moral agent who uncovers and applies a set of
fundamental rules through the use of (allegedly) universal and abstract reason.13 Male
philosophers have traditionally denied to women the reasoning capabilities ofmen, and
women were thus regarded as incapable of acting as fully functioning moral agents. For
instance, Immanuel Kant denied to women the ability to reason impartially (i.e. without
contamination from emotions) and thus concluded that they could not be moral:
Women will avoid the wicked not because it is unright, but because it is
ugly . . .Nothing of duty, nothing of compulsion, nothing of obligation! They do
something only because it pleases them, and the art consists in making only that
please which is good. I hardly believe that the fair sex is capable of [moral]
principles.14
13 Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers, eds., Women and Moral Theory (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman &
Littlefied, 1987), 3.
14 Immanuel Kant, "Of the Distinction of the Beautiful and the Sublime in the Interrelation of the Two
Sexes," in Observations on the Feeling ofthe Beautiful and the Sublime, trans. John T. Goldwaite (Berkley:
University of California Press, 2003), 81.
15
By extension, women were denied political independence and were thought to require the
protection of males who could exercise moral and political autonomy on their behalf.
Aristotle thus argues that
The element [i.e. the male] which is able, by virtue of its intelligence, to exercise
forethought, is naturally a ruling and master element; the element [i.e. the female]
which is able, by virtue of its bodily power, to do what the other element plans, is
a ruled element, which is naturally in a state of slavery...15
Reason and Autonomy
What is "autonomy" and why is it important in this line of thinking? For Immanuel Kant,
autonomy is a characteristic of the will of every adult human being:
So far as morality is based upon the conception of man as a free agent who, just
because he is free, binds himself through his reason to unconditioned laws, it
stands in need neither of the idea of another Being over him, for him to apprehend
his duty, nor an incentive other than the law itself, for him to do his duty.
For Kant, having autonomy therefore means considering principles impartially (i.e.
detached from blind adherence to tradition or authority, by unreflective impulse, and so
forth). As impartiality, autonomy is also a component of
an ideal for moral legislation, or general debate about moral principles and values.
(It is) an ideal feature of a person conceived in the role of a moral legislator, i.e., a
15 Aristotle, The Politics ofAristotle book 1 chapter 1, 1252 a 15-b 9, ed. and trans, by Ernest Baker (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1962), 3.
16 Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits ofReason Alone, trans, by Thedore M. Greene and Hoyt H.
Hudson (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), 3.
16
person reviewing various suggested moral principles and values, reflecting on
how they may conflict and how they might be reconciled, and finally deciding
which principles are most acceptable, and whether or how they should be
qualified.17 [italics in the original]
Because Kant regarded reason as universal, his model ofmoral autonomy does not posit
any contradiction between individual autonomy and social cooperation. We become
morally autonomous by following rules that we have chosen for ourselves through
reason, and everyone chooses the same rules on the basis of the same universal (non
culture-bound) reason. In this model of autonomy, we can each govern ourselves because
we are all rational beings and thus share the same underlying, potentially-benign (i.e.
purged of affect) true self.
To say that human beings are autonomous is to extend to them a right to control
certain matters for themselves. A right of individual autonomy may be described as
a right to make otherwise morally permissible decisions about matters deeply
affecting one's own life without interference by controlling threats and bribes,
manipulations, and willful distortion of relevant information.18
Because humans are capable of moral autonomy, they are morally entitled and ought to
be legally entitled to conduct their lives as they see fit. The justice perspective's doctrine
of human dignity is based on this idea ofpersonal liberty, and, more specifically, human
rights. For this reason it is sometimes called the "rights perspective." These rights serve
to protect people from external interference, but, since they may conflict with each other,
they must be qualified and given a hierarchical arrangement. In this model, morality




entails uncovering and following an ordered set of generally applicable, yet highly
differentiated rules.
Within the rights perspective, moral agents treat moral problems as analogous to
mathematical equations, and moral reflection therefore consists of impartial, rational
choosing ofprinciples and the application of these principles.19 We will revisit the so-
called "rational-choice" perspective and its implications for moral agency, later in this
paper.
Kohlberg and the stages of moral development
The psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg privileged a justice perspective when conducting
his research into moral development. Kohlberg pioneered a model for moral development
that elaborates six stages that every person (allegedly) moves through on his or her way
to moral maturity. According to the model (which may be grouped into three levels),
children initially obey authority in order to avoid punishment, but in time, they come to
recognize that the rules they are expected to follow serve to maintain a mutually-
advantageous social arrangement. The next two stages see the development of loyalty and
trust with partners, conceived initially as those people with whom one has a direct
relationship, and then the members of the larger social group. The last two stages entail
increasing levels of abstraction, in which personal relationships are subordinated to
universal principles ofjustice. Full moral maturity (the postconventional level) is
achieved via fidelity to universal, abstract principles. This final stage is consistent with
the justice perspective, and the picture of moral autonomy that follows from it is
19IWd., 141.
18
consistent with the Kantian view. Kohlberg describes this final stage (the "universal
ethical principle orientation") as follows:
Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical
principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency.
These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical
imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At
heart, these are universal principles ofjustice, of the reciprocity and equality of
human rights, and of the respect for the dignity of human beings as individual
persons, [italics in the original]
Note that the final stage of moral development in Kohlberg's model celebrates
those principles that have traditionally been associated with the male: reason, objectivity,
impartiality, and universality. By extension, the traits that have typically been associated
with the female (the particular, the 'subjective' emphasis on personal relationships) are
relegated to a lower stage of development. This gendered, hierarchical ordering of the
moral stages of development is not merely implicit in the study; rather, the moral
dilemmas that he used when studying the moral development of children (i.e. "Heinz' s
Dilemma") reveal a difference in the ways that male and female children responded to the
problems. Male children were more likely to reason in terms of increasingly abstract
principles, while female children appeared to be stuck at a (allegedly) lower stage of
moral development.21
20 Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is To Ought," in Cognitive Development and Epistemologa', ed. Theodore
Mische] (New York: Academic Press, 1971), 165.




Feminist thinkers have widely criticized Kohlberg's theory, and Carol Gilligan's
In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women 's Development has been
especially influential. Gilligan noted that, although differences could be observed in the
ways that male and female children reasoned with regard to moral problems, the
approach of the female subjects was not inferior to the male. Rather, it represented a
different— and typically feminine— mode of moral reasoning that was especially
responsive to the particular and relational aspects of moral dilemmas.22 Gilligan
elaborated this basic female moral orientation into what has come to be known as the
"care perspective," and it has been juxtaposed against the justice perspective. In her
critique of Kohlberg's hierarchical ordering of the stages of moral development, she
noted that
Women's moral weakness, manifest in an apparent diffusion and confusion of
judgment, is thus inseparable from women's moral strength, an overriding
concern with relationships and responsibilities.23
In a later article, Gilligan used an analogy from Gestalt psychology to illuminate
the relationship between the caring and justice perspectives. Just as a well-known image
can appear to be either a vase or two faces— but not both at the same time— so can a
moral dilemma be framed in terms ofjustice or in terms of care. The distinction between
these alternative moral perspectives
" The type of feminist ethics pioneered by Gilligan is often referred to as feminine ethics.
" Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women 's Development (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1982), 16-17, 26, 28, 31.
is based empirically on the observation that a shift in the focus of attention from
concerns about justice to concerns about care changes the definition of what
constitutes a moral problem, and leads the same situation to be seen in different
ways. Theoretically, the distinction between justice and care cuts across the
familiar divisions between thinking and feeling, egoism and altruism, theoretical
and practical reasoning. It calls attention to the fact that all human relationships,
public and private, can be characterized both in terms of equality and in terms of
attachment, and that both inequality and detachment constitute grounds for moral
concern.24 [italics in the original]
Perhaps the most comprehensive articulation of a care perspective is to be found
in Nel Noddings's Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education.
Noddings distinguishes between natural caring, which arises without effort on the part of
the caretaker (think of a mother's caretaking efforts on behalf ofher child) and ethical
caring, which does require an effort and is thus morally salient. The latter arises in
response to a reflection on the former. In other words, when faced with an ethical demand
that does not immediately evoke a natural caring response (for instance, when a stranger
asks us for help), Noddings argues that we ought to respond by remembering what it was
like when we ourselves were cared for (for instance, by our mothers). This reflection on
the "caring ideal" leads to a requirement to respond to the demands of the concrete other:
I commit myself either to overt action on behalf of the cared-for (I pick up my
crying infant) or I commit myself to thinking about what I might do. In the latter
case... I may or may not act overtly in behalf of the cared-for. I may abstain from
action if I believe that anything I might do would tend to work against the best
interests of the cared-for. But the test of my caring is not wholly how things turn
out; the primary test lies in an examination of what I considered, how fully I
Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers, eds., Women and Moral Theory (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman &
Littlefied, 1987), 20.
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received the other, and whether the free pursuit of his projects is partly a result of
the completion ofmy caring in him.25
The caring perspective is thus relational, in that it is with reference to our specific
relationship with a concrete other, and not to abstract principles, that the ethical course of
action is determined. The autonomous and isolated "I" is thus no longer to be regarded as
the sole (or even the primary) locus of meaning and the basis of what it is to be human.
Rather, to be human is to be cared for by and to care for others, within the context of a
nexus of (potentially reciprocal) relationships. When the other makes a demand that I am
initially inclined to ignore or reject, "the source of my obligation [to respond] is the value
I place on the relatedness of caring. This value itself arises as a product of natural caring
and being cared-for and my reflection on the goodness of these concrete caring
situations."26
The relational character of the caring perspective also guides our moral choices in
terms ofhow we ought to respond to competing demands, and which demands ought to
receive priority. Although we may (theoretically) develop a caring relation with anyone,
Noddings argues that we should arrange our caring priorities hierarchically in relation to
the potential for reciprocity and mutuality. These criteria are themselves (at least
potentially) limited by proximity. In other words, caring for the other in front of me takes
priority over caring for the other that is outside my immediate realm:
We are not obliged to summon the "I must" if there is no possibility of
completion in the other. I am not obliged to care for starving children in Africa,
NeI Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkley: University of
California Press, 1984), 299.
26 Ibid.. 301.
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because there is no way for this caring to be completed in the other unless I
abandon the caring to which I am obligated. I may still choose to do something in
the direction of caring, but I am not obliged to do so. . .27
In the caring perspective, the extent of my obligation to the other is a function of the
potential for the cared-for to respond to my caring. My obligation to the other increases in
direct proportion to the potential for reciprocity and mutuality of relation. I would
therefore have a stronger obligation toward my child, whose potential for increased
response is enormous, than toward my pet goldfish, whose potential for response is static.
Criticisms of the Caring Perspective
Arti Dhand has criticized the emphasis on proximity as a determinant of the
priority of relation from the perspective of Hindu ethics. Her critique is important
because, in drawing upon the sources of the Indian epic tradition, it exposes the
(unexamined) Western presuppositions of the caring perspective. Dhand looks to the
ideal of the Indian family, which is extended in the epic sources to include all beings,
including animals. According to this vision of the family,
all older women are recast as mothers, aunts, elder sisters. All youngers are
cherished as daughters, all peers are indulged as sisters. Similarly, all older men
are respected as being representatives of one's father; younger men are guided as
one would guide one's own sons, peers are treated as one's brothers.28
What emerges from this reading of the Indian epics is a universal ethics within a
relational framework, within a concentric vision of family. Such a social organization is
moral because it stresses self-negation,
27 Ibid., 302.
28 Arti Dhand, "The Dharma of Ethics, the Ethics of Dharma: Quizzing the Ideals of Hinduism," Journal of
Religious Ethics 30, vol. 3 (Fall 2002): 367.
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an ethic that is moreover ultimately consistent with the soteriological goals of the
Hindu tradition, which stress ego-effacement. In the reverse of what one is
conditioned to do in ordinary Western-style modern life, where one places high
importance on individualistic goals, according to the ideals of Ramayana, one
should sacrifice one's own interests for the sake of one's nuclear family. One
should sacrifice the interests of one's nuclear family for the sake of a more
extended notion of family. Finally, one should sacrifice the interests of all narrow
notions of family for the sake of broader notions of family, for dharma?9 [italics
in the original]
Dhand juxtaposes her relational dharma ethic with the ethics of care. As we have seen,
the latter posits proximity as the means for prioritizing our relationships, and Dhand sees
this as a prescription for partiality towards our most immediate family and friends. She
notes that such partiality is presented, at least according to Hindu ideals, as selfish
favoritism towards one's own. Hindu ethics denies this approach in favor of generosity
towards others.30
Daryl Koehn has criticized the caring perspective as well, albeit from a different
direction. While generally sympathetic to the relational dimension of this approach, she
wonders if the exclusive emphasis in the work of Gilligan and Noddings on the positive
dimensions of caring might lead them to defend female ethics "that reproduce the same
violence, silencing, and manipulation that they discern in the 'male' ethics of Immanuel
Kant, John Rawls, and John Stuart Mill."31 After all, it is possible for people to care too
much, so that the caring that emerges from such a relationship is smothering and
" Ibid., 367.
30 Many feminists have argued that Noddings's emphasis on proximity and reciprocity are too extreme. For
a summary of such criticisms, see James Rachels, The Elements ofMoral Philosophy (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 2010), 154. Other feminists have sought to modify or supplement Noddings's approach. For
instance, Virginia Held has sought to apply care ethics to public (rather than merely private) concerns with
the introduction of her notion of degrees of care. See Virginia Held, The Ethics ofCare: Personal,
Political, and Global (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
31 Daryl Koehn, Rethinking Feminist Ethics: Care, Trust and Empathy (London & NY: Routledge. 1998),
3.
(ultimately) destructive. One can easily imagine a parent who is over-involved in the
child's life, so that the caring takes on an oppressive quality, and the child is denied the
separation and independence required for adequate emotional growth and development to
occur.32 On this reading, the care perspective can place too much emphasis on the
perspective of the caregiver, to the detriment of the viewpoint of those who are on the
receiving end of the care:
To the extent that an ethic of care or empathy provides no incentive to self-
reflection, the caregiver may easily slip into a self-righteous anger. Care (trust,
empathy, etc.) and manipulation are not necessarily mutually exclusive. What
appears to an empathie trustor as a "betrayal" may be a healthy distancing in the
eyes of the person who is resistant to the other's care or trust.33
Koehn worries that the absence of regulative principles (a prominent feature of the justice
perspective) in these ethics means that they tacitly sanction a dangerous self-
righteousness. They also mislead, at least potentially, because we can never be fully
certain that we understand what the other is trying to convey. Rather, we inevitably filter
what we hear through our own pre-conceptions of the issue under discussion:
they [i.e. Gilligan and Noddings] make it seem as though if we are just open
enough to others we can grasp exactly what they are thinking. No such mind-meld
is possible, however. We always mediate what others are saying through some
conception we have of the issue under discussion. To the extent that these ethics
fail to address this problem ofmediation, they prove every bit as rigid and
exclusionary as traditional ethics.
Naturally there is widespread disagreement as to what constitutes adequate, as opposed to excessive or
deficient, separation and independence from parental caring.
33 Daryl Koehn, Rethinking Feminist Ethics: Care, Trust and Empathy (London & NY: Routledge, 1 998),
3.
34IbSd., 15.
The caring perspective also lacks any vision of the human good toward which we can
strive when organizing our lives. People are counseled to engage in generic practices of
caring, but these are defined solely in terms of formal operations. The form of care is
morally salient, and yet we cannot assess its moral character without some notion of the
good around which our relationships are organized. Koehn provides the example of a
doctor who refuses to heal a patient because she wants to care for her patient by writing
her patient's will. Clearly, the type of caring outlined in this example would not be
considered ethical, and yet the caring perspective does not provide us with guidelines for
making that determination.
The relational conception of the self that emerges from the caring perspective also
presents some difficulties for Koehn. The caring perspective glosses over the question of
limits (recall that the autonomous "I" of humanism is separate and distinct), because it
envisions a world in which everyone is maximally nurturing and understanding and
thereby has a chance to achieve self-fulfillment. She asks how we are to make sense of
virtues such as integrity, much less maintain a sense of it in our lives,
if the self is nothing more than the product of random trusting encounters with
others or if the self is totally constituted by prevailing social relations of
nurturance, trust, etc.? Ifwe are morally bound to empathically apprentice
ourselves to every person we encounter, how can we ever get around to achieving
our own goals and to executing our plans?36
Ibid., 15. In a footnote, Koehn points to Noddings's suggestion that we simply abandon professionalism
as symptomatic of these lacunae in the caring perspective. The professionalism of doctors and lawyers is
usefully constrained by particular goods (health and legal justice, respectively).
36IbJd.. 15.
Emotions and Relationalitv
More recent scholarship has sought to provide an account of feminist ethics that
fleshes out this notion of a relational self. The philosopher Martha Nussbaum has
challenged the hierarchical dichotomy between reason and emotion in her book,
Upheavals ofThought: The Intelligence ofEmotions (2001). She argues against the view
that emotions are akin to forces of nature completely outside of our control, which erode
and impair our capacity to reason soundly (i.e. impartially) concerning moral matters.
Rather, emotions should be regarded as morally salient because they are cognitive and
evaluative (i.e. they are directed towards and evaluative of objects), and they inform us
about the importance of such objects as elements in our own scheme of goals.37 I love
my parents because they are important to me, and my life will be very different once they
are gone. I fear for my stepson's safety when he boards an airplane to take him away for
the summer. What distinguishes these different emotions is the way in which their object
(my parents or stepson) is seen:
In fear, one sees oneself or what one loves as seriously threatened. In hope, one
sees oneself or what one loves as in some uncertainty but with a good chance for a
good outcome. In grief, one sees an important object or person as lost; in love, as
invested with a special sort ofradiance.38
These emotions inform us about the importance of their objects because they
embody (often highly complex) beliefs about them. For instance, in order to have anger I
Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001),
4. Nussbaum tries on p.] 33 to distinguish between emotions, which always have an object, and moods
(such as general depression or anxiety), which appear to lack such an object. However, she is forced to
admit that the distinction is somewhat arbitrary: "The fact that these distinctions are difficult to make in
many particular cases and that even the theoretical distinction is a somewhat imprecise one. ..should not be
seen as a problem for the account: for what would be a problem in an account of emotion would be an
excessive rigidity or definitional dogmatism."
38 Ibid.. 28.
must have a complex set of beliefs that includes some idea of significant damage that has
occurred to me or to someone close to me, and that the damage was inflicted deliberately.
Disentangling the beliefs that make up our emotions is often a difficult process that
involves time and effort. However, as our emotional responses often help to clarify how
we understand our own flourishing, scrutinizing them can be very beneficial. Nussbaum's
account therefore has a notion ofthe good— in this case, human flourishing (a translation
ofAristotle's eudemonia) — that is absent in Noddings.
Nussbaum's account also affirms the role of diverse social norms in constructing
the emotional repertory of a society. By examining the role of social construction in the
emotional life, Nussbaum shifts the emphasis from the individual agent to socio-political
orders that produce our emotional lives.39
Finally, Nussbaum's account is developmental in the sense that it takes seriously
the insights ofpsychoanalysis, which trace the foundations of adult emotional life from
early infancy (and, in some instances, even earlier). Taken together, these features of
Nussbaum's theory can be seen to value the individual in her particularity. Emotions are
not regarded as a hindrance to an otherwise fully rational and isolated self. Instead, they
are understood in the context of a given social environment and personal history.
Nussbaum does not deny that our emotional lives can conflict with our capacity for
detached, abstract rational thought. In fact, she asserts the positive value of emotions and
the helplessness that they entail:
insofar as they involve acknowledgement of neediness and lack of self-
sufficiency, emotions reveal us as vulnerable to events that we do not control;
Ibid., 6. Nussbaum's socio-political critique culminates in her capabilities approach. Please see Martha
Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
and one might hold that including a large measure of uncontrol in one's
conception of a good life compromises too deeply the dignity of one's
agency. . .1 proceed on the assumption that at least some things and persons
outside one's own control have real worth.40
Nussbaum's neo-Stoic theory challenges us to evaluate the moral salience of our
emotions, leading perhaps to a réévaluation of our understanding of our flourishing.
Where Western philosophy has traditionally viewed the emotions as inferior to (and in
competition with) reason, Nussbaum sees them as the wellspring of the uncertainty and
vulnerability that characterize every worthwhile human life. Our emotions reveal our
relational character, and the extent to which these relationships are necessary in order for
us to flourish.
The Relational Self and Narrative
Other feminist thinkers have taken up the concept of a relational self and explored
its implication, from a postmodern/poststructuralist perspective, for our notions ofmoral
agency and responsibility. For example, Hilde Lindemann Nelson argues in her Damaged
Identities, Narrative Repair that personal identity can be understood as a complicated
interaction of one's own sense of self and other's understanding of who one is. On her
view identity
functions as a lever that expands or contracts one's ability to exercise
moral agency. The way in which others identify us establishes what they
will permit us to do; if they identify us as morally defective, our freedom
to act will be restricted. How we identify ourselves establishes our own
40 Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001 ),
12.
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view of what we can do; if our self-conception marks us as morally
defective, we will mistrust our own capabilities and so treat ourselves with
suspicion or contempt, or exempt ourselves from full responsibility for our
actions. This too restricts our moral agency.41
In other words, an important component of our self-worth is connected to
recognition. In order to be held responsible, persons must be recognized as having
a certain moral status, of being eligible to participate in moral exchanges (i.e. by
providing suitable responses such as giving good reasons, admitting faults, and so
forth). When we internalize oppressive norms that deny us the status of fully
accountable moral agents, we may then feel unworthy to take responsibility for
our actions.
The connection between identity and agency poses a serious problem when the
members of a particular social group are compelled by the forces circulating in an
abusive power system to bear the morally degrading identities required by that system.
These mandatory identities set up expectations in terms of the behavior, knowledge, and
accountability (by and towards others) appropriate to group members. Here Lindemann
Nelson speaks of damaged identities, and one thinks for example of the restrictive range
of (subordinate) identities that have been available to women42 in traditional patriarchal
societies.
An individual's identity is damaged when a powerful social group views the
members of her own, less powerful group as unworthy of full moral respect, and in
consequence unjustly prevents her from occupying valuable social roles or entering into
Hilde Lindemann Nelson, DamagedIdentities, Narrative Repair (Ithaca & New York: Cornell
University Press, 2001), xi.
Restrictive identities have of course also been assigned on the basis of age, race, class, ethnicity, religion,
sexual preference, and so forth.
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desirable relationships that are themselves constitutive of identity. Lindemann Nelson
refers to this harm as deprivation of opportunity. Further, infiltrated consciousness
occurs when a person endorses, as part of her self-concept, a dominant group's
dismissive or exploitative understanding of her group, and loses or fails to acquire a sense
of herself as worthy of full moral respect.43 As we have seen, either injury to identity
may constrict a person's ability to exercise her moral agency.
Lindemann Nelson argues that it is useful to conceive of identity as consisting of
a synthesis of the stories that others tell about us, and that we tell about ourselves. The
self is therefore not single and isolated, as postulated in the justice perspective. Rather, it
is very much a product of our relationships to individual persons and groups within a
particular social context. Furthermore, if identities are understood to be narratively
constituted, and if they can be damaged through harmful narratives, then it is possible to
conceive oftheir narrative reparation. The morally pernicious stories that construct
identity according to the requirements of an abusive power system can be at least
partially dislodged and replaced by identity-constituting counterstories that portray group
members as fully valued or worthy moral agents.
Lindemann Nelson identifies two ways in which counterstories resist the evil of
diminished moral agency. First, by uprooting the harmful stories that constitute the
subgroup members' identity from the perspective of an abusive, dominant group,
counterstories aim to alter the dominant group's perception of the subgroup. The
dominant group might then be less likely to deprive subgroup members of the goods and
Hilde Lindemann Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair (Ithaca & New York: Cornell
University Press, 2001), 7. The term "infiltrated" connotes a clandestine, unwanted, and ultimately hostile
entry, as when a soldier infiltrates enemy lines with the goal of sabotaging their operations. The term
"infiltrated consciousness" also recalls Marx's notion of false consciousness.
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opportunities that are on offer in the society, and this would allow the members of the
subgroup to exercise their moral agency more freely.
Second, by uprooting the harmful identity-constituting stories that have shaped a
person's own sense of who she is, counterstories aim to alter a person's self-perception.
If she replaces the harmful stories with a counterstory, she may come to see herself as
worthy of moral respect. She might in that case be less willing to accept others'
degrading representations ofher, and this too would loosen the constraints on her moral
agency.
Counterstories may therefore be regarded as tools designed to repair the damage
inflicted on identities by abusive power systems. They are purposive acts of moral
definition, developed on one's own behalf or on the behalf of others. Note that a person
with a severely diminished sense of her own moral worth may be incapable of initiating
the construction of a counterstory on her own.44 These counterstories then set out to
resist, to varying degrees, the stories that identify certain groups ofpeople as targets for
ill treatment. Their aim is to re-identify such people as competent members of the moral
community, and in so doing, to enable their moral agency.
Lindemann Nelson provides a very precise and useful conceptual vocabulary, in
addition to some careful analysis and distinctions. However, she presents the
counterstory as a normative concept (which it is not), and fails to adequately explain what
makes a counterstory truer (or more compelling) rather than simply more idealized or
friendly. Even false renditions may enhance our agency, and Lindemann Nelson does not
address the question of identities that are damaged through genuine misconduct (i.e.,
This need for sympathetic groups (i.e., of women) is a common feature in feminist theorizing and
practice.
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through violent crime). As earned identity-damage can also be understood to restrict
agency, so it can be repaired. However, this can have problematic consequences, as
when what is evil is retold so as to make it sound good or acceptable. An alternate
method of repair might be repentance (the beginning of a new story), accompanied by
forgiveness (the acceptance that a new story has begun). The counterstory may thus
involve a new start, rather than re-adjustment of identity already earned. Furthermore,
while Lindemann Nelson touches upon the notion of unconscious forces in her discussion
of the harm of infiltrated consciousness, she fails to give an adequate account of the
operation of such forces in the construction ofnarratives designed to enhance agency.
Stated succinctly, in what ways are unconscious forces involved in this process?
Feminism and Psychoanalysis
The philosopher and psychotherapist, Jane Flax, has explored the role of
unconscious forces in the formation of gender and identity. This is an important task,
because the relationships between gender systems and knowledge, power and theory have
become increasingly controversial among feminist theorists. Feminist thought has
problematized gender and exposed the (previously unexamined) gender biases in
traditional philosophy, revealing a host of assumptions that have served to maintain male
dominance in patriarchal societies. However, the discovery of gender as a category for
analysis begs the question: in what ways does gender operate "behind the scenes" among
feminist thinkers in the formation of feminist theory? How does one account for gender if
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there is no abstracted, gender-neutral perspective from which one can gain a critical
purchase for reflection?
Flax identifies psychoanalytic and postmodern theories as useful in working out
these questions:
If both men and women are formed in and through gender systems, then the
thinking of women (or feminists) as well as that ofmen (or nonfeminists) must be
shaped in complex and sometimes unconscious ways by gender relations. How
can such stories in any sense be more true, more accurate, less distorted, or more
'objective' than others?45
The development of female identity in Western culture is typically influenced and
structured "around conflicts between and about sexuality, differences, power, autonomy,
and attachment or sociality" and these conflicts are reflected in feminist theories.46 As
these conflicts are major subjects of psychoanalytic theorizing, a psychoanalytic theory
that is sensitized to gender can contribute a great deal to the development of feminist
theory.
Given the large scope of feminist theorizing that employs psychoanalytic
concepts, we must narrow our focus to that material that is most germane to the topic of
this paper. As we have seen, responsibility is conceived by feminists such as Gilligan
and Noddings as consisting in human practices of responsiveness to particularity and
context, of being accountable to others. It is a feature of our relational character, i.e. we
are responsible to and for the others whose interests are vulnerable to our choices and
actions, and with whom we are in perpetual relation. This is an expansion of the concept
Jane Flax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, & Postmodernism in the Contemporary West
(Berkely: University of California Press, 1990), 139-40.
46Ibid., 140.
Among the feminist theorists who have employed psychoanalytic concepts are Juliet Mitchell, Dorothy
Dinnerstein, Nancy Chodorow, Helene Cixous, Jessica Benjamin and Luce Irigaray. Each of these thinkers
has been cited extensively in Flax's Thinking Fragments.
as it has been employed in traditional Western philosophy, according to which
responsibility derives from our free will as autonomous and isolated agents and is thus
focused on holding other (separate) people to account. Given the relational character of
the concept of responsibility as it is employed by feminists, we are especially interested
in post-Freudian psychoanalytic theories that privilege our earliest (pre-oedipal)
relationships and explore their role in our subsequent development.
Psychoanalysis and the pre-Oedipal period
The emphasis of the post-Freudian thinkers on the pre-oedipal period (when the
relationship of the infant— or in some cases, the fetus— and the mother is of central
import) serves to illustrate the enormous and continuing impact of the mother/mothering
on the adult psyche. By stressing the centrality of the oedipal event, Freud tended to
minimize the importance of the mother in favor ofthe father-child (especially the father-
son) relationship. Luce Irigaray has drawn on some of these Freudian and post-Freudian
insights in order to demonstrate what she believes to be the innate psychological
differences between men and women. For example, her studies of language use reveal
that adult women maintain closer ties to the pre-oedipal relationship. Unlike men, who
often deny and/or suppress the ongoing psychic importance of the feminine, women tend
to be more ambivalent towards the pre-oedipal experiential realm, which is in turn
reflected in the kinds of relationships they are liable to form. Irigaray explored and
revealed many of these differences through a linguistic analysis of the responses given to
questions concerning relationships and self-conceptions, provided by male and female
subjects. Her findings revealed that, among other things,
women appear to be more capable [than men] of listening to, discovering or
accommodating the other and the world, of remaining open to objective invention
or creation, provided that they can also say I.4$ [italics in the original]
This insight is consistent with Gilligan's view, rooted in her observations, that women
have a distinctive way (i.e. the caring perspective) of approaching moral dilemmas.
The Feminist Critique of Freud
Feminist critique ofFreud has revealed the extent to which his theories are phallocentric.
The privileging of the oedipal to the near-exclusion of the pre-oedipal, as well as the use
ofbinary oppositions (antinomies) that conceal andocentric biases (i.e. nature versus
culture, other versus self, body versus mind, primitive versus mature, patient versus
analyst) are revealed via a gendered analysis of his thought. Irigaray traced these
otherwise unexamined (and hence, "unconscious") binary oppositions to the very ways
that languages (and especially reflective languages such as her French mother tongue) are
structured. Through an analysis of basic linguistic structures, she reveals the extent to
which the masculine gender is taken for granted as the norm.49
Jane Flax argues that Freud's phallocentrism is largely unconscious, and reflects
the social context in which Freud wrote. In other words, Flax employs the very
Luce Irigaray, "The Three Genres," in The Irigaray Reader, ed. Margaret Whitford (Cambridge, Mass:
Basil Blackwell), 146.
49Ibid.. 144.
techniques and concepts of psychoanalysis to reveal the gaps and omissions in Freud's
own thought.50 Flax has noted that many of the post-Freudian thinkers resolve the
antinomies evident in Freud's thought by suppressing or denying one of the two poles.
For instance, the vicissitudes of the body and the power of sexuality is often minimized
or ignored in object-relations theory. Object-relations theorists such as Fairbairn and
Winnicott provide an account of the infant-mother dyad that is told almost exclusively
from the perspective of the infant. The mother is either good enough or not good enough,
solely in terms of the extent to which she meets the infant's developmental requirements.
In other words, she disappears as an individual in her own right, with sexual and
relational needs that are not centered on her child. In their account, the "body" pole of the
mind-body antinomy is obscured or repressed.51
While the post-Freudian thinkers provide an account of development that is useful
to feminists in its affirmation of the centrality of mothers/mothering, they fail to account
for the social context in which mothering takes place. In other words, they fail to treat
gender as a salient category for inquiry, even though its effects on development are
profound. This enormous oversight is likely due to the fact that the social arrangements in
which parenting take place are largely taken for granted by these thinkers. The power of
Freudian theory as a social critique is thereby blunted in subsequent theories that fail to
examine how phallocentric social structures come to be in the first place.
This suppression of the importance of gender in Freudian and much of post-
Freudian theory represents an enormous theoretical lacuna. For example, Winnicott
discusses the formation in early infancy of a self that is either 'true' (when the mothering
Jane Flax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, & Postmodernism in the Contemporary West
(Berkely: University of California Press, 1990), 77-78.
51 Ibid., 90.
is good enough) or 'false' (when the mothering is inadequate). Since feminist theorists
have shown that gender identities are instilled at approximately the same period, a
consideration of gender would have significant consequences for Winnicott's
developmental account.
Feminist theorists have often been guilty ofmany of the same omissions as Freud
and the post-Freudians. A deconstruction of feminist discourses in light of the effects of
gender, are often missing in these theories. The developmental models posited by
psychoanalysis, when supplemented with a consideration of the formation of gender,
serve to undermine the idea that there exists a neutral, genderless perspective from which
to launch a critique ofphallocentrism. Freud's notion of ambivalence and our attempts to
resolve the resulting anxiety via premature closure and totalizing modes ofthought is a
central component of Flax's work. Flax argues that in many instances feminist theorizing
is guilty of the same ambivalences as the patriarchal perspectives that it criticizes.
Conclusion
Feminist theory offers some important insights concerning moral responsibility. Feminist
critiques ofphilosophy call into question the model ofthe human as an autonomous and
isolated "I" that reasons abstractly without social or emotional constraints. On this
account of the human, responsibility is tied to knowledge and the free exercise of the
will, in that we are responsible for the choices that we (knowingly) make (usually after a
cost-benefit calculation of the potential consequences).
In its place is advanced a relational conception of the human, in which the person is
conceptualized within a complex web ofpre-existing and overlapping social networks.
This relational conception of the human brings into focus salient features that are
characteristic of relationships, such as the requirement for responsiveness to the needs of
the other and her vulnerability to our choices and actions. On this account, responsibility
consists in being accountable to others.
The following chapter will continue the critique of the atomistic and autonomous
"I" with reference to postmodern thought. The so-called postmodern critique entails a
methodological "pulling back" in which the frame of inquiry is broadened in order to
analyze and deconstruct the linguistic and institutional power-structures, now considered
within historically situated (and thus contingent) contexts, that give rise to allegedly
universal (i.e., foundational) truth claims. Postmodem insights into what it means to be a
responsible moral agent will be examined and read with and against feminist insights.
Chapter Two: Postmodernism and the De-centering of Reason and the
Self
The terms postmodern, postmodernity, and postmodernism are highly
problematic. Many so-called "postmodern" artists, writers and theorists have refused the
label, and the terms have been used for so many different purposes that it can be difficult
to arrive at satisfactory definitions. Nevertheless, I believe it possible to trace the
historical developments of this trend; to identify some of the key figures associated with
the movement; and to isolate and examine the salient ideas and themes that have come to
be associated with postmodernism. Once this is done, we will be able to assess what
postmodernism can contribute to our understandings of moral agency and responsibility.
At its most basic level, postmodernism refers to a set of artistic and literary
practices that first emerged after the Second World War in the 1950s, grew in strength
during the 1960s, and dominated many artistic disciplines throughout the 1970s and early
1980s. In the realm of the arts, postmodernism initially referred to a radicalizing of the
self-reflexive tendencies in modernism, along with a return in some cases to (political,
ironic, self-reflexive) representational practices that had been rejected by an anti-
representational modernism.52
On a theoretical level, postmodernism refers to a set of philosophical propositions
that critique realist epistemology and the Enlightenment project founded upon it. Among
the most salient propositions are the rejections "of the Cartesian autonomous, and self-
Hans Bertens and Joseph Natoli, eds., Postmodernism: The Key Figures (Maiden, Mass: Blackwell
Publishers, 2002), xii. Andreas Huyssen in After the Great Divide:Modernism, Mass Culture,
Postmodernism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986), 1 84, identifies Irving
Howe and Harry Levin as among the first postmodern literary critics of the 1950s.
identical subject, of the transparency of language, of the accessibility of the real, [and] of
the possibility of universal foundation."53 Instead, postmodernism emphasizes the
primacy of the other, desire, contingency, change, difference, and the absence of a non-
contingent self and (ultimately) of objective meaning itself.
This theoretical postmodernism borrowed heavily from the French
poststructuralism of (initially) Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida, and later from the
writings of Jacques Lacan, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze, and, especially,
Michel Foucault. In its later stages, the movement began to share Foucault' s concern with
the relationship between knowledge and power and to accept his argument that the two
are inextricably linked. Foucault is perhaps most responsible for the focus in theoretical
postmodernism with the "other," and it is this focus that makes postmodern theory
difficult to distinguish from the post-colonial thought of such theorists as Homi Bhabha
and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.54
A number ofpostmodern critics have sought to elaborate a "postmodern
condition" that (in their view) characterizes life in the late-twentieth/early twenty-first
century Western world. For instance, Jean-Francois Lyotard identifies the failure of the
so-called grand-narratives that legitimized modernity. Frederick Jameson equates
postmodernism with the global victory of capitalism and the collapse of the Marxist
distinction between the mode of production and culture. Elaborating the Marxist notion
of alienation, Jean Baudrillard argues that postmodernity is characterized by a pervasive




sense of inauthenticity, while the social scientist Ronald Inglehart identifies a shift from
materialist to so-called "postmaterialist" values.55
These separate accounts of the postmodern began to be clustered together from
the middle of the 1980s onward and what gradually came to seem important was a
vigorous syncretism in thinking of the postmodern. Starting in the 1990s "the concept of
the 'postmodern' was ceasing to be used principally in the analysis ofparticular objects
or cultural areas and had become a general horizon or hypothesis."56 By the middle of the
1990s "postmodernism" became the name for the activity of writing about
postmodernism, and thus passed from the stage of accumulation into a more autonomous
phase.57
Jane Flax has identified a number of major themes within postmodernism, and her
list is helpful. These themes include the following: the nature of contemporary Western
culture; the construction of knowledge and its relations to power; the critique of
philosophy and totalizing thought; the identification and dismantling of forms of
domination; subjectivity and the self; and the valorization of difference and the other.58
Flax regards postmodernism, and in particular the theoretical variant that is directed
against traditional philosophy and the Enlightenment project, as
a valuable form of discipline philosophers impose on themselves. . .In the realm of
knowledge, postmodernism represents philosophic attempts to come to grips with
the displacement of philosophy from any privileged relation to truth and
knowledge.59
"lbid.,xiii.
Steve Connor, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), 2.
57 Ibid., 4.
Jane Flax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, & Postmodernism in the Contemporary West
(Berkley: University of California Press), 188.
59Ibid., 189-190.
This form of discipline is crucial, because, from a postmodern perspective, the history of
the West and the philosophy that underpinned it has been one of domination, in which
difference has been reduced to the same or violently eradicated altogether. The
philosophic enterprise has, at least since the time of the ancient Greeks, been
characterized by the search for a singular truth that is knowable through reason and
underlies and explains the apparent diversity ofphenomena. Anything that failed to
conform to this singular truth was relegated to the realm of the irrational. Postmodern
critiques have sought to reveal how, through its various permutations, philosophy has led
to totalizing modes of thought that have— sometimes indirectly— facilitated the most
violent forms of oppression.
The displacement of philosophy by the sciences in the last century from its
previous place of privilege has led both modern and, later, postmodern theorists to adopt
a number of strategies. Among them is the equation of thought and language, in which
the world is textualized. Language is no longer regarded as transparent. Rather, thoughts
must be transcribed into writing or texts that are then disseminated within the world, and
there is no world outside texts. In other words, there is no access to a single "truth" that is
unmediated by language. As theoreticians of writing or texts, philosophers could thereby
reclaim their place, and by demonstrating the indeterminacy of textual interpretations,
postmodern theorists could displace any given (and, especially, dominant) truth claim as
but one among many. An important feature of this strategy is the identification and
privileging of marginal and subjugated voices— of the so-called "other"— within the
dominant narratives.60
Ibid., 191.
Various postmodern critiques are related. However, for the purposes of this paper,
the critique of philosophy, the relationship between language and power, and the critique
of the self; are especially germane. I will summarize these various critiques and examine
their relevance to how we think about moral responsibility.
Critique of foundational claims
Theoretical postmodernism has called into question the foundational claims of
western thought and has sought to unmask its philosophical corollary, humanism, as a
form of covert oppression. Realist epistemology is undermined, and philosophy is
relieved ofthe task of providing knowledge of the true. There is a radical de-centering of
the human subject as the locus ofknowledge and agency. Narrative logic is turned on its
head and thereby deprived of its power as an organizing principle. Even the notion of a
so-called real world is called into question. The "real"
is permanently encased in quotation marks, and even such an (apparently)
uncomplicated matter as sexual difference is rendered illegitimate and misleading,
while newer, more difficult ways of theorizing gender are opened up.61
These moves have been undertaken by postmodern theorists in order to
undermine the possibility of so-called totalizing thought, of teleology, and of any kind of
final closure. In other words, they are directed against the entire western philosophic
tradition. For example, Rene Descartes's radical skepticism is most commonly associated
with the foundationalist claim that a correct beginning could be established for
philosophy, while G.W.F. Hegel's dialectical approach sought to organize the entirety of
61 Paul Sheehan, "Postmodernism and Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism, ed.
Steve Connor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 21.
western thought within an all-encompassing and purposive whole that had (supposedly)
reached its final expression in his philosophy. In undermining these claims, theoretical
postmodernism seeks to uncover the gaps, inconsistencies, and shortcomings of the
modernist project in order to bring it to a close along with its (allegedly) oppressive
legacy.
The linguistic turn and the end of metaphysics
Another important theme in theoretical postmodernism is the critique of the idea
that philosophical thinking can be conveyed in the language of proposition and logical
argument. In negating this key aspect of the philosophical tradition, the method of
metaphysical speculation and argument elaborated by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of
Pure Reason is resisted, thereby undermining the traditional basis for such foundational
philosophic (and metaphysical) claims as the transcendental character ofman and his or
her (alleged) separation from nature.
This rejection ofmetaphysics was set in motion by the so-called linguistic turn in
philosophy, the origins of which can be traced to the philosophies of Ludwig
Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger. The former introduced a new thinking and
terminology ("language games," "family resemblance," "forms of life," "the private
language argument") whereas the latter urged a return to creativity and the language of
(especially German) poetry as an antidote for the modem malaise.
In Wittgenstein's analytic tradition, this linguistic turn represented a shift in
focus from ideas to words and from an idealist perspective to a language-centered
62Ibid., 23.
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philosophy. If Descartes, with his famous dictum cogito ergo sum initiated a move
towards the contents of the mind, then Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations
reversed this trend. In the analytical tradition, the linguistic tum contended that the limits
of philosophy, and ofwhat is understood to be "reality," could manifest themselves only
within language. It was a turn from ideas to words, from an idealist philosophical focus to
a language-centered one— a reversal, in short, of what Descartes had inaugurated with
his inward turn towards ideas and the contents of the mind.63 Instead of concentrating on
the kinds of human practices that made language possible in the first place, Wittgenstein
came to see it [language] as a purely human product and attempted to define the
limits thereof. The focus was thus on the social perspective of linguistic analysis,
and the ways in which everyday communication takes place.64
The theoretical postmodernism that emerged from the continental tradition
presents a different perspective. It stresses the connotative aspect of language and argues
that it is incapable of representing the world with any degree of accuracy, and certainly
not in the (allegedly) transparent manner assumed by much modernist thought. As words
rely on other words for their meaning, and not on some extra-linguistic foundation,
human identity is a construct of language. Martin Heidegger denied human beings the
instrumental command of language upon which humanism relies when he wrote that
See, for instance, Lyotard's reading of Wittgenstein's notion of "language games:" "What he
[Wittgenstein] means by this term is that each of the various categories of utterance can be defined in terms
of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which they can be put- in exactly the same way as the
game of chess is defined by a set of rules determining the properties of each of the pieces, in other words,
the proper way to move them. ..every utterance should [therefore] be thought of as a 'mover in a game."
Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1984), 10.
Paul Sheehan, "Postmodernism and Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism, ed.
Steve Connor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 23.
46
"man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language
remains the master ofman."65 [italics in the original]
Both Wittgenstein and Heidegger (along with John Dewey) have influenced the
philosopher Richard Rorty. Rorty is interested primarily in epistemology and the history
of philosophy and his neo-pragmatic approach rejects the claim of a privileged insight
into the foundations of knowledge assumed by western philosophy since Kant. In place of
epistemology, Rorty recommends that philosophers engage in an open-ended
conversation that continuously seeks improvement, what he terms "edification."
Edification refers to a project "of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful
ways of speaking... edifying discourse is supposedio be abnormal, to take us out of our
old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings."66 [italics in
the original]
Michel Foucault and the death of the subject
The post-modem critique entails a radical de-centering of the first-person account
of the self upon which the autonomous moral agent ofphilosophy is grounded. In the
western tradition, the transcendental subject was the primary locus of meaning, and the
strict separation of the human and the animal could be asserted on the basis of the
formers supposed "metaphysical" nature. According to theoretical postmodernism, there
65 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1978), 348. Cited in Paul
Sheehan, "Postmodernism and Philosophy/' in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism, ed. Steve
Connor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 23.
6 Cited in Paul Sheehan, "Postmodernism and Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to
Postmodernism, ed. Steve Connor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 24.
is no self as such, and what is mistaken as a self is nothing more than an effect or by-
product of the prevailing linguistic and power-structures in a given social and historical
context. On this reading, (traditional) ethics and moral responsibility are illusory. The
best that one can do is to resist complicity with the oppressive power structures and
gesture towards some (as yet) inarticulate future.
Michel Foucault is responsible for the most influential and sustained critique of
the modernist notion of an essential subject or self. Since his death in 1984, a widespread
critical consensus has arisen regarding the historical development and thematic trajectory
of his thought. Beatrice Han's division ofhis work into an early "archaeological" period;
a middle "genealogical" period; and a late "history of subjectivity;" is representative of
this consensus.67 This essay will seek to elaborate both Foucault's critique of the
autonomous, humanistic self, and his advancement of what I will referto as his "ethics of
resistance." Foucault's critiques of phenomenology and psychoanalysis will also be
examined, in order that his thought may be brought into a dialogue, in the concluding
chapter of this project, with Emmanuel Lévinas and Hans Loewald.68
Beatrice Han, Foucault's Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical, trans. Edward
Pile (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), xiii. The early period includes The Birth ofthe Clinic
(1963), The Order ofThings (1966), and The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969). The middle period
includes The Order ofDiscourse (1970), Discipline and Punish (1975), and Volume I of The History of
Sexuality (1976). The late period includes The Use ofPleasure, Volume II of The History ofSexuality
(1984) and The Care ofthe Self Volume IH of The History ofSexuality (1984).
While Han's division of Foucault's work into separate periods is valuable from a heuristic point of view,
Foucault himself had a tendency to recast, in his later years, his earlier so-called "archaeological" and
"genealogical" work in light of his concern with ethics and the formation of subjectivity. One concern that
remains consistent throughout all three of these periods is the critical aim of unmasking the contingency of
that which is allegedly universal: "in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is
occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point, in brief, is
to transform the critique conducted in this form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes
the form of a possible transgression." Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?", in The Foucault Reader,
ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 45.
Foucault and Phenomenology
Foucault' s profound opposition to the phenomenology of the 1950s that was (along with
Marxist thought) the principal theoretical approach in the French Academy is a consistent
theme throughout his work. In recalling the phenomenology of the 1950s, Foucault noted
that it was "academic and university-oriented. You had privileged objects of
phenomenological description, lived experiences or the perception of a tree through an
office window."6 In other words, he consistently thematized and mocked
phenomenology as "a kind of bankrupt, bourgeois subjectivism, the last gasp of 'depth'
hermeneutics on the nineteenth-century transcendental ist model."70 Although Foucault's
work went through various methodological changes, he was consistent in always defining
himself against phenomenology.71 What is the theoretical basis of Foucault's rejection of
phenomenology? At the heart of this rejection is the founding role played by subjectivity.
The phenomenological approach seeks to understand human experience within its
own parameters, thereby rejecting those (prior) approaches that sought to reduce that
experience via explanatory categories. Only by taking the experience of the subject as a
serious focus of inquiry— by describing, rather than explaining it— are we able to avoid
the trap "of objectifying the subject into misleading or oppressive explanatory
categories."72 However, this phenomenological emphasis on description privileges the
category of the experiencing subject, and it is precisely the authority of the subject that
69 Michel Foucault, "What Our Present Is,'' in The Politics ofTruth, ed. Sylvere Lotringer (New York:
Semiotext(e). 1 997), 149. Cited in Jeffrey T. Nealon, Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and its
Intensifications since 1984 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 82.
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Stanford University Press, 2008), 82.
Todd May, "Foucault's Relation to Phenomenology," in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, ed.
Gary Gutting, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 285.
72 Ibid., 302.
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Foucault (following Nietzsche) rejects.73 Foucault thus subjects this subjective
experience to historical critique, thereby placing it in perspective and unmasking its
contingent character. In other words, instead of undertaking an internal,
phenomenological reflection on the constitution of experience, he "subjects the categories
of knowledge of experience to historical (archaeological, genealogical) analysis."74
The object of Foucault' s methodology is no longer the experience of the
experiencing subject, but rather the categories within which that experience is constructed
and articulated. There is a methodological stepping back from, or placing in perspective
of, the content of subjective phenomenological experience, thereby taking as its own
content that which phenomenology already takes for granted (i.e. the experiencing
subject). If subjective experience is the object that is described via phenomenology, then
Foucault takes as his object phenomenology (and other human sciences) and subjects it to
his historical method.75
In order to understand who we are, we are thus no longer required to grasp the
ontological nature of the human. Rather, we must understand how, historically, "we came
to embrace one set of ontological categories [rather than alternative formulations] as
answering the question of who we are."76 Foucault expressed the goal of his historical
approach in a late interview (conducted two years before his death), in which he noted
that
it is one ofmy targets to show people that a lot of things that are a part of their






historical changes. All my analyses are against the idea of universal necessities in
human existence.77
Foucault and Psychoanalysis
Foucault' s career-long preoccupation (obsession?) with Sigmund Freud and
psychoanalysis was noted by Jacques Derrida in his critical essay, "To Do Justice to
Freud: The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis."78 One possible
explanation for this struggle was rivalry, because both thinkers examined much of the
same theoretical terrain: "the normal and the pathological, rationality and irrationality,
the modern subject, the human sciences, sexuality and techniques of self-
transformation."79 Joel Whitebook has speculated that Foucault's rivalry with Freud and
his rejection of psychoanalysis derives from his profound discomfort with the type of
prolonged introspective exploration that is required by psychoanalysis.80 Indeed,
Foucault's historical examinations of subjectivity sought to demonstrate that the psyche
itself, along with our experiences of interiority, were themselves contingent historical
constructs. In this vein, Patrick H. Hutton has noted that Foucault's work is "heavy with
Freud's unstated presence," and that their respective methods of approaching the mind
are diametrically opposed:
Michel Foucault, "Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault," in Technologies ofthe Self,
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Whereas Freud provides a method for investigating the internal workings of the
psyche, Foucault seeks to show how the method itself is an ancient technique of
self-fashioning that has over the centuries shaped the mind externally. Our
conception of the psyche., .has been sculpted by the techniques that we have
devised to probe its secrets, to oblige it to give up hidden knowledge that will
reveal to us the truth ofwho we are.81
If Freud believed himself to be an archaeologist of the (repressed) psyche, in a manner
analogous to the physical excavations of Troy and Mycenae that were undertaken by
Heinrich Schliemann (one of Freud's inspirations), then according to Foucault he was
rather a highly skilled (and yet unwitting) architect of the psyche.
Le Regard and the Care of the Self
What is the basis of Foucault' s objection to the inwardly directed gaze of
psychoanalysis? In his examination of Classical and (especially) Hellenistic and Roman
philosophy, Foucault identified the notion of epimeleia heautou (translated as "care of
oneself or "care of the self) and sought to differentiate it from the more philosophically
ubiquitous gnothi seauton, or "know thyself."82 The former was not concerned with
discovering one's limits or in discovering that which was true or real within the self.
Rather, it consisted in an attitude toward the self as well as toward others and toward the
world; it entailed turning one's attention away from the outside and directing it inwardly
(and in particular toward what we think and what takes place in our thought); and it
81 Patrick H. Hutton, "Foucault, Freud, and the Technologies of the Self." in Technologies ofthe Self, eds.
Luther Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick Hutton (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 121.
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designated a variety of actions "exercised on the self by the self, actions by which one
takes responsibility for oneself and by which one changes, purifies, transforms, and
transfigures oneself." This turning ofone's attention away from the outside and towards
a form of self-monitoring represents, for Foucault, a benign form of the inwardly directed
gaze. One directs the gaze inward in order to care for the self in the service ofa larger
teleological aim, such as being able to conduct oneself properly in order to govern the
city-state (as in the case ofAlcibiades being instructed by Socrates) and in order to be
concerned with justice.84 The gaze that is directed inwardly in the service of the care of
the self thus has an ethical dimension as well, because it has implications for how we
relate to others. While this is a necessarily simplified treatment of Foucault's examination
of epimeleia heautou (which he traces in detail from Plato through the various Hellenistic
and Roman philosophical schools), it is important to emphasize that the self-monitoring
associated with this practice is self-directed (it is not imposed from without) and it does
not seek to uncover the "true" or "real" self, but rather seeks to keep one on the right
track (however this is defined).
In order to understand Foucault's objections to the inwardly directed gaze of the
human sciences (including psychoanalysis), we must briefly consider his examination of
why this ancient practice of self-care has disappeared today, and what has taken its place.
Foucault identifies four main factors that have transformed the culture of the self away
from the ancient model of self-care. All of these factors have a strong authoritarian
dimension in that they are now imposed on us from without, instead of being self-




confessional practices) in the Roman world, which introduced what Foucault calls "the
ethical paradox of Christian asceticism," in which the monitoring of the self gave way to
a renouncing or sacrificing of the self. Second, the older techniques of self-care85 have
been integrated into psychological/medical authoritarian structures (and into the mass
media) and are imposed upon us by others. Third, the human sciences and the
relationship to the self are now defined in terms of knowledge, which means in turn that
they are inextricably linked with power. Fourth, and in light of the previous three factors,
we now think that we have to "disclose, to excavate, to liberate the hidden reality of the
self, but [the] self is not a reality that can be hidden." Instead, Foucault argues that the
self is a "correlate of technologies built and developed through our history," and we
should thus "consider how it could be possible to elaborate new types of relationships to
ourselves."86
The Psychoanalytic Gaze
If for Freud the analysis of the psyche was the source of uncovering hidden
meanings about our true natures, for Foucault the psyche is a mirror rather than an
archive. In other words, to search the psyche for truth about our natures would be futile,
For a discussion of these techniques, see Foucault's examination of the ancient Greek notion of
therapeuein, from which is derived the (more restrictive) modern notion of therapy. In Michel Foucault,
The Hermeneutics ofthe Subject: Lectures at the College de France 1981-1982, ed. Frederic Gros, trans.
Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2005), 98-99. A more comprehensive examination of the practical
applications of Hellenistic and Roman philosophy can to be found in Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of
Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1994). When Foucault first lectured on these sources, there were very few systematic treatments available.
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because it can only reflect the images that we have constructed to describe ourselves.
These images that we have constructed, which include our received notions of interiority
and moral agency or conscience (in psychoanalytic terms, the Ego, Id, and Superego) are
for Foucault part and parcel of the overarching linguistic and societal power structures
with which we police (and thereby limit) ourselves. In other words, they are forces of
oppression that must be resisted, and the psychoanalytic technique is itself a vehicle for
the construction and transmission of these forces.87
Foucault therefore objects to the inwardly directed gaze ofpsychoanalysis
because he regards self-observation itself, when undertaken in search of a hidden or
"true" self, as inherently violent. In this sense self-observation is a corollary to the
oppressive, institutionalized (i.e. psychiatric) gaze directed at one from without, and so
there is no possibility in psychoanalysis of a form of benign self-exploration (i.e. of a
non-objectionable division between an observing and an observed part of the self). In
psychoanalytic terms, Foucault makes no distinction between an observing ego and "the
continuous scrutiny of a sadistic superego."88
In connection with this critique, Christopher Norris has noted that at the heart of
Foucault's critical project is a protest against the very idea of conscience. In other words,
Foucault rejects the notion of an internal psychical moral agency (i.e. the Superego) that
is created via the internalization of external authority, and through which the subject
gains her autonomy.89 We will see that the most pervasive critique of Foucault's thought
For a discussion of Foucault's notion of the psyche, see Patrick H. Hutton, "Foucault, Freud, and the
Technologies of the Self," in Technologies ofthe Self, eds. Luther Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick
Hutton (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 121-144.
88 Joel Whitebook, "Foucault's Struggle with Psychoanalysis," in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault,
ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 320.
89 Christopher Norris, "'What is Enlightenment?': Foucault on Kant," in The Truth About Postmodernism
(Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993), 67. Cited by Joel Whitebook, "Foucault's Struggle with
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results from his inability (or perhaps, unwillingness) to advance an alternative
conceptualization of moral agency.
Foucault' s opposition to psychiatry is well documented in his work, and
particularly in Madness and Civilization. He characterizes the psychiatrist as a psychic
stand-in for the bourgeois father-doctor, and the true goal ofpsychiatric treatment as the
adjustment of the patient to the demands and norms ofbourgeois society.90 The
psychiatrist is therefore an agent of oppression, in the sense that the norms of health and
sanity that are brought to bear on the patient are themselves contingent constructs that
serve (among other things) to circumscribe the range ofpermissible human experiences
and to perpetuate the asymmetrical power relation between psychiatrist and patient. The
asylum (along with the psychiatric profession that created and manages it) therefore
reduces differences, represses vice, eliminates irregularities. It denounces
everything that opposes the essential virtues of society . . . [it] sets itself the task of
the homogenous rule of morality, its rigorous extension to all those who tend to
escape from it.91
Sometimes Freud is identified by Foucault as a central figure in opposing the
aforementioned oppressive efforts of the medical-psychiatric establishment (for instance,
Freud is praised for reintroducing the dialogue between reason and unreason), and at
others he is situated squarely among the oppressors. If the psychoanalytic situation
abandons the physical asylum in favor of the doctor-patient couple, according to Foucault
this relationship has merely internalized what was previously an external confinement:
Psychoanalysis," in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 343 (footnote 47).
"The physician could exercise his absolute authority in the world of the asylum only insofar as, from the
beginning, he was Father and Judge, Family and Law- his medical practice for a long time no more than a
complement to the old rites of Order, Authority, and Punishment." Michel Foucault, Madness and
Civilization: A History ofMadness in the Age ofReason, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Vintage
Books, 1965), 272.
1 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History ofMadness in the Age ofReason, trans. Richard
Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 258.
Freud demystified all the other asylum structures. . .but on the other hand, he
exploited the structure that enveloped the medical personage; he amplified its
thaumaturgical virtues, preparing for its omnipotence a quasi-divine status. He
focused upon this single presence- concealed behind the patient and above him-
all the powers that had been distributed in the collective existence of the
asylum. . .to the doctor, Freud transferred all the structures Pinel and Tuke had
set up within confinement.92 [italics mine]
Foucault's treatment of Freud in The History ofSexuality Volume 1: An Introduction is
also ambiguous. Freud is explicitly mentioned only a handful of times, and Foucault
occasionally praises him for his genius and distinguishes psychoanalysis from
psychiatry.93 However, it is where Freud is not mentioned by name that psychoanalysis is
situated squarely among the other human sciences and subjected to the most scathing
critique. This critique occurs in part three of the text in the context of Foucault's
discussion of scientia sexualis. Foucault identifies scientia sexualis and ars erotica as the
two opposing procedures that have been used, historically, "for producing the truth about
sex," and his preference for the latter is clear from the language he employs to describe it:
truth is drawn from pleasure itself, understood as a practice and accumulated as
experience; pleasure is not considered in relation to an absolute law of the
permitted and the forbidden, nor by reference to a criterion of utility; but first and
foremost in relation to itself; it is experienced as pleasure, evaluated in terms of
its intensity, its specific quality, its duration, its reverberations in the body and the
soul.94
vz Ibid., 277-8.
"It is very well to look back from our vantage point and remark upon the normalizing impulse in Freud;
one can go on to denounce the role played for many years by the psychoanalytic institution; but the fact
remains that in the great family of technologies of sex, which goes so far back into the history of the
Christian West, of all those institutions that set out in the nineteenth century to medicalize sex, it was the
one that, up to that decade of the forties, rigorously opposed the political and institutional effects of the
perversion-heredity-degenerescence system." Michel Foucault, The History ofSexuality Volume 1: An
Introduction, New York: Vintage Books, 1980, p. 119.
94 Michel Foucault, The History ofSexuality Volume 1: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books. 1 980),
57.
While the ars erotica involve a relationship to a master who holds its secrets, this
relationship is not oppressive (although the master may be severe) and the teachings "are
said to transfigure the one fortunate to receive its privileges: an absolute mastery of the
body, a singular bliss, obliviousness to time and its limits, the elixir of life, the exile of
death and its threats."95
Ifthe ars erotica consist in a life-affirming celebration ofpleasure, then scientia
sexualis are of a different order altogether. Foucault traces the origins of scientia sexualis
to the codification of the sacrament ofpenance by the Lateran Council in 1215 "with the
resulting development of confessional techniques. . . [and] the setting up of tribunals of
Inquisition," all of which served "to give the confession a central role in the order of civil
and religious powers."96 Foucault identifies the confession as among the most highly
valued techniques for producing truth in the West, and notes that it plays a role in many
different facets of our lives.97 The confession is also tied to coercion and torture:
One confesses— or is forced to confess. When it is not spontaneous or dictated by
some internal imperative, the confession is wrung from a person by violence or
threat; it is driven from its hiding place in the soul, or extracted from the body.
Since the Middle Ages, torture has accompanied it like a shadow, and supported it





It plays a part injustice, medicine, education, family relationships, and love relations, in the most
ordinary affairs of everyday life, and in the most solemn rites..." Michel Foucault, The History ofSexuality
Volume 1: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1980). 59.
98IbJd.. 59.
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The confession is not only tied to violence, but it is also linked to a search for that which
is hidden and trae in the self, a secret nature that must surface by overcoming the
constraints that hold it in place. For Foucault, the production of truth via confessional
techniques is inextricably tied to relations ofpower, and is thus inherently oppressive."
Although the confession remains a "general standard" today in the production of
truth discourse, it has undergone significant historical transformations since its initial
association with penance. It is now employed in many different types of relationships,
including "children and parents, students and educators, patients and psychiatrists,
delinquents and experts" and its motivations and techniques are now varied.100 How is the
confession related to psychoanalysis? Without mentioning Freud by name, Foucault
charts the ways in which the confession was made to function within the "norms of
scientific regularity," and it will become clear that he has Freud and psychoanalysis
firmly in mind.
According to Foucault, the confession came to be constituted in scientific terms
through a series of five interconnected steps, which included combining confession with
examination, "the personal history with the deployment of a set ofdecipherable signs and
symptoms; the interrogation, the exacting questionnaire, and hypnosis, with the
recollection of memories and free association;" by positing a causal relationship between
our earliest experiences and our adult life, so that "the most discrete event in one's sexual
"The confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement;
it is also a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship, for one does not confess without the presence (or
virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who requires the
confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console and
reconcile; a ritual in which the truth is corroborated by the obstacles and resistances it has had to surmount
in order to be formulated; and finally, a ritual in which the expression alone, independently of its external
consequences, produces intrinsic modifications in the person who articulates it..." Michel Foucault, The
History ofSexuality Volume 1: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), 61-62.
'00IbJd., 63.
behavior— whether an accident or a deviation, a deficit or an excess— was deemed
capable of entailing the most varied consequences throughout one's existence;" by
introducing a principle of latency intrinsic to sexuality, in which what was to be
confessed was hidden from the confessor, "being incapable of coming to light except
gradually and through the labor of a confession in which the questioner and the
questioned each had a part to play;" through the introduction of interpretative methods
designed to decode an obscure truth that had to be interpreted and verified by the one
who heard it in order to be scientifically validated; and via the "medicalization of the
effects of confession" in which the sexual domain was placed "under the rule of the
normal and the pathological" instead of under the notions of sin etc.101 The five steps that
Foucault identifies all involve theoretical strategies and techniques that are common to
psychoanalysis, and some involve practices (i.e. free association) that were pioneered by
Freud himself. Foucault' s hostility towards psychoanalysis is therefore clear, even if
Freud is not directly mentioned by name in connection with scientia sexualis. The
inwardly-directed gaze ofpsychoanalysis thus shares for Foucault many of the same
oppressive and violent features of the ancient confessional practices of the Church, from
which it supposedly originates.
This linkage seems excessive. Freud's hostility toward religion was well
documented, and he was genuinely concerned with helping his patients, many of whom
suffered terribly and were unresponsive to the other (far more invasive, i.e. surgical)
medical techniques of his day. To liken Freud to an inquisitor, even indirectly, is to
mischaracterize the nature of the "talking cure." Nor is it clear that all of Foucault's
criticisms ofpsychiatric diagnostics are applicable to psychoanalysis. Analysts (at least
101 Ibid., 65-67.
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within classical Freudian psychoanalysis) are concerned primarily with whether or not a
given patient is analyzable—- in other words, whether or not she can meet the difficult
challenges that characterize the transference experience— rather than with the question
of diagnosis.
Is a prospective patient capable of meeting the arduous and knotty demands that
characterize the transference experience? Can he or she be an interlocutor in the
analytic dialogue with unreason- working to understand archaic mentation and
affective states and putting them into words?102
Foucault' s criticisms of psychoanalysis do have some merit, particularly as they
apply to the power relation within which analysis takes place. Starting with Freud, who
argued that the positive transference to the father-doctor ought to remain unanalyzed,
some analysts have resisted examining their own positions in the analytic context. Freud
also believed that analysts could rid themselves of contamination by the
countertransference (in other words, of their own wishes, conflicts, and pathology), in
order that they could serve "as blank screens and neutrally observe their patients'
transferences as they unfold." 103 However, these ideas have been largely abandoned in
psychoanalysis as it is practiced today, and analysts recognize that the acknowledgement
and examination of the countertransference does not undermine their authority or disrupt
the asymmetry of the analyst-patient dynamic. There remains, of course, widespread
disagreement within the field about what these concepts mean.104
102 Joel Whitebook, "Foucaulfs Struggle with Psychoanalysis." in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault,
ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 327.
103 Ibid., 330.
104 Ibid., 331. Stephen Mitchell provides instructive examples of countertransference analysis in his Can
Love Last? The Fate ofRomance Over Time (New York: W.W. Norton Company, 2002).
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Foucault and Subjectivity
Through his so-called archaeological and genealogical examinations, Foucault has
sought to demonstrate the historical origin and contingency of our received essentialist
notions regarding "human nature," and he located the constitution of the western subject
and our experiences of subjectivity within confessional practices (i.e. the rise of
Christianity in the Roman world) and disciplinary practices associated with the various
human sciences that emerged over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
(and later with psychiatry and psychoanalysis).105 As a result of this placing-in-
perspective of our (previously unexamined) understandings of personal autonomy and
freedom, Foucault argues that what we have to come to regard as a self is, in fact, a
fiction. In other words, there is no "I" as such, in the sense of a naturally occurring and
self-contained entity that serves as the locus of agency and freedom. Rather, our sense of
self is merely the product or effect of power:
The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive
atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against
which it happens to strike...The individual is an effect of power, or precisely to
the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation. The
individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle.106
Michel Foucault, The Culture ofthe Self. Introduction and Program, part 1, April 12 1983: Berkeley
Language Center- Speech Archive SA 1456 (audio recording).
1 Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Critique and Power, edited by Michael Kelly (Cambridge,
Massachusetts, and London: The MIT Press, 1994), 36.
If individuals are merely the effects of power, then the proper line of inquiry concerns
how that power came to be and why it was exercised in one way, rather than in another.
In other words, its contingent character must be unmasked and charted:
The critical question today has to be turned into a positive one: in what is given to
us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is
singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?...that criticism is no
longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal
value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to
constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing,
thinking, saying.107
The discourses that emerge from these practices, which are presented as "truths"
that reflect "facts of human nature," tell us what it means to be human: "They 'normalize'
the 'individual' who is constituted and named by these discourses. The individual that
power has constituted becomes the vehicle ofthat power."108 Foucault thus argued for the
inherent (though obscured) relationship between knowledge and power. Like Rorty, he
stresses the historical and contingent dimension of knowledge, which is always generated
by pragmatic questions oriented to action. However, whereas Rorty's edifying
conversation is conceptualized as occurring among mostly equal and homogeneous
participants, Foucault understands Western culture as a continuing struggle between
disparate elements that are mutually irreducible:
You are well aware that this research activity, which one can thus call
genealogical,109 has nothing at all to do with an opposition between the abstract
Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 45-46.
Jane Flax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, & Postmodernism in the Contemporary
West (Berkley: University of California Press, 1990), 206-207
109
For a discussion of the genealogical method, see Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in
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unity of theory and the concrete multiplicity of facts. ..What it really does is to
entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate
knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter,
hierarchize and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some
arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects.110
Jane Flax has noted that Foucault' s genealogies of power are motivated by desires
or interests that are themselves obscure. He has not explicitly accounted for the agency of
his own discourse, which (ifhis central argument is correct) must merely be the by-
product of historically-situated and contingent forces. If he is trying to free up the
marginal voices that have been drowned out in the dominant western discourses,111 then
his notion of freedom or the possible locus of opposition "has an aesthetic or even
romantic cast that by its nature excludes important social relations from further
consideration."1'2
Jana Sawicki has taken a different view of Foucault's account of subjectivity. She
attributes to his notion ofthe subject the capacity to critically reflect on the forces that
The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 81 . "On the contrary,
to follow the complex course ofdescent [i.e. the genealogical method] is to maintain passing events in their
proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations-or conversely, the complete
reversais-thé errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that
continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being does not lie at the root of what
we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents." The genealogical method is also described in
Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate,
edited by Michael Kelly (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1 994), 22-23.
Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate,
edited by Michael Kelly (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1994), 22.
The freeing up of marginal voices is one way of reading the stated aim of Foucault's genealogical
studies: "And this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what
we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has
made us what we are, the possibility ofno longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think. It is
not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has finally become a science; it is seeking to give new
impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom." [italics mine] Michel Foucault,
"What is Enlightenment?" in The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books,
1984), 46. See also Foucault's discussion of so-called "subjugated knowledges" in Michel Foucault, "Two
Lectures," in Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate, edited by Michael Kelly
(Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1994), 20-21.
Jane Flax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism. & Postmodernism in the Contemporary-
West (Berkley: University of California Press, 1990), 209.
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have composed it and to choose creatively among competing discourses; to "reflect upon
the implications of its choices as they are taken up and transformed in a hierarchical
network of power relations;" in short, to exercise real agency. His subject is thus
"neither entirely autonomous nor enslaved, neither the originator of the discourses and
practices that constitute its experience nor determined by them."114
Sergei Prozorov argues that the central ontological presupposition of Foucault' s
philosophy is a particular kind of freedom "that requires neither a concept of the anterior
subject nor a teleology of liberation."115 Rather, our experience of freedom represents for
Foucault an always-present potentiality to be more than we have permitted ourselves to
be in the present. We limit our own freedom when we fail to resist the forces that
constrain it, and thereby become complicit in our own imprisonment:
This experience of the universal availability of freedom leads to a sobering
realization of the full extent of our unfreedom in the past. . .Indeed, many of the
practices we have previously engaged in under the assumption that there was 'no
alternative' only succeeded in governing us because of the absence of our
resistance to them.1
Foucault himself suggests that his "historico-critical attitude," which represents "a
historico-practical test of the limits that we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out
by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings"— need not necessarily lead to our being
determined by forces "of which we may well not be conscious [i.e. drives], and over
"J Jana Sawicki, "Foucault and Feminism," in Critique and Power, edited by Michael Kelly (Cambridge,
Massachussets, and London: The MIT Press, 1994), 355.
1,4 Ibid., 355.
115 Sergei Prozorov, Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company,
2007), 25.
116 Ibid., 149-50.
which we may have no control." In other words, we may identify the (contingent)
constraints that have been historically imposed on us from without or that are self-
imposed and may seek to transgress them, but these limits are not to be confused with the
allegedly universal limiting structures of the human sciences (i.e. with the unconscious in
psychoanalytic discourse). It is unclear, however, how such a radical refusal to accept
closure of any kind can be consistent with the sense of value and (at least provisional)
agency or control that provide us with meaning in our lives. While there is obviously
great value in deliberating thoughtfully about the important choices that we face over a
lifetime, sooner or later we must select options that foreclose alternatives. Pursuing one
path to its conclusion, which usually entails making sacrifices, is often a sign of
commitment and discipline, and not simply an acceptance of oppressive constraints on
our freedom. For instance, a person who struggles to become successful in a chosen
career (or who decides to start a family) will feel a sense of satisfaction once their goals
are realized, in spite of the realization that they might have pursued very different goals.
Alternatively, they may feel a sense of loss and disappointment if they pursued the wrong
goals. Either way, the choices that we make (and those we do not make) serve to define
who we are and who we are not, and to provide us with a sense of meaning. While
Foucault does not deny the place of limits, it may be that the degree of freedom that he
recommends requires a heroic degree of individual will and creativity (appropriate for a
Nietzschean Übermensch!) that is unrealistic for most people.
Meili Steele echoes this critique of Foucault and the poststructuralist claims
concerning a de-centered subjectivity. Foucault does not account for the agency of his
117 Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow (New
York: Pantheon Books. 1 984), 46-47.
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own statements. In other words, there is no theoretical account of the agent who
recognizes or acts against oppression. Foucault's arguments (along with Derrida's and
Lyotard's) derive their force by unmasking the networks ofpower inherent in discourse
and by making an implicit appeal to negative freedom— we ought to resist oppression.
However, resistance of oppression toward what end? As Nancy Fraser frames the issue:
Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought domination to be resisted?
Only with the introduction of normative notions could he [Foucault] begin to
answer such questions [and]. . .tell us what is wrong with the modem
power/knowledge regime and why we ought to oppose it.118
Steele adds that there is no attempt to offer a hierarchy when it comes to resisting
competing exclusions or marginalization. Are all cases equally bad, or should some be
resisted more strongly than others? Foucault does not provide us with any answers to
these questions. Nevertheless, Foucault's genealogical accounts trace the manner in
which these practices serve to, in Habermas's words,
delimit heterogeneous elements out ofthat gradually stabilized monologue that
the subject, raised in the end [to] the status of universal human reason, holds with
itself through making everything around it into an object."9
In other words, Foucault's analysis unmasks the violence to which the other has been
subjected via the triumph in Western culture of reason-centered rationality as the sole
locus ofmeaning.
Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 29. Cited in Meili
Steele, Theorizing Textual Subjects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 997), 28-31.
Jürgen Habermas, "Critique of Reason, Unmasking the Human Sciences,'" in Critique and Power, edited
by Michael Kelly (Cambridge, Massachussets, and London: The MIT Press, 1 994), 52.
Foucault's Ethics of Resistance
In light of these critiques of Foucault's project, of what do ethics consist for him?
Foucault rethinks ethics as a practice and discourse of resistance, oftransgressing the
limits of the (contingent, historically situated) prevailing norms. One is to resist the
oppressive, policing forces of morality in order to continuously fashion and re-fashion
one's life as an artist creates new projects: "Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover
what we are. . .but to refuse what we are."120 But to refuse what we are in the name of
what? Todd May has constructed and defended a moral perspective that draws upon
poststructuralist thought, including Foucault, and which attempts to answer this question.
As he puts the problem:
what motivates us to question what we previously took for granted? Why bother?
And why should we consider the radical alternatives this particular perspective
proposes to us? Ifpoststructuralism is to answer these questions, it must appeal to
us in terms with which we can in some way identify. We must be able to see
ourselves in its proposals, or else it is nothing more than interesting fiction to
us.12'
May links the poststructuralist thinkers with a commitment to antirepresentationalism,
and in the case of Foucault, with an "aesthetics of living" in which lives are to be judged
in aesthetic terms, alongside moral terms. Thinking in aesthetic terms permits us to
reflect upon how to live our lives "without introducing the burden— oppressive both to
theorizers and to the objects of theory— of wondering which kind of lives ought to be
Michel Foucault, "Subject and Power," in The Essential Foucault, edited by Paul Rabinow and Nikolas
Rose (New York: New Press, 2003), 134. Cited in Jeffrey T. Nealon, Foucault Beyond Foucault (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 75.
Todd May, The Moral Theory ofPoststructuralism (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1995), 136.
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universalized and in what ways."122 May cites the late jazz saxophonist John Coltrane as
an example of someone whose life could be fruitfully evaluated using the aesthetics of
living approach, and while the portrait that emerges is of an innovative, creative genius
who succeeded in expressing himself in unique and authentic ways, it is unclear that
Coltrane could (or should) serve as a model for how to live a life.123 For one thing, most
people are not, like Coltrane, enormously gifted creative geniuses. For another, such
creativity frequently carries a heavy cost: Coltrane's heroin addiction is believed to have
contributed to his death at the age of 40. In any case, May argues that just as there is no
single moral value that is ideal for every person, so there no single aesthetic value that is
ideal for everyone. However, the aesthetics of living approach is useful because
"everyone. . .ought to construct a life of some beauty— just as everyone ought to
contribute to the moral good— but that construction can be different in different
cases." Nevertheless, this approach provides little in the way of specifics about how
one ought to live, beyond the general proviso to resist those (contingent, historical) forces
that limit our creativity.125
Foucault appears to seek a type of ethical anonymity or invisibility that will free
him up from the societal discourses and practices of power (for instance, the human
sciences) that serve to restrict and delimit what it means to be human, as well as from




Foucault cites the examples of Baudelaire and Constantin Guys as artists who creatively embodied the
"attitude of modernity" which is "indissociable from desperate eagerness to imagine it [the present], to
imagine it otherwise than it is, and to transform it not destroying it but by grasping in it what it is." Michel
Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1984), 40-41.
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which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a
certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct,
and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.126
In rejecting the definitions and demands made upon one from without (i.e. by the Other)
or by the self (via the internalization and acceptance of a conception of a self that can
examine itself as an object of knowledge), Foucault is advancing a conception of ethics
that is (paradoxically) self-centered. The paradox lies in the fact that there is no stable
selfupon which this ethics can center. Whereas Foucault shares a concern with other
(postmodern, post-structuralist, post-colonial) thinkers for freeing up those discourses
that have been marginalized and suppressed via the consolidation of institutional power,
there is nothing in his ethics that compels us to acknowledge and respond to the demands
made upon us by other people. For instance, Foucault does not explicitly ground his
ethics outside of the self, i.e. in the self-other relation. It is true that he argues that we
must inquire as to "how we are constituted as moral subjects of our own actions" and that
this emphasis (on what he terms the "axis of ethics") is concerned with how we relate to
other people.127 However, Foucault does not tell us how we should relate to others in any
detail. Why should I care about other people and honor their needs? Is it enough that I
merely resist complicity with oppressive forces by rejecting any self-conception that is
stable and (therefore) capable of oppressing the other? Is it possible to be responsible for
others (for example, for one's family) without circumscribing one's identity in the name
of reliability and stability? For Foucault, the benign form of Ie regard that was associated
12 Michel Foucault, "Technologies of the Self," in Technologies ofthe Seìf: A Seminar with Michel
Foucault, edited by Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst: The University of
Massachusetts Press, 1988), 18.
127 Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?'' in The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 48-49.
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with the ancient practice of epimeleia heautou has been replaced by the authoritarian
variant of the human sciences (including psychoanalysis) that defines us in the service of
oppressive norms, and is therefore inherently violent and malevolent.128 In the concluding
chapter, we shall see how Foucault's ethics is distinguished from that of Emmanuel
Lévinas, who grounds his radical reformulation of subjectivity in a phenomenological
analysis of the face of the other.
The Narrative Turn and Psychoanalysis
Closely related to this questioning in theoretical postmodernism of human
subjectivity is the investigation and unmasking ofnarrative logic. The philosopher
Alasdair Maclntyre has described man as "essentially a story-telling animal," while
Roland Barthes has described the past tense ofnarrative as "the ideal instrument for every
construction of a world; it is the unreal time of cosmogonies, myth, History and
Novels.. .The world is not unexplained since it is told like a story."129 On this reading,
narrative (and the type of knowledge it produces), which in the guise of storytelling
requires no proof other than its own internal (language-game) consistency, is juxtaposed
with science, which claims to produce knowledge that is universally valid (and thus
authoritative). The postmodern critique has sought to unmask those dominant narratives
Joel Whitebook, "Foucault's Struggle with Psychoanalysis," in The Cambridge Companion to
Foucault, edited by Gary Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). See also Patrick H.
Hutton, "Foucault, Freud, and the Technologies of the Self," in Technologies ofthe Self, edited by Luther
Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick Hutton (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 1988).
129 Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (London: Jonathan Cape,
1967), 30. Cited in Paul Sheehan, "Postmodernism and Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to
Postmodernism, edited by Steve Connor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 28.
71
that have claimed universal (i.e. ahistorical) legitimacy by showing the extent to which
they are the product of contingent, particular social practices.130 Once such a narrative
has thus been unmasked, it would presumably lose much of its power to legitimize
oppressive practices.131
The psychoanalyst and philosopher Roy Schäfer132 has embraced the narrative
approach as an efficacious method in the treatment of patients. His approach is helpful
because he provides guidelines for assessing the life-narratives that are constructed
between patient and analyst. What allows a particular narrative to impart meaning and (at
least some measure of) stability?
First of all, Schäfer proposes that psychoanalysis be understood in hermeneutic
rather than (as Freud preferred) scientific terms. On this account, psychoanalytic
understanding is a narrative process, and unavoidably so. As with good historical
explanations, good psychoanalytic interpretations must make sense, pull together as much
of the relevant detail as possible, and provide a coherent and persuasive account.
From the description of this new account, there follows a systematic project of
constructing a psychoanalytic reality in which one retells the past and the present, the
infantile and the adult, the imagined and the so-called real, and the analytic relationship
and all other significant relationships. One retells all this in terms that are increasingly
focused and coordinated in psychoanalytic terms of action. One achieves a narrative re-
description of reality. This retelling is adapted to the clinical context and relationship, the
Ij0 See Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). See also Hilde
Lindemann Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair (Ithaca & New York: Cornell University Press,
2001). Lyotard refers to these dominant narratives as the "Grand Narratives of Modernity," while
Lindemann Nelson terms them "master narratives."
131 An extreme example of such an oppressive narrative that masqueraded as science would be the so-called
racial science of the National Socialists.
u Roy Schäfer, Retelling A Life: Narration and Dialogue in Psychoanalysis (USA: Basic Books, 1 992).
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purpose of which is to understand anew the life and the problems in question. The patient
joins in the retelling (re-describing, reinterpreting) as the analysis progresses.
The essential aim of this joint narrative is the increased possibility of change, of
new and beneficial action in the world. The appropriate conception of change excludes
randomness or personally ahistorical and discontinuous consequences, such as abrupt and
total reversals of values or behavior— precisely the kinds of consequences that cannot be
ruled out by Foucault's radical historico-critical critique. The joint narrative is judged by
its fruitfulness in the patient's life with others. Finally, the analytic accounts achieved
may be judged more or less valid by their ability to withstand further tough searching
questions about the story that has now been told and retold from many different,
psychologically non-contradictory though often conflictual, perspectives and in relation
to considerable evidence constituted and gathered up within the analytic dialogue.
Postmodern feminist philosophy
Postmodernist feminist thought provides a nexus point where post-metaphysical,
anti-humanist, anti-essentialist and non-narrative critiques converge. Through the
problematization of gender, feminists initiated the process of analyzing and dismantling
the western notion of an essential "man," a task that was later taken up by
postmodernists. For example, Luce Irigaray has characterized the modernist tradition as a
site of endless conflict: "The philosophical order is indeed the one that has to be
111 t
questioned, and disturbed, inasmuch as it covers over sexual difference." [italics in the
133 Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. Catherine Porter and Carolyn Burke (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1985), 159. Cited in Paul Sheehan, "Postmodernism and Philosophy," in The
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original] However, important differences exist between feminist and postmodern
philosophy, and the two should not be conflated.
Whereas postructuralists such as Foucault trumpeted the "end of man" and argued
that subjectivity was an illusory construct that manifested and obscured relations of
power, feminist philosophy of the 1 970s regarded the constructed nature of subjectivity
as an opportunity to recover a specifically female identity/subjectivity. Irigaray has
argued that female subjectivity is a project to be realized— an ongoing process of
becoming— rather than a closed, essentialized foundation upon which to erect a new
totalizing metaphysics:
In order to become, it is essential to have a gender or an essence (consequently a
sexuate essence) as horizon. Otherwise, becoming remains partial and subject to
the subject. . .To become means fulfilling the wholeness of what we are capable of
being. Obviously, this road never ends.1 4 [italics in the original]
The postmodern feminist Judith Butler has criticized Irigaray's attempt to rework the
metaphysics of identity. Butler shares the postmodern mistrust of metaphysics and argues
that Irigaray's identification of a unitary, monolithic phallocentric signifying economy is
itself a totalizing gesture: "The effort to identify the enemy as singular in form is a
reverse-discourse that uncritically mimics the strategy of the oppressor instead of offering
Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism, edited by Steve Connor (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), 32.
134 Luce Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies, trans. Gillian C. Gill (New York: Columbia University Press),
61 . Cited in Paul Sheehan, "Postmodernism and Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to
Postmodernism, edited by Steve Connor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 33.
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a different set of terms."135 Even the use of the term "women" in feminist discourse is
problematic for Butler.136
The absence of fixed identities complicates the praxis of gender politics, which is
the principal aim of feminism. If the symbolic economy is not, as Irigaray maintains,
unitary, then collective resistance to it is untenable. Party politics, which require a
common front (directed against a common foe) in order to be successful, become
hopelessly complicated. Feminist postmodernism has thus been criticized as apolitical or
anti-political, and for undermining the goals proper to feminism. Jane Flax summarizes
this view in her essay "The End of Innocence":
"You cannot be a feminist and a postmodernist," I was told. Postmodernists are sl-
ot even antipolitical. They are relativists; if we take them seriously, any political
stance will be impossible to maintain or justify... Since postmodernists believe
meanings are multiple and indeterminant, ifyou write clearly and comprehensibly
you cannot be a postmodernist.137
Flax ultimately resists this caricatured position, and argues— as I do here— that bringing
the postmodern and feminist discourses into dialogue with each other is a useful and
productive exercise. In particular, theoretical postmodernism serves as a valuable
corrective to totalizing modes of thought in which all differences are glossed over or
deliberately suppressed, and this includes any theory that appropriates the Marxist
conception of false consciousness. Although it is true, as we have seen in Hilde
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion ofIdentity (New York and London:
Routledge, 1990), 13. Cited in Paul Sheehan, "Postmodernism and Philosophy," in The Cambridge
Companion to Postmodernism, edited by Steve Connor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004),
33.
For a good discussion of the history and stakes of the feminism/postmodernism debate, see Bonnie
Mann, Women 's Liberation and the Sublime (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
137 Jane Flax, "The End of Innocence," in Feminists Theorize the Political, edited by Judith Butler and Joan
W. Scott (New York: Routledge, 1992). Cited in Bonnie Mann, Women 's Liberation and the Sublime (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 75.
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Lindemarin Nelson's theory, that individuals living in oppressive societies have a
tendency to internalize distorted norms that damage their self-conception(s) and inhibit
their agency; this does not mean that such individuals should not be treated as fully
responsible moral agents. Those who hold to the false-consciousness theory (whether that
false consciousness is instilled through patriarchy, capitalist control of the means of
production, unconscious infantile urges, or some other force or oppressive social order)
run the risk of denying any agency to those who do not share their views. The opinions
and aspirations of such people can therefore be ignored or dismissed, under the pretext
that they do not know their own minds, let alone what lies in their best interests.
Postmodern critique reminds us of the potential dangers inherent in this perspective.
As we have seen, postmodern critique does a good job of unmasking the uneven
social hierarchies and distributions ofpower that are hidden by references to a fixed (and
metaphysically-grounded) human nature or essence. It is also useful for deconstructing
historical accounts— so-called metanarratives— that have served to justify western
hegemony while obscuring the often-violent suppression of difference in the history of
the West. Postmodern critique has also revealed the manner in which modernist forms of
writing reproduce and support totalizing systems of thought. However, postmodern
criticism is often accused ofpresenting a view from nowhere, a perspective from which
no person can actually live and flourish. We are constructed, but we are also
constructing— we require a sense of our own agency in order to feel as though our lives
are meaningful. Postmodern critique falls short when it comes to articulating the ways in
which we construct meaning for ourselves and with others, and so it cannot, on its own,
provide a satisfactory account of moral agency and responsibility. Rather, it must be
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brought into dialogue with discourses that take the first-person perspective to be non-
illusory and valuable.
The following chapter will examine the thought of the post-Freudian
psychoanalyst and philosopher, Hans Loewald. Loewald provides a developmental
account of subjectivity that takes seriously both first- and third-person accounts of the
self, while bringing these accounts into a dialectical relation that incorporates many of the
feminist and postmodern insights into the nature of moral agency and responsibility.
Furthermore, Loewald' s account brings into focus the centrality of the affective realm,
and especially guilt and atonement, in the development of a responsible self.
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Chapter Three: Hans Loewald and the (Counter-) Movements of
Primary and Secondav Processes
The psychoanalyst and philosopher, Hans Loewald, is arguably among the most
important of the post-Freudian thinkers, and yet he is hardly known in the discourse
about psychoanalysis that runs through the humanities and the social sciences. This is
starting to change: Nancy Chodorow has referred to him as "perhaps the greatest and
most wide-ranging contributor to American psychoanalysis"138 while Thomas Ogden has
labeled Loewald's paper, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex," as "a watershed in the
development of psychoanalytic thought."139 Nevertheless, his work remains an extremely
fertile and largely untapped field for exploring a variety ofphilosophical subjects.
This chapter will focus on a number of facets of Loewald's thought that are salient to his
account of responsibility and moral agency. As his account unfolds via his analysis of
various core psychoanalytic concepts (Repetition and Repetition Compulsion; the
Transference; Memory; Repression and Internalization; the Oedipal Complex and
superego formation) this chapter will examine Loewald's understanding of these
concepts. Particular attention is devoted to Loewald's account of the Oedipal Complex
and the development of the Superego. As the seat of our conscience and the locus of our
sense of inner agency, the development of the superego is central to Loewald's notion of
what it means to be a responsible self. A central theme throughout Loewald's work is his
elaboration of the relationship between primary and secondary processes, and this idea
will be examined as well. Loewald focuses on meaning (as opposed to positivist accounts
138 Nancy J. Chodorow, "The Psychoanalytic vision of Hans Loewald," InternationalJournai of
Psychoanalysis 84, vol. 4 (Aug 2003): 897.
Thomas H. Ogden, "Reading Loewald: Oedipus reconceived," International Journal ofPsychoanalysis
87, vol. 3 (June 2006): 651.
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of normalcy and pathology) in the context of his developmental account of the origins of
mental life, and a definition of Loewald's notion of"meaning" will be provided. The
chapter will conclude with an examination of Loewald's thought in relation to
postmodernism and the feminist critique of (Freudian) psychoanalysis.
Meaning
Unlike many other psychoanalysts of his generation, Loewald has not shied away from
writing about morality and meaning.140 If Freud was primarily concerned with making
the unconscious conscious and bringing the ego to be where there had formerly been id,
Loewald was attentive to the larger meaning of life and integrated this into his conception
of analytic goals:
For Loewald, a meaningful human life is founded not upon the replacing of
unconscious life with consciousness or secondary-process thought, nor upon
overcoming the influence of the unconscious, but upon the infusion of
unconscious life into, and its integration with, consciousness. Unconscious
fantasies expressed in dreams and transferences enrich life and give it meaning.
What does Loewald have in mind when he speaks of "meaning?" Loewald framed the
question himself as part of a panel discussion held by the American Psychoanalytic
Association held In New York in 1 977:
Is the psychoanalytic process one of objective investigation ofpsychological
facts, or is it interpretation ofmeanings? If the latter, are the meanings there, to be
uncovered by us as analysts, or are we, although not arbitrarily, providing
140 At least since the 1990s, there has been a shift in focus among many psychoanalysts away from
considerations of pathology and towards an emphasis on meaning.
141 Nancy J. Chodorow, "The Psychoanalytic vision of Hans Loewald," International journal of
Psychoanalysis 84, vol. 4 (Aug 2003): 905-6.
meanings? Are the patients providing the meanings, or the psychological facts, as
a function of our active receptivity as analysts? Are "meanings" something that
arises in the interactions between analysand and analyst?'42
We will see that, in his theoretical writings, Loewald distances himself from the idea that
meaning is derived from an examination of objective psychological facts, and instead
affirms the second part of his query.
For instance, when he describes memorial activity (i.e. memory) as a "linking
production and reproduction of experience" he notes that "the links of action and feeling
[which are appropriate to the primary, undifferentiated mode of remembering] become
links ofmeaning."143 In this context, Loewald has in mind the organizing function of the
ego, which strives to produce (or re-produce) a sense of coherence and continuity. It is
this sense of continuity— of having a history— that gives one a (relatively) stable and
meaningful sense of self. In order for the present to be meaningful, one must have access
to (in a manner that can be integrated in increasingly differentiated, complex, and often
novel ways) the primary (i.e. unconscious) memorial processes, and in the analytic
encounter, it is the analyst who facilitates this access: "As such, the repressed is a
reservoir ofprimary memorial processes, which through interpretation (meaning-giving
on the part of the analyst) may combine with or again become part of a context of
«144
meaning.
Elsewhere, Loewald discusses meaning with reference to language and primary and
secondary modes of mentation: "What we call meaning comprises both the
142 Hans Loewald, "Reflections on the Psychoanalytic Process," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential
Loewald: Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000),
375.
14j Hans Loewald, "Perspectives on Memory," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald: Collected
Papers and Monographs (Haeerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 169.
144 Ibid., 170.
differentiating-linking of word and thing (their mutual reference) and that of presentation
(memorial act) and percept."145 [italics in the original] In other words, language does not
merely convey meaning denotatively or connotatively (i.e. on the secondary-process,
differentiated level) but as part of a primary-process, undifferentiated global experience.
Loewald describes this global experience within the mother-infant matrix:
One might say that, while the mother utters words, the infant does not perceive
words but is bathed in sound, rhythm, etc., as accentuating ingredients of a
uniform experience. The distinction between sounds as ingredients of a total
occurrence, and what the heard sounds refer to or signify- this is a slowly
developing achievement to which we apply the term secondary process.146
Once again, meaning in this context refers to the existence of an ongoing and fertile,
dialectical relation between primary and secondary processes:
The linking between thing-presentation and word-presentation in secondary
process is a rejoining on a different level, by way of a creative repetition, of
elements that had been at one; it is a reconciliation.147
We may thus conceive of meaning for Loewald as a reconciliation between primary and
secondary ways of mentation14 that provide the ego with a sense of coherence and
continuity.
14 Hans Loewald, "Primary Process, Secondary Process, and Language," in Hans W. Loewald, The




148 "jne varjous elements of action and feeling [primary process experiences] begin to encounter and
'know' each other [differentiate, i.e. become part of secondary process mentation]; they become a context
of meaning, which is one way of describing the organizing function of the ego. Freud increasingly insisted
on the ego's character as a coherent organization." Hans Loewald, "Perspectives on Memory," in Hans W.
Loewald, The Essential Loewaid: Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University
Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 169.
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Loewald's preoccupation with meaning is perhaps the result ofhis early training.
Prior to turning to psychoanalysis, he studied philosophy with Martin Heidegger (and
would feel betrayed by Heidegger's embrace ofNazism). Even after taking up
psychoanalysis, Loewald continued to theorize in a manner that is more typical of a
philosopher:
Heidegger believed that the riches of the philosophical tradition are sedimented in
its vocabulary. He therefore constructed his own iconoclastic position through an
idiosyncratic exegesis of basic terms from Greek philosophy and German
Idealism. Similarly, Loewald believes that the basic terms of psychoanalysis are
'essentially contested concepts' (Gallie, 1956). That is, they have so much
meaning condensed in them and are so centrally located in our conceptual
schemes, that they constitute a virtually open-ended source for creative
argumentation and theorizing.149
The Origins of Mental Life
It is obvious that Loewald's conception of the origins of mental life differs in
significant ways from the classical Freudian conception. For Freud, the infant is born as a
basically self-contained entity that engages external reality only in response to an inner
impulse or a perceived lack (i.e. the need for nourishment and the absence of the
nourishing breast). Development towards emotional and psychological maturity then
consists in "civilizing" our originally "bestial" nature via (usually highly conflicted)
interaction with the so-called reality principle. In other words, our instinctual, "primitive"
impulses are gradually tempered by the mitigating influence of the parents and, especially
Joel Whitebook, "Hans Loewald: A Radical Conservative," Internationaljournal ofPsychoanalysis 85,
vol. l(Feb 2004): 99. Whitebook cites WB Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," in Proc Aristotelian
Soc 56 (1956), 167-93. Stephen A. Mitchell draws the same connection between Heidegger and Loewald in
a footnote in "From Ghosts to Ancestors," Psychoanalytic Dialogues 8, vol. 6 (1 998): 837.
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for Freud, the father. This conflict finds its partial resolution in the drama of the Oedipus
Complex, in which (in ideal circumstances) the child abandons his or her infantile
fantasies and the Super-ego (which, along with Ego and Id, is one of the three basic
Freudian mental structures) arises. In classical Freudian psychoanalysis, neurosis and
more serious psychological problems are generally traced back to the Oedipal drama.
Hans Loewald has a very different understanding of the origins of mental life. For
Loewald, consciousness emerges gradually from an original unity between infant and
mother that is undifferentiated. The infant initially has no sense of inside and outside, self
and other, past and present, reality and fantasy:
All the dichotomies, which we come to think of as givens, as basic features of the
way the world simply is, are for Loewald complex constructions. They arise
slowly over the course of our early years and operate as an overlay, a parallel
mode of organizing experience that accompanies and coexists with experiences
generated by the original, primal unity.150
This earliest, "primary process" way of experiencing the world never disappears, but
continues to exist simultaneously with the differentiated, "secondary process" way of
experiencing the world that characterizes adulthood and is necessary for the scientific
perspective. For Loewald, mental and emotional health consists in the ability to
continuously integrate and re-integrate primary and secondary-process ways of mentation
(i.e. fantasy and so-called objective reality), and it is this dialectical relation that infuses
an otherwise sterile and meaningless "objective" reality with meaning. According to this
understanding of mental health, the neurotic is one who is locked into so-called objective
reality and the psychotic is one who is locked into primary process ways of experiencing.
Stephen A. Mitchell, "From Ghosts to Ancestors," Psychoanalytic Dialogues 8, vol. 6 (1998): 826.
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As we shall see, Loewald takes the Freudian conceptual vocabulary and reinterprets it in
a way that radically alters the meaning of many of Freud's key concepts. These
reinterpretations make Loewald's thought germane to both feminism and postmodernism,
and these theories will be examined as they relate in particular to his ideas about moral
responsibility. In the following section, we will examine Loewald's reformulation of the
Freudian notion of repetition and repetition-compulsion, for it is within the context of this
reformulation that Loewald introduces the notion ofmoral responsibility as it relates to
the task ofpsychoanalysis.
Responsibility and Repeating Knowingly
Hans Loewald discusses moral responsibility within the context of his
examination of the psychoanalytic concepts of Repetition and Repetition Compulsion.
The challenge for the patient in analysis is to come to experience the contents/effects of
her unconscious (dreams, repetitive patterns that are acted out) as her own, even if they
are operating behind-the-scenes. This is a moral appeal, even though Freud did not make
this explicit due to his aversion to imposing moral standards on the patient. It is an appeal
to the patient to take ownership over what had previously been disclaimed, to take
responsibility for that which was not (consciously) chosen:
To acknowledge, recognize, understand one's unconscious as one's own means to
move from a position of passivity in relation to it to a position where active care
of it becomes possible, where it becomes a task worthy of pursuit to make one's
business and concern those needs and wishes, fantasies, conflicts and traumatic
events and defenses that have been passively experienced and reproduced....Such
appeal, to begin with, comes from the outside and becomes internalized as an
aspect of the superego. Psychoanalysis as a method oftreatment, it seems to me,
has this tension toward assuming responsibilityfor oneself, that is to learn by
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being instructed in self-knowledge, in repeating oneselfknowingly, to take over
thisfunction ofactive repetition: to become a self. '51 [italics mine]
What does Loewald mean by "repeating oneself knowingly?" Here he speaks of
repetition— the act of repeating certain formative psychical patterns, either knowingly or
(more commonly) unknowingly— as an important yet somewhat obscure concept in
psychoanalysis, inextricably linked with the notion of an unconscious.
It is, in fact, one of the most important issues confronting us in a psychoanalytic
consideration of repetition to make the distinction between such relatively passive
or automatic repetitions and active repeating, and to study the conditions under
which transitions from one to the other take place. . .Any consideration of the
relations between id, ego, and superego has to deal with the passivity-activity
issue in terms of repetition, and so does any consideration ofpsychoanalysis as a
therapeutic process.152
Primary process experiences— emotions, sensations, feelings of connection and/or
separation between the so-called "inner" and "outer" worlds— that cannot be properly
integrated into the increasingly differentiated secondary process realm, are acted out (i.e.
are expressed without our being conscious of what we are doing). These psychic
disturbances may lead to neurosis, psychosis, and other psychological problems. As long
as these experiences remain un-integrated they are passively repeated, which is to say, the
person is unaware of the patterns of behavior that she is repeating. However, once they
become integrated with the present in the analytic situation (which is to say, are actively
repeated together with the analyst) then the linking between primary and secondary
1 Hans Loewald, "Repetition and Repetition Compulsion," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald:
Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 95-6.
Ibid., 87. On pages 97 and 99-100 of the same essay, Loewald makes an interesting reference to the
notion of repetition in the work of Kierkegaard.
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processes is reestablished on a more highly differentiated level and the present gains or
regains meaning.
To return to Loewald's discussion of repetition, he also distinguishes between
repetition and remembering, although the two concepts do not stand in a strictly binary
relation. Within the classical psychoanalytic context, repetition has typically referred to
the experience ofmemorial content at the level of affect and action, while remembering
has typically referred to the conscious recollection of the same content. In other words,
when experienced unconsciously, the memorial content is acted out, whereas it is
remembered (via the mediating activities of the therapist in the transference) once it is
integrated into conscious reflection. Until such a time as this integration takes place, one
is doomed, as it were, to continue repeating (acting out) the content. However, Loewald
emphasizes that both repeating and remembering are forms of remembering- of psychic
functioning- that occur on different levels of mentation (i.e. primary and secondary,
respectively). In other words, a dialectical relation between unconscious
(undifferentiated) and conscious (differentiated) ways of remembering/experiencing is
maintained:
On the other hand, conscious remembering is a kind of repetition, a repetition in
the mind. Repetition in the form of action or behavior and affect is a kind of
remembering, albeit unconscious, and remembering as a conscious mental act is a
kind of repetition. If one adheres, as psychoanalysis does, to the concept of
unconscious memory, repetition and recollection can be understood in terms of
each other, depending on whether we focus on the present act, in which case we
speak of repeating, or on the past prototype, in which case we see recollection.153
Hans Loewald, "Repetition and Repetition Compulsion,'' in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald:
Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 88.
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The Transference Relationship
In classical psychoanalysis the transference is the cornerstone of the
psychoanalytic relationship between analyst and analysand, since it is within the context
of the transference relationship that unconscious remembering becomes conscious. The
transference refers to the unconscious re-enactment, within the therapeutic context, of
repressed infantile content, which is projected onto the person of the analyst (who
functions as a stand-in for the parental figure). Once projected, the content can then be
analyzed and (in successful analysis) reintegrated at the conscious level into the life of
the patient. For Freud, the transference operated as a form of resistance to the attempts to
uncover repressed memories— to sort out the past from the present as well as providing
the energy to change things— that was at the heart of his form of therapy. For Loewald,
"transference serves as a revitalization, a relinking of the past and the present, fantasy and
reality, primary process and secondary process."154
This relationship between repeating and remembering is central to the
psychoanalytic project, as it provides a framework in which to initiate the excavation of
the unconscious within the analytic context. As previously indicated, remembering may
be understood as a form of repetition in the psychical field that occurs on a conscious
(differentiated) level, whereas "acting out" or repeating by action may be understood as a
form ofremembering that occurs on an unconscious (undifferentiated level). The two
forms are therefore related and this connection bridges the divide between "past and
Stephen A. Mitchell, Relalionality: From Attachment to Intersubjectivity (Hillsdale NJ: The Analytic
Press, 2000), 25.
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present, the id and the ego, the biological and the psychological."155 Ifacting out is
potentially destructive outside the analytic context (i.e. in one's personal life), it
represents a transference manifestation within the analytic situation and it "is a vehicle of
the therapeutic process."156
Within the transference relationship the analyst recognizes that the patient is
recollecting unconsciously (i.e. repeating) and helps her to integrate the content at a
differentiated (conscious) level. As we have seen, in order for the remembered content to
be meaningful, it is necessary that the link between the primary and secondary ways of
experiencing is maintained.
In Freudian psychoanalysis, the prototypical patterns that are repeated throughout
ones life are fueled by the Oedipus Complex, and, in particular, the specific manner in
which this drama is played out in the infancy of the individual. If there is a partial
resolution of the Oedipal drama when the young child of five or six (temporarily)
renounces his mother as a libidinal object in response to the castration threat, this drama
is reawakened at puberty and there is a danger that it will be repeated passively (i.e. acted
out) on an infantile level of psychic organization, instead of on a more differentiated level
that is appropriate for a more developed ego. In short, it will be repeated "on
approximately the same level on which the original conflict took place."157 The task of
the analyst is to reactivate the conflict with the patient within the analytic context (i.e. in
the transference relationship) in order that it may be repeated in an active (as opposed to
purely passive) manner and thus remembered. In this way it is "actively taken up by the
155 Hans Loewald, "Repetition and Repetition Compulsion," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald:




ego's organizing capacity" and integrated into a more appropriately differentiated
The super-ego arises as a result of the Oedipal drama, and is the seat of the
conscience in the Freudian and Loewaldian accounts of the development ofmental life.
As such, the Oedipal drama is central to Loewald's understanding ofwhat it means to be
responsible. A brief elaboration of the Oedipal drama in psychoanalysis is therefore in
order.
The Oedipal Complex
The psychoanalyst Stephen A. Mitchell provides a coherent summary of the
Oedipal phenomenon and its relation to guilt, in which he underlines the bi-phasic nature
of our psychological lives in the Freudian account. In other words, prior to and
underlying our "normal" life (i.e. the life that we know and remember) is an earlier,
forgotten life of childhood sexuality:
That life was both wondrous and terrifying, body-centered and full of
polymorphously perverse sexuality and phantasmagoric aggression. For each
small child that earlier life culminates in reenacting the role of Sophocles'
Oedipus. Our sexual ambitions lead us to alternately both desire our parents and
plot their murder. Each of us becomes implicated in the most psychologically
horrifying of crimes- incest and parricide. And each of us becomes a social,
responsible being through fear ofpunishment and retaliation and the assumption
of guilt for those forbidden impulses: the external objects of our desire and hatred
are replaced by internal objects of conscience and surveillance [i.e. by the
superego], and the darkness of repression falls across our earlier life.159
,5* Ibid., 89.
159 Stephen A. Mitchell, Can Love Last? The Fate ofRomance Over Time (New York & London: W.W.
Norton & Company, 2002), 1 56.
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In the successful therapeutic situation, that which had been acted out and thus repeated
passively (i.e. the reproduction of infantile unconscious prototypical experiences in
neurosis) is re-experienced actively when
organizing ego activity is mediated by the analyst and his interpretations. [In these
cases] repetition means reactivation on a higher level of organizing potential,
which makes possible novel configurations and novel resolutions to the
conflict.160
It is therefore the manner in which the early experiences and conflicts of infantile history
are repeated that distinguishes a healthy life from one that is "blocked or stunted by
excessive repression and ego restriction."1 ]
As previously indicated, the patterns that are repeated throughout a life are closely tied to
the Oedipus complex (which for Loewald is itself a repetition of those experiences which
preceded it, but on a new organizational level). This mixture of more or less passive
reproductions is manifested in the ways in which our inner lives and personal
relationships are configured. Ideally, these patterns will be re-created in the psychic field,
i.e. actively repeated or remembered, as opposed to being repeated or acted out passively
(where they may lead to a perpetuation of oedipal fantasies or pathological introjections).
The erection of the superego may be viewed as a new differentiation within the ego, and
as such it is
aprime example of re-creative repetition in the psychic field... Internal re-creative
repetitions of external involvement and its dissolution enable the individual to
160 Hans Loewald, "Repetition and Repetition Compulsion," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald:
Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 89.
161 Ibid., 89.
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progress to progressive mastery of the Oedipus complex in the external arena of
personal... involvements in later life.162
As the terms suggest, "active" and "passive" repetition are closely tied to the notion of
volition. Loewald elaborates this connection when he speaks of the psychoanalytic
understanding of the destiny of a person, in which a great deal more personal activity is
assigned to the vicissitudes of life than has previously been recognized. Within the
psychoanalytic account, inner, unconscious forces are assigned a much more active role
in determining the things that befall me, and as manifestations of my unconscious, these
forces may potentially be brought under the organizing control of the ego. By the same
token, much of what I have been inclined to interpret as purposeful voluntary acts are
actually determined by forces over which I exert little control. In both cases the role of
unconscious forces are emphasized:
But while in the first case the emphasis is on the power of unconscious
motivations, in the second case the emphasis is on theirpotentialfor coming
under the ego 's organizing control. 163 [italics in the original]
Simply put, we do not truly control what we think we control, and we have far more
control in areas where we are normally inclined to disclaim any agency. In





Agency and the Unconscious
In psychoanalysis, these unconscious motivations are understood, as motivations, to
determine much of what had previously been characterized in an individual's life as
chance occurrence, or conscious choice, or as caused by biological causes. In other
words, these determining forces operate, as it were, behind the back of the person,
seemingly curtailing their individual agency. However, this curtailment of agency is only
part of the story. The main impact of this determinism lies in the fact that its origins are
psychic, and the causes are conceived as potentially personal and unconscious forces that
have an overt effect on our behavior. Furthermore, these causes are understood to be
susceptible to influence and modification by psychological processes:
If this were not so, the whole idea that the reactivation of unconscious conflicts
and their re-creation and working through in analysis could lead to change in
present behavior would fall to the ground.164
As long as these unconscious patterns are subject to repression (i.e. insulated from the
organizing activity of the ego), the compulsion to repeat will remain. Exposure to the
ego's activity in the therapeutic context leads to what Loewald has identified as re-
creative repression. Unconscious infantile experiences are repeated within the
transference relationship, and as potentially active (conscious) repetitions, they may be
taken up and transformed within the ego's organizing activity. These transference
interpretations do not merely uncover unconscious infantile context, but they also
communicate that these processes are personal experiences
Ibid., 92.
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that reveal psychic activity of some kind, granted that this psychic activity had
been or long since had become- not merely unconscious- but automatic, removed
from intra- and extra-psychic influence, and thus a process passively
reproduced.165
Bringing these unconscious forces to the light of consciousness is closely linked with the
agency of the patient. In fact, the analytic process requires the patient to assume
responsibility, to take ownership, for that which had previously appeared to be outside of
her control. What had previously been experienced as passive, reproductive repetition,
now (via the interpretations of the analyst) may take on the character of active re-creative
repetition:
We try to make the patient see, or rather feel, that he as an actor is or can be
involved, that he was compelled by his unconscious because it had been
automatic and autonomous. The difference between automatic process and
personal activity we convey to the patient when we point out to him that the
unconscious he becomes aware of is his unconscious, or that he dreamed the
dream he had.166 [italics in the original]
The concepts of reproductive and re-creative repetition are closely linked to Loewald's
notion of so-called primary and secondary-process. The former is connected to Freud's
concept of the Id and, as we have seen, is characterized by a lack of differentiation. We
might also say that this is the realm of affect. In primary-process experiences, there are
no distinctions between inside and outside, the self and other etc; nor is there any sense of
time. In contrast, secondary-process experiences are differentiated and connected to
Freud's concept of the ego, and they also correspond to our usual notions of the intellect.




experiences on a "higher" (i.e. increasingly complex and differentiated) level, so that
those experiences may inform and impart meaning to the present.
The ego repeats, on a new level of organization which in our subjective
experience and to our observation appears as heightened psychic activity as
compared with the antecedent level, the processes which we conceptualize as id;
the ego, insofar as it does not defend against them, repeats them in reorganizing
them, i.e., re-creatively.167
In the act of re-creation or reorganization of earlier subjective experience this new level
of organization assumes the quality ofconsciousness, although Loewald also notes that it
will likely lose this quality over time (and may require re-creation or reorganization onto
yet another level of organization).
Repetition is also connected with memory and so-called memory traces. The latter refer
to those earlier levels of recorded ego-organization that are not normally accessible to
consciousness, and which may yet be taken up and creatively re-organized. As we have
seen, conscious remembering can be described as active repetition, just as active
repetition can be described as a (passive) form of remembering. Both forms are
(mutually) reconfigured in the process of recreating, and a sense of loss may accompany
the process in which a new organization of experience (gradually) loses its character of
consciousness as a new element of the unconscious has been added:
The sense of loss which may be felt when such creative remembering and
reorganizing in analysis recedes from consciousness while the gain from such
conscious experience is not lost, is evidence of this course [i.e. of generating new




This notion of a sense of loss that accompanies the therapeutic process is closely tied to
the concept of mourning, which, as we will see in connection to the Oedipal drama, is for
Loewald an inescapable part of the process of becoming a responsible agent.
And there can be another sense of loss ofthe opposite kind, when some memory,
some unconscious id wish becomes conscious, because the new organization
achieved in this conscious moment of recreation hinders retrogression to an
earlier organizational level: something of the poignant intensity and immediacy,
of the youth of living up to that level is to be given up. The unconscious id wants
to reproduce on its own level and resists organization. It is here that there are
connections between remembering, working through and the work of mourning
that deserves close study.169
Murder, Guilt and Mourning
The importance of mourning and its relation to responsibility is examined in "The
Waning of the Oedipus Complex." This article charts the continuing relevance of the
Oedipus complex, both as an organizing psychical complex within the life of the
individual, and as an invaluable meta-theoretical tool within psychoanalytic theory itself.
Loewald wrote the article in part as a response to the dwindling interest in the Oedipus
complex in light of the growing body of theoretical data that emphasized the pre-Oedipal
stages of development. It is within this context that he elaborates the significance of
mourning for the development of autonomy.
The active words, destruction and demolition, which Freud has used in referring
to the [temporary] dissolution of the Oedipus complex [until it rears its head again
during adolescence], may be heard as reverberations ofthat dominant feature of
the oedipal conflict, parricide, the destruction of the parent by the child.170
Hans Loewald, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald:
Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 387.
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The term parricide is used rather than patricide, as the latter only refers to the murder of
the father. The former term is more inclusive, and includes within it the murder of
someone who symbolizes a parent figure (mother or father) or an entity of group
representing parental authority. The sacred bond between parent and child is violated,
thus murdering the parental authority itself:
Ifwe take etymology as a guide, it is the bringing forth, nourishing, providing for,
and protecting of the child by the parents that constitute their parenthood,
authority (authorship), and render sacred the child's ties with the parents.
Parricide is a crime against the sanctity of such a bond. The bond is most clearly
exemplified for us by the relationship to biological parents.171
Obviously, it is not actual physical parricide that is germane to the discussion of the
Oedipus complex. What is significant is that a form of psychical parricide inevitably
occurs as the individual assumes responsibility for herself, i.e. becomes a responsible
agent. This responsibility implies a measure of autonomy in the etymological sense of the
person becoming "self-legislating," but it is an autonomy that is nevertheless significantly
constrained/encumbered by (internal/external) forces. These constraints radically
distinguish it from Descartes's cogito or Kant's transcendental subject and the derivative
conceptions of the unencumbered self that continue to inform much of Western
philosophy (in this connection, Rawls' s original position comes to mind).
With this psychical crime comes guilt (an example of the aforementioned constraints),
which must be atoned for if the individual is to become genuinely responsible.
In the process of becoming an adult significant emotional ties with parents are
severed [thus producing guilt and a need to atone]. They are not simply renounced
171 Ibid., 387.
96
by force of circumstances, castration threats, etc- although these play an important
role- but they are also actively rejected, fought against, and destroyed to varying
degrees.172
For Loewald, guilt does not derive purely from Oedipal fantasies in the child's mind, as
postulated by Freud. Rather, in viewing the Oedipus complex in terms of generational
struggle,173 Mitchell (correctly, in my view) reads Loewald as arguing that a version of
the parent is actually destroyed or murdered as a child develops and becomes more
independent. At one time the infant was totally dependent on her parents for everything,
and even though the parents may take great pleasure in watching her grow, it is with
difficulty that they give up the joys and responsibilities that this level of total care entails.
And yet the growing child must renounce this level of care and kill that version of the
parent, no matter how much resistance she encounters:
Parents always exit confiictedly, never simply gracefully, from each
developmental stage. And the child, who needs to struggle toward his own
emancipatory freedom, must do his part in pushing the parent off. The murder
brings guilt, and bearing that guilt is an important part of psychological growth.
Murder and emancipation are thus inescapably intertwined. We develop our autonomy,
respresented by the superego, and engage in "non-incestuous object relations" by killing
our parents and appropriating their power and authority, including their responsibility for
us:
172 Ibid., 388-9.
173 Erik H. Erikson also makes the Oedipal complex into a generational issue, but he views it differently
from Loewald. Loewald touches on this in his "Internalization and the Superego," in Hans W. Loewald,
The Essential Loewald: Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing
Group, Inc., 2000), 267.
174 Stephen A. Mitchell, Can Love Last? The Fate ofRomance Over Time (New York & London: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2002), 159-60.
175 Emancipation, with its positive connotation, is favored by Loewald in his developmental account of
mental life. We will come to see how Emmanuel Lévinas interprets the assertion of personal freedom and
autonomy by the individual (which is much the same thing) in a very different light from Loewald.
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In short, we destroy them in regard to some of their qualities hitherto most vital to
us. Parents resist as well as promote such destruction no less ambivalently than
children carry it out. What will be left if things go well, is tenderness, mutual
trust, and respect, the signs of equality.176
Loewald clearly elaborates the need for opposition in the individual's striving for
autonomy. Parental figures that provide too much leeway and insufficient boundaries
often hinder the emancipation of their children, even though they believe (perhaps with a
measure of denial?) that they are facilitating independence. Without such a struggle that
results in parricide, there would be no guilt and thus no development of a responsible self
that can atone for the crime. It would therefore appear "as if opponents are required with
whom the drama of gaining power, authority, autonomy, and the distribution of guilt can
be played out."177
Superego and Conscience
It is this (partial) mastering of the Oedipus complex that leads to the configuration
of the superego, which for Freud and Loewald is the locus of conscience and the
repository of morality. The superego may be thought of as an internalization of the moral
norms represented in the person of the father (or, more generally for Loewald, either
parental figure), and it assumes a more or less stable psychical structure in the post-
Oedipal individual. For object-relations theorists, it represents an internal object. In other
176 Loewald, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex;' in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald:
Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 390.
'77IbJd., 389.
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words, the superego as internal object is configured as the parents are destroyed as
libidinal objects. The constitution of the superego occurs as the direct result of the
psychical crime of parricide, and this psychic structure/internal object then has the task of
monitoring (i.e. taking responsibility for) the ego.178
If the superego is constituted as a result ofpsychical parricide, it is also structured in part
as a means of atoning for this crime. This atonement takes place because in some way the
superego restores the libidinal relationships that were destroyed, but internally rather than
externally:
The organization of the superego, as internalization or narcissistic transformation
of oedipal object relations, documents parricide and at the same time is its
atonement and metamorphosis: atonement insofar as the superego makes up for
and is a restitution of oedipal relationships; metamorphosis insofar as in this
restitution oedipal object relations are transmuted into internal, intra-psychic
structural relations.
Thus, for Loewald, the superego "embodies the child's successful appropriation of
parental authority which is transformed into the child's capacities for autonomy and
responsibility."180
This oedipal drama of guilt and atonement frequently plays out in the psychoanalytic
context in the interactions between analyst and patient. The inability on the part of the
patient to assume responsibility for herself is often the result of an inability or
unwillingness to bear the guilt associated with parricide. An unending need for
Ibid., 389. As we shall see in the following chapter, this idea recalls Emmanuel Levinas's reading of
Pascal's "taking one's place in the sun" in which the assertion of the ego necessarily occurs at the expense
of the Other.
179IbJd., 389.
Thomas H. Ogden, "Reading Loewald: Oedipus reconceived," Internationaljournal ofPsychoanalysis
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punishment ("cruel, inflexible standards and demands") may then be substituted for
authentic atonement or reconciliation, which can only come about by means ofproper
mourning for that which was lost/destroyed:
Need for punishment tends to become inexhaustible if atonement or reconciliation
is not eventually brought about by mourning, which leads to a mature superego
and to the possibility of non-incestuous object relations (the word "atone,"
literally and in many contexts, means to become or cause to become at one, to
reconcile, to bring to concord or harmony).181 [italics in original]
For Freud, as for Loewald, guilt represents the linchpin in the human ascent from the
bestial to the civilized. If Oedipal guilt is absent the result is sociopathy, while an excess
of Oedipal guilt results in neurosis (the symptoms of which express and provide
punishment for infantile sexual wishes). The latter situation leads to what Freud termed
the "negative therapeutic reaction" in which the neurotic seeks relief from therapy but
cannot permit herself to derive any: "As the oedipal criminal he unconsciously takes
himself to be, he regards himself as undeserving of help: his crimes are unpardonable."18
We have therefore seen that becoming responsible for oneself— becoming an
autonomous agent— involves forcibly severing and reformulating sacred bonds with our
primary caretakers, our most intimate others.183 In Loewald' s developmental account of
the origins of consciousness, these bonds are prior to the self, they are antecedent to the
autonomous "I" that is regarded as the primary (and often the sole) locus of meaning in
!8! Loewald, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex." in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald:
Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 389-390.
182 Stephen A. Mitchell, Can Love Last? The Fate ofRomance Over Time (New York & London: W.W.
Norton & Company, 2002), 156-7.
183 This account of subjectivity is both similar to, and radically different from, Emmanuel Levinas's
account. For both thinkers, the development/assertion of the ego necessarily occurs at the expense of the
other. Other similarities and differences will be explored in the following chapters.
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Western Philosophy. Within the psychoanalytic paradigm, the notion that one can
become a completely unencumbered moral agent (i.e. free from guilt) through an exercise
of will (as in the Kantian context) is illusory, and necessarily entails considerable
repression.
The (always incomplete) resolution of the Oedipus conflict in childhood leads to
the temporary waning (i.e. repression) of this complex until adolescence, when it
reemerges and is expressed via passive repetition (i.e. unconsciously). For Loewald, this
repression is an important part of the developmental process ofbecoming morally
responsible. It is also an indispensable part ofthe process of building healthy (i.e. non-
incestuous), loving relationships with others:
Parricide is carried out, instead of being sidestepped, in that dual activity in which
aspects of oedipal relations are transformed into ego-superego relations
(internalization), and other aspects are, qua relations with external objects,
restructured in such a way that the incestuous character of object relations gives
way to novel forms of object choice. These novel object choices are under the
influence of those internalizations. Insofar as human beings strive for
emancipation and individuation as well as for object love, parricide on the plane
of psychic action is a developmental necessity.184 [italics in the oriinal]
It is this ongoing linkage between internal and external relations, primary and
secondary processes, that infuses a life with meaning (by giving way to "novel forms of
object choice") in Loewald' s developmental account.
As previously indicated, this psychical parricide renders us guilty and requires
atonement. One of the ways in which this guilt is made manifest is in the need for
i84 Loewald, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald:
Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 390.
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punishment, although as we have seen, punishment cannot in and of itself remove the
guilt. This is due to the fact that punishment (whether self-inflicted or inflicted by others)
is primarily (although not necessarily exclusively) in the service of repression of the
sense of guilt. In other words, guilt frequently leads to a need for punishment. In a similar
vein, anxiety frequently leads to a defense against guilt,
but anxiety is not therefore to be equated with a need for assuaging or eliminating
it. Nor is anxiety, in its primary function, a signal to induce flight or repression,
but a sign of internal conflict and danger that may be dealt with in a number of
ways.18
The guilt resulting from the psychical murder of the parents therefore leads to inner
conflict, which in turn is passively repeated by the individual. Punishment, which has a
strong masochistic component, represents a short-circuit of the process of atonement. In
order for genuine mourning and atonement to take place, the guilt must first be borne
(rather than evaded and thus short-circuited) for a period of time:
For action that is not compulsive to take place, the affect is to be borne for a time
(it is here that the "holding environment" is ofhelp). Thought and feeling (affect)
are "delayed action," that is, activity that lingers, is "long," instead of being a
short circuit (it should be kept in mind that seeing any action or process that does
not short-circuit as a delay, takes reflex action and direct "energy discharge" as
the standard).186
We have seen that the superego, as an internalization of the moral norms of the parents,
serves in part as an internal monitor of the ego, and in this way allows a person to be
autonomous (literally, "self-legislating") and hence morally responsible. This is one way
in which we atone for the psychical parricide that inevitably results from our passage to




possibility is that, at the same time that the parents are (psychically) murdered, a form of
immortality is also bestowed upon them. By internalizing important aspects of our
experience of our parents into who we are as individuals (i.e. into our very structure), we
secure for them
a place, a seat of influence, not only in the way the child conducts his life, but also
in the way the child's children conduct their lives [since these same moral norms
will be passed on to the succeeding generations], and on and on.187
While the Oedipus complex is never fully mastered, it is possible to mitigate the guilt that
stems from it. In order to achieve this, one must work through (and eventually reconcile)
the complex and conflicting oedipal strivings. In other words, they must be reintegrated
on a more highly differentiated level of mental organization. Loewald elaborates the
conflicted nature of these oedipal strivings in his essay "Ego and Reality," and his
account is significantly more nuanced and complex than that ofFreud. This essay is
significant from a feminist perspective as well, in that Loewald's account of the Mother
and Father is more ambiguous than Freud's (and thus less restricted by gender
stereotypes).
For Loewald, the father figure is not primarily a hostile figure (as he is for Freud),
representing the castration threat to which the young boy responds by either passive
submission and/or rebellion. He also has a positive and more essential role for the
development of the ego:
1 Thomas H. Ogden, "Reading Loewald: Oedipus reconceived," Internationaljournal ofPsychoanalysis
87, vol. 3 (Jun 2006): 659.
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Against the threat of the engulfing, overpowering womb, stands the paternal veto
against the libidinal relationship with the mother. Against this threat of the
maternal engulfment, the paternal position is not another threat or danger, but a
support ofpowerful force.188
As this passage suggests, the oedipal relationship with the mother is also more conflicted
than Freud initially postulated. She represents more than an object of libidinal desire, the
union with which is thwarted by the father. There is also the overpowering,
"annihilating" aspect of the maternal figure, in which the individuating child is threatened
with a loss of differentiation:
To express it in broader terms: The original unity and identity [i.e. between infant
and mother], undifferentiated and unstructured, of psychic apparatus and
environment is as much of a danger for the ego as the demand of the "paternal1 RQ
castration threat" to give it up altogether.
We may therefore discern two pairs of relationships to the parent figures that play out in
the Oedipal drama:
(1) in regard to the mother, a positive libidinal relationship, growing out of the
primary narcissistic position, and a defensive, negative one of dread of the
womb, dread of sinking back into the original unstructured state of identity
with her;
(2) in relation to the father, a positive, "typically masculine" identification with
him, which lends powerful support against the danger of the womb; and a
defensive relationship concerning the paternal castration threat.19
These positive and defensive relationships with the mother and father enter into the
Oedipus complex and form components of it. What has been referred to as the paternal
188 Hans Loewald, "Ego and Reality," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald: Collected Papers and
Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 14.
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castration threat now consists of a later, hostile (castration) threat and an earlier positive
identification with an idealized version of the father. Furthermore, the positive libidinal
relation with the mother now consists of a need for union with her as well as a dread of
this union. Loewald is thus claiming that "as the dread of the womb cannot be explained
primarily by the fear of the father's penis, so the positive identification with the father
cannot be reduced to the fearful submission to his castration threat."1 l
Loewald thus rejects the simplistic characterization of the relation to the Mother as solely
positive and to the father as solely hostile in the Oedipal drama. Although he is
nevertheless emphasizing the biological role of the woman as mother (i.e. he is, at least in
this regard, essentializing women), one could argue that his account is less monolithic
and Patriarchal than Freud's.
As we have seen, in order to master the guilt that inevitably follows the crime of
psychic parricide, the individual must come to terms with the conflicting Oedipal
strivings toward the mother and father figures. The link to these primary process ways of
experiencing the relationships to our earliest caretakers must be maintained, but these
connections must be integrated into the more complex and differentiated ways of
experiencing that are appropriate to the adult world. The development of the superego
may be understood from this perspective.
The nuanced picture of responsibility elaborated by Loewald strikes a balance between
the more extreme depictions of moral agency that are current in contemporary Western
culture. One the one hand, Loewald's account rejects the abject powerlessness associated
191IbJd., 15-16.
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with the so-called medical-biological account ofmoral agency, in which our thoughts and
actions are solely determined by internal or external forces beyond our control (i.e. in
which our agency is illusory). On the other hand, he rejects the hyper-rational
consumerist account of moral agency in which our most difficult choices are construed as
radically unconstrained. For Loewald (as for Heidegger with his notion ofgeworfenheit),
we are thrown unwilling into the world at birth and it is our (developmental) task to own
up to our circumstances so that we can experience ourselves as agents:192
I will stress here only certain relevant aspects of self-responsibility. It involves
appropriating or owning up to one's needs and impulses as one's own, impulses
and desires we appear to have been born with or that seem to have taken shape in
interaction with parents during infancy. Such appropriation (notice that I use the
same word as when I spoke of appropriating parental authority), in the course of
which we begin to develop a sense of self-identity, means to experience ourselves
as agents, notwithstanding the fact that we were bom without our informed
consent and did not pick our parents.193
Agency for Loewald is not, as it appeared to be for Freud, illusory. Our capacity to be
responsible and to choose is real, but so are the forces that serve as constraints on our
freedom. The superego, which is an internal object (i.e. it is a construct and thus limited),
is the essence of our internal agency. Using a construct!vist analogy, Stephen A.
Mitchell194 has likened the balance between freedom and constraints to those limitations
imposed on an architect or artist by the medium in which she is working. A great variety
of houses can be made out of brick or straw, but the materials used will impose real
For an elaboration of the continuities between Loewald and Heidegger, see Stanley A. Leavy, "Time
and World in the Thought of Hans W. Loewald," The Psychoanalytic Study ofthe Child 44 (1989): 231-
240.
1 Hans Loewald, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald:
Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 392.
194 Stephen A. Mitchell, Can Love Last? The Fate ofRomance Over Time (New York & London: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2002). This analogy also recalls Martin Buber's notion of fettered surprise. For a more
detailed treatment please see Michael Oppenheim, Jewish Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: Narrating the
Interhuman (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006).
constraints on how the houses are designed- In a similar vein, agency and choice are
possible within the constraints of the forces that threaten them. The desires and impulses
to which we are subjected are not to be repressed or overpowered, but are rather to be
granted the active existence that they will have regardless (i.e. with or without our
consent). Taking ownership over these desires and impulses by recognizing and accepting
them as our own may partially mitigate their severity, but at any rate will allow us to be
responsible for them.
Following the lead of the word responsibility, one may say that appropriation
consists in being responsive to their urgings. A harsh, unyielding superego is
unresponsive and in that sense irresponsible. Unless modified it leads to self-
destruction or to having to be bribed and corrupted. Self-inflicted or "arranged"
punishment is one form of such corruption; it merely assuages guilt for a while.195
Loewald, the Self, and Responsibility
According to Loewald's reading of what it means to be responsible, one cannot become
an autonomous self without atoning for the guilt incurred by the crime of psychical
parricide. This notion of guilt and atonement is absent from traditional liberal
conceptions of the autonomous self, which asserts itself as an act of will. One might
argue that this act of imposing the will represents an attempt to master reality, to stamp
one's authoritative interpretation upon the world into which one has been thrown.196
Hans Loewald, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald:
Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 392-3.
This notion of "allowing or granting [our desires and impulses] that existence that they have in any event,"
rather than trying to overpower or repress them, recalls the approach recommended in certain types of
Buddhist meditation (i.e. Zen and Vipassana). A more detailed comparison is beyond the parameters of the
present examination.
196 We shall explore this idea in the next chapter in relation to Levinas's account of the assertion of the ego
and the subjugation of the Other.
From Loewald's psychoanalytic perspective, this latter account represents an evasion or
repression of the need to atone, and hence a denial of responsibility:
Responsibility to oneself, in the sense of being responsive to one's urgings in the
manner I described, involves facing and bearing the guilt for those acts we
consider as criminal. Prototypical, in the oedipal complex, are parricide and
incest. I97
As we have seen, it makes little difference on the psychical plane if these acts are merely
fantasies or are carried out symbolically, because they nevertheless possess a psychic
reality (i.e. they serve to configure our internal and external relations) and require
atonement. An internal restitution of the child-parent relation is needed:
Atonement for these crimes- which I defined as reconciliation, being again at one-
consists in a reconstitution of child-parent relations on the internal scene of action
(internalization). As mentioned before, this transposition or transmutation, at once
destruction and restitution, in metapsychological language is a transformation of
object cathexis [repression] into narcissistic cathexis [internalization].198
Responsibility is therefore paradoxical, in that it entails both a criminal act and its
restitution. From the viewpoint of received morality, self-responsibility is a crime (i.e.
parricide) of which humans are inevitably guilty as they emancipate themselves as
individuals, but it is at the same time restitution and atonement for that crime:
Without the guilty deed of parricide there is no autonomous self. And further, also
from the viewpoint of received morality, individuality and its maturity- 1 am not
speaking of unbridled individualism- is a virtue, a summum bonum, at any rate in
Hans Loewald, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald:
Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 393.
198 Ibid., 393. Loewald distinguishes between object cathexis and narcissistic cathexis in Hans Loewald,
"On Internalization," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald: Collected Papers and Monographs
(Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 76-7.
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modem Western civilizations. To live among these paradoxes appears to be our
fate for the time being.199 [italics in the original]
It bears repeating that for Loewald, we are all inevitably guilty simply by becoming self-
responsible individuals, at least within a western context that valorizes individuality as a
virtue. We will see that this may not be the case in so-called collectivistic, non-western
contexts.
The self, for Loewald, is therefore in its very structure designed to require or to
bring about atonement. In particular, affect (especially guilt) is instrumental in creating a
self. Without this guilt which requires atonement, there can be no self. This depiction is
very different from the self of Western Philosophy (i.e. Kant and Mill, as explored in the
earlier chapter on Feminism) which is radically unencumbered by affect and from which
ethics can be deduced via a mathematical equation (consequentialism) or by reference to
abstract universal moral laws (deontology). From the point of view of such theories, guilt
is either irrelevant or an actual hindrance to sound (i.e. rational) thinking about moral
matters. For Loewald it is indispensable:
Guilt then is not a troublesome affect that we might hope to eliminate in some
fashion, but one of the driving forces in the organization ofthe self. The self, in
its autonomy, is an atonement structure, a structure of reconciliation, and as such
a supreme achievement.
If Loewald challenges the traditional philosophical conceptions of the self, then he also
challenges the supposed dichotomy of objectivity and subjectivity that pervaded the
scientific paradigm of Freud's time. Although the self acts upon the world in the sense
199 Hans Loewald, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald:
Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 393-4.
that our experience is shaped by the particular contours of consciousness, the self and
consciousness are also shaped by the world. This dialectical back-and-forth enriches our
experience and facilitates new ways of relating to the world (and of loving):
In mature object relations, ideally the self engages in a return movement with
objects that are differently organized and experienced by the self thanks to its own
richer organization. It is this richer self-organization that can lead to novel ways
of relating to objects while being enriched by their novelty. In some sense that
novel way of relating with objects- most obvious in mature relations- creatively
destroys and reconstitutes, in a sea-chañge on the plane of object love, the old
oedipal relations. It also constitutes an atonement. 0I
We will recall that for Loewald, the ego emerges gradually over time from an original
unity between infant and mother in which there is no differentiation between self and
other, inner and outer. So-called "objective" reality emerges as a distinct sense of self is
formed— objectivity and subjectivity are thus co-created. The developing ego serves an
integrative function, in which the original experience of unity and connectedness is
preserved on increasingly complex and differentiated levels of experience. For Loewald,
a "richer self-organization" means that the links between primary and secondary
experience (or, in terms of one aspect, between fantasy and reality) are vibrant and alive.
By permeating the present with the primary experiences of the past, the present is
enriched and transformed, thereby transforming our experience of "reality." As reality is
transformed, we find new ways of relating to the objects (i.e. people) in the world, and
these new relations in turn have a transformative effect on us. It is important to keep in
mind that these relationships— between subject and object, reality and fantasy— are
Ibid., 394. One also recalls in this connection the implications of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in
quantum mechanics.
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continuously negotiated and renegotiated over a lifetime. Loewald equates any reification
of the self with psychopathology (acting out, neurosis, etc).
This fluid account of the relationship between objectivity and subjectivity and between
fantasy and reality clearly anticipates many of the insights of the postmodern critique of
philosophy. However, it would not be accurate to characterize Loewald as a postmodern
thinker. For example, Loewald posits a cause and effect relationship between our early
experiences and later psychopathologies that is far more deterministic than a strictly
postmodern account. As we have seen, Loewald brackets his account of Oedipal conflict
by situating it within a particular time and place (i.e. the Western context) but his version
of intrapsychic structural development is, at least from the vantage point of the explicitly
postmodern-historicist or social-constructivist theories that followed him, positivist.
After all, Loewald maintained the Freudian conceptual frameworks (for example, the
structures of Id, Ego and Superego) even while introducing radical transformations of
their meaning. Joel Whitebook argues that Loewald' s resistance to making the
postmodern move was a result of theoretical choice and not, as implied by Teicholz, a
result of bad timing, but this is not entirely clear.203 In any event, Loewald' s account is
structured in such a way as to avoid the excesses (i.e. the inability to account for real
human agency in a radically de-centered self) that afflicts much of postmodern theorizing
about the subject.
202 Judith Guss Teicholz, Kohut, Loewald, and the postmodems: a comparative study ofselfand
relationship (Hillsdale, N.J.: Analytic, 1999), 18-9.
20j Joel Whitebook, "Hans Loewald: A radical conservative," Internationaljournal ofPsychoanalysis 85,
vol. 1 (Feb 2004): 101 (footnote 3).
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Loewald and Feminism
Before discussing Loewald and feminist theory, it would be useful to reconsider his
views on the maternal dimension in the Oedipal drama. Although he identifies parricide
as the primary psychical crime for which the individual must atone, he also stresses the
significance of the closely-related crime of incest, in which the sanctity of the primary
process (i.e. undifferentiated) unity between mother and infant is violated as the infant
differentiates herself and yet still desires to maintain that original unity. In other words,
as the infant comes to experience herself as a separate entity, her mother is (by extension)
experienced as separate, too (i.e. as an external object). The incestuous desire for union
with that object thus inevitably accompanies the process of differentiation. Incestuous
acts and fantasies constitute a crime because they violate the sanctity of the original
oneness, i.e. the infant-mother unity that precedes the Oedipal phase:
The "sacred" innocence of primary narcissistic unity and its derivatives, anterior
to individuation and its inherent guilt and atonement, while resulting from sexual
union of the parents, precedes and is the undifferentiated source of the child's
emerging sexuality. Our vision tends to be blurred by a nostalgic longing for such
a state... Implicit in the modern objective, scientific world view, on the other
hand, is an investment in the opposite direction that tends to negate the validity,
however compromised and complicated by subsequent development, of the
primacy ofthat unitary source.2 4
Here Loewald alludes to the idolization of science, which mistakes the world of
"objectivity" for the sole reality. He "regarded such a state as a culturally valued,
normative pathology."205 From a feminist perspective, Loewald is asserting the value of
the stereotypically feminine sphere of fantasy, affect and subjectivity against the
204 Hans Loewald, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald:
Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 396.
205 Stephen A. Mitchell, "From Ghosts to Ancestors," Psychoanalytic Dialogues 8, vol. 6 (1998): 849.
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obsession with the allegedly masculine sphere of abstract hyper-rationality and
objectivity.
How does the incestuous impulse play a role in the development ofa (responsible) self?
As we have seen, incest occurs on the psychical plane when someone (i.e. the mother)
with whom we had a prior unity becomes a libidinal object: "The very same person with
whom there had been a pre-objectal [in other words, undifferentiated] bond prior to and
continuing into the oedipal phase now becomes an object of sexual desire."206
Understood in this way, incest is the inevitable consequence of the shift, without a
substitutive change of person, from a primary-process (and hence undifferentiated) way
of experiencing to a secondary-process (i.e. differentiated) way of experiencing. The
incestuous object was previously not experienced as a distinct object at all, but rather as
part of a unified whole. As differentiation occurs, the ego strives to maintain the original
unity on a more complex level of organization, and thus the "new" object emerges as an
object of desire. As with the crime ofparricide, which follows later, incest is the
inevitable consequence of the development of secondary-process ways of experiencing
the other (who was originally the same). The emerging libidinal object thus has,
ontologically speaking, a liminal status:
The incestuous object thus is an intermediate, ambiguous entity, neither a full-
fledged libidinal objection nor an unequivocal identification. The fact that the
incestuous object, insofar as it is libidinal object, is the very same person that
originally had been and continues to be also an identificatum, renders incest evil
in our eyes. The identificatory intimacy of child and parent (or close relative) is
both exploited and defied in incest.207 [italics in the original]
Hans Loewald, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald:
Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 397.
207 Ibid., 397.
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When Loewald speaks here of identification (identification), he is referring to the
psychological process whereby an identity of subject and object (i.e. infant and mother)
or ofparts or aspects of them, is established:
Insofar as, in identification, they become identical, one and the same, there is a
merging or confusion of subject and object. Identification tends to erase a
difference: subject becomes object and object becomes subject.208
Incest can thus be understood as "a regressive, back-sliding repetition of an intermediate
stage in the process of individuation," and "incestuous oedipal fantasies dominating
sexual life in adulthood represent non-resolution of the Oedipus complex."209 Seen from
another light, the desire to maintain the (prior) unity with the mother in a newly-
differentiated context is a driving force in the development of the superego and hence, for
Loewald, of a self. Becoming a responsible, autonomous self entails giving up the
oedipal-incestuous ties in the process of superego formation. In other words, the primary
identifications must be renounced so that they may give way to (or be reconfigured as)
secondary or superego identifications.210
The maternal figure, at least in terms of the Oedipal period, is thus granted a far more
important role in Loewald's developmental account than in Freud's theory. However,
Loewald also emphasizes the centrality of the maternal role in the pre-Oedipal period,
and especially with reference to his notion of conscire (which derives, along with the
word "conscious," from the Latin conscius, "to know together").
208 Hans Loewald, "On Internalization," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald: Collected Papers
and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 83.
Hans Loewald, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald:
Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc.. 2000), 398.
2,0 Ibid., 398.
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Conscire is related to the preconscious, which may be distinguished from primary-
process mentation by virtue of it being differentiated to some degree. However, this
differentiation occurs mainly on an internal, psychic plane, and thus does not entail
conscious awareness in the usual sense:
We are most familiar with this conscire, with this splitting into different psychic
elements which thereby encounter and know each other, from consciousness. But
it is not conscious awareness of such things that establishes that knowing.21 x
[italics in the original]
If this knowing is not established by conscious awareness, then how does it arise? It
originates with the mother, in her "mirroring interpretation and organization of the child's
urges, feelings, and actions— through such processes the links of action and feeling
become links ofmeaning."212 Of particular importance in this passage is the interpretive
dimension of the mother's mirroring. Rather than passively reflecting back what she
perceives in her child, the whole process of this reflection and recognition becomes a
central constituent of the child's individuation. This is due, in part, to the fact that the
mother (and other primary caretakers) are far ahead of the infant's stage of
development/differentiation:
Parental care, knowing, understanding, embedded in their interactions with the
child, take place in the context and perspective ofthe child's overall requirements
and future course of development, as perceived and misperceived by the parents.
Thus, parental recognizing care reflects more, as it were, to the child than what he
211 Hans Loewald, "Perspectives on Memory," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald: Collected
Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 169.
212Ibid., 169.
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presents; it mediates higher organization. This generating difference or gradient is
essential.213
By assigning the primary (but not necessarily exclusive— other caretakers, including the
father, also have salient roles) responsibility for the development of conscire in the infant
to the mother, Loewald is rejecting the patriarchal characterization of the feminine as the
irrational (and thus inferior) member of the male-female dyad. For him, it is the mother
who initiates and shapes the development of secondary-process mentation in the infant,
which is the sphere characterized by differentiation and (at sufficiently-advanced levels
of organization) philosophical and scientific thinking.
We may therefore discern a number of features in Loewald's thought that are consistent
with many of the insights revealed through the feminist critique ofphilosophy and of
Freudian psychoanalysis.
First and foremost, Loewald does not privilege a stereotypically masculine way of
experiencing/interpreting reality. On the contrary, he forcefully argues that a meaningful
present is only possible when a dialectical relation between fantasy/affect (primary
process) and reality/rationality (secondary process) is extant. In this way the two relations
to reality, "the paternal and the maternal, which have their own advantages and dangers,
are, in fact, perfect complements."214 Another way of stating this is that Loewald does not
Hans Loewald, "Psychoanalysis and the History of the Individual," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential
Loewald: Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000),
540. In the same essay, Loewald reiterates the central role of the mother in initiating the development of
conscire in the infant: "This mirroring, I said, reflects more than what the infant presents. It contains the
mother's acts of organizing the infant's activities and experiences within an envisioned temporal-spatial
totality of his being- the prototype of what is called his ego as a coherent organization. . .The totality or
coherent organization is to begin with merely in the mother's foreseeing eye, as a kind of unperceived plan
And so the infant's uniform mental acts [i.e. primary-process mentation] thus acquire differentiation, (p.
542)
Joel Whitebook, "Hans Loewald: A radical conservative," Internationaljournal ofPsychoanalysis 85,
vol. 1 (Feb 2004): 104.
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repress the pre-oedipal (feminine) in his work while privileging the oedipal (masculine)
dimension.
Nor does Loewald believe (along the lines of Kohlberg's stages ofmoral development)
that the highest stage of differentiation is the most meaningful. On the contrary,
reification at such a hyper-rational level is a form ofpathology:
Perhaps the so-called fully developed, mature ego is not one that has become
fixated at the presumably highest or latest stage of development, having left the
others behind it, but is an ego that integrates its reality in such a way that the
earlier and deeper levels of ego-reality integration remain alive as dynamic
sources of higher organization.215
Mitchell reads Loewald's treatment of language along similar lines. Loewald does not
privilege the denotative, syntactic dimension of language, but argues for the need of an
active link between the same words in their primary (i.e. undifferentiated) and secondary-
process forms.216 In this way his theory compliments Luce Irigaray's feminist critique of
the patriarchal (and hence inherently repressive) character of secondary-process language
use. If Irigaray's studies of language revealed that women have more difficulty saying "I"
(i.e. asserting themselves as autonomous subjects), then Loewald's theory affirms the
pathological origin of this state of affairs. On this reading, languages that, by virtue of
their structure, restrict the agency of women (this is more explicit in reflective languages)
are engaged in a (neurotic) repression of the primary process experiential realm. Such
societies would thus be inherently pathological.
215 Hans Loewald, "Ego and Reality," in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald: Collected Papers and
Monographs (Hagerstown, Md: University Publishing Group, Inc., 2000), 20.
216 Stephen A. Mitchell, "From Ghosts to Ancestors," Psychoanalytic Dialogues 8, vol. 6 (1998): 832-3.
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While Freud has been criticized by feminists for his phallocentrism and biological
determinism, it is much more difficult to situate Loewald's position on sexuality and
gender. Teicholz identifies this difficulty noting that
the paucity of Loewald's exploration of the specific issues of sexuality and gender
has led me to stretch toward an interpretation ofhis position on the basis of
meager material in his writings. This absence alone probably speaks for itself.217
Teicholz has also indicated that in postmodern thought and contemporary perspectives on
gender, the dichotomy between masculine and feminine is resolved "by invoking a
dialectical relationship between them."218 As we have seen, the centrality of this
dialectical relationship is a core feature of Loewald's thought.
The following chapter will focus on the thought of Emmanuel Lévinas. By
reading Lévinas for what it means to be responsible, important features in his account of
subjectivity will be brought into focus. In particular, the importance of guilt, persecution,
and atonement will be examined, and these features will then be compared and contrasted
with Hans Loewald's developmental account of subjectivity.
Judith Guss Teicholz, Kohut, Loewald, and the postmoderns: a comparative study ofselfand
relationship (Hillsdale, N.J.: Analytic, 1999), 21 1.
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Chapter Four: Emmanuel Lévinas and the Priority of the Other
Since Emmanuel Lévinas' death in 1995, his philosophical legacy has given rise to a
veritable industry of scholarly articles, books and conferences examining various facets
of his thought. It would not be possible to do justice to the full breadth ofhis contribution
to philosophy in a single chapter. This essay will commence with a brief summary ofhis
life and a review of the current state of Lévinas scholarship. The salient themes in his
thought will then be examined, beginning with Levinas's critique of philosophy, his
phenomenology of the inter-human encounter, the need to preserve the alterity of the
other in that encounter, and the reduction of the other to the same that is the inevitable
result of totalizing thinking. Levinas's arguments for ethics as first philosophy will be
examined, which includes his juxtaposition ofwhat he terms "Greek" (ontological) and
"Hebrew" (ethical) perspectives. It is in this vein that Levinas's interpretation of the
biblical story of Cain and Abel will be considered, in which he juxtaposes Cain's
undeveloped subjectivity with the fully developed ethical relation that is represented,
from the point of view of the mother, by maternity. The importance that Lévinas
attributes to the face will be examined, along with his thoughts on bad conscience and
death. Levinas's radical re-conception of human subjectivity and what it means to be
unique will be examined in detail, and the chapter will conclude with a careful
consideration of his phenomenology of non-intentional consciousness. The overarching
theme that unites these facets of Levinas's thought is his engagement with what it means
to be a responsible (ethical) self, and the theme of responsibility will be considered
throughout the chapter.
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Emmanuel Lévinas: A brief biographical overview
Lévinas was born in Lithuania in 1906 and studied philosophy in Germany at the
University of Strasbourg from 1928-29 with Husserl and Heidegger before settling in
France in the 1930s. He has been credited with introducing phenomenology to Sartre and,
hence, to French intellectual life.219
Lévinas fought for France during the Second World War and was captured and
imprisoned by the Germans. Although he and his immediate family escaped death, their
extended families were murdered by the Nazis. Following the war, Lévinas held chairs in
philosophy at Poitiers, Paris-Nanterre and the Sorbonne. 20
Totality and Infinity (1961) and Otherwise than Being: or, Beyond Essence (1974) are
Levinas's most significant works, and he has had a profound influence on an entire
generation ofpostmodern French philosophers, including Jacques Derrida (particularly in
his essay, "Violence and Metaphysics"), Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Luce Irigaray.
Indeed, it has been argued that Levinas's critique ofphilosophy "can be seen to underlie
almost all responsible work in postmodernism."221
"!9 "But it was Sartre who guaranteed my place in eternity by stating in his famous obituary essay on
Merleau-Ponty that he, Sartre, 'was introduced to phenomenology by Lévinas.'" Emmanuel Lévinas,
"Dialogue with Emmanuel Lévinas," in Face to Face with Lévinas, edited by Richard Cohen (Albany:
SUNY Press, 1986), 16.
Robert Eaglestone, "Postmodernism and ethics against the metaphysics of comprehension," in The
Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism, edited by Steven Connor (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), 184-5.
221IbJd., 185.
The current state of Lévinas scholarship
Colin Davis's recent article222 reflects on the state of Lévinas scholarship eleven years
after his death. The backdrop for this reflection is the publication of The Cambridge
Companion to Lévinas which was edited by Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002).
While the collection does a good job of reflecting the current state of Lévinas studies,
there is little in the way of criticism of his work. The book offers
A useful chronology of Lévinas' s life and career; an Introduction which explains
the main issues in his thought; discussions of his relation to Judaism and to other
thinkers such as Husserl, Heidegger, Kant and Blanchot; essays on key terms such
as the face, the feminine, substitution and evil; analysis of his views on language,
poetry and art; and finally a decent Bibliography and a detailed Index.223
As for the criticism, Stella Sandford argues that no useful resources for feminism are to
be found in Lévinas' s account of the feminine,224 while Gerald L. Bruns recovers from
Lévinas a useful contribution to modernist aesthetics.225
With these two exceptions, there is little in the way of explicit criticism of Levinas's
work in this volume, and there is rather "a discernible inclination to speak from within
Levinas's discursive universe rather than attempting to elucidate it for the uninitiated."
Elsewhere, Davis notes that rather than offering a critique of Lévinas, many of his
222 Colin Davis, "Lévinas at 100," Paragraph 29, vol. 3 (2006): 95-104.
223 Ibid., 96.
Stella Sandford, "Lévinas, feminism and the feminine," in The Cambridge Companion to Lévinas,
edited by Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). There
is a sizable literature on Lévinas and feminism, which include some positive approaches to his work.
225 Gerald L. Bruns, "The Concept of Art and Poetry in Emmanuel Levinas's Writings/' in The Cambridge
Companion to Lévinas, edited by Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002).
commentators "seem content to inhabit and to mimic his discourse with gratitude."
This tendency is particularly evident in discussions of the Levinasian theme of the face,
which (as we shall see) is central to his thought yet obscure.227
Davis has also identified a softening of Levinas's asymmetrical and impossibly
demanding ethics into something much gentler and less troubling. For instance, in the
introduction of the Companion, Critchley summarizes Levinasian ethics in the following
manner:
As Lévinas was fond of putting it, the entirety of his philosophy can be
summarized in the simple words, 'Apres vous, Monsieur.' That is, by everyday
and quite banal acts of civility, hospitality, kindness and politeness that have
perhaps received too little attention from philosophers. It is such acts that Lévinas
qualifies with the adjective 'ethical.'
This reading of Levinas's ethics is "Levinas-lite: domesticated, sanitized, and with all the
pain taken out."229
This softening of Levinas's ethics is most evident when juxtaposed with his (extreme)
claim in Otherwise than Being that, I am even responsible for the persecutor and thus for
the persecution to which I am subjected:
Obsessed with responsibilities which did not arise in decisions taken by a subject
'contemplating freely', consequently accused in its innocence, subjectivity in
itself is being thrown back on oneself. This means concretely: accused of what the
226 Colin Davis, "Lévinas at 1 00," Paragraph 29, vol. 3 (2006): 96.
See, for instance, Bernhard Waidenfels, "Lévinas and the face of the other," in 7"Ae Cambridge
Companion to Lévinas, edited by Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), 63-81.
Simon Critchley, "Introduction" in The Cambridge Companion to Lévinas, edited by Simon Critchley
and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
229 Colin Davis, "Lévinas at 1 00," Paragraph 29, vol. 3 (2006): 98.
others do or suffer, or responsible for what they do or suffer. The uniqueness of
the self is the very fact ofbearing the fault of another.230
For Hillary Putnam, this statement goes too far and can thus be left aside without
necessarily compromising Lévinas' s overall project.231 Elsewhere in the Companion
Robert Bernasconi suggests that Lévinas' s claim has been misunderstood and that he
does not mean to shift the blame for violence and murder onto the victim. Such a reading
would entail a confusion between Levinas's analysis of ethical responsibility and the
legal variant of responsibility that is the frequent focus of Western ethics.232
While it is true that one may not be legally to blame for persecution, this does not mean
that one is not ethically responsible for it (although the nature of this responsibility is
unclear). Bernasconi wonders whether or not Levinas's sense of being persecuted is a by-
product of his experience as a Jew, but he chooses to defer this highly difficult and
sensitive consideration to some other occasion.233
If Putnam wishes to set aside this aspect of Levinas's thought and Bernasconi wishes to
soften it (or delay discussion of it to some later date), Davis argues that it is impossible to
remove from the account of subjectivity developed in Levinas's text "the claim that I am
responsible for the persecutor without fundamentally altering his account of the subject as
persecuted, obsessed, accused, hostage and responsible."234
Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or BeyondEssence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht
Boston and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 1 12.
Hilary Putnam, "Lévinas and Judaism" in The Cambridge Companion to Lévinas, edited by Simon
Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
Robert Bernasconi, "What is the question to which 'substitution' is the answer?" in The Cambridge
Companion to Lévinas, edited by Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), 240.
233 Colin Davis, "Lévinas at 100," Paragraph 29, vol. 3 (2006): 99.
234IWd., 100.
Through a careful examination of the account of subjectivity developed by Lévinas, this
examination will advance an interpretation of this difficult facet in his thought. In the
next chapter, we will examine Levinas's account of subjectivity, and in particular this
notion of responsibility for the persecution to which we are subjected, in relation to
Loewald's account of superego formation and the Oedipal Crime that
precipitates/accompanies it. A critical comparison with Loewald will bring into focus
salient aspects of Levinas's account ofthe self, in particular the significance of guilt,
persecution, and the need to atone that permeates his account of subjectivity. In short, we
will clarify what it means to be a responsible self for Lévinas, as well as what it means to
be responsible for the persecution to which we are subjected.
Lévinas and Alterity
The Cambridge Companion to Lévinas omits some of the most serious
philosophical challenges to Levinas's project, among them the critique of his notion of
alterity.
According to Davis, the entirety of Levinas's philosophical project is predicated
upon his notion of alterity. As we shall see, for Lévinas the initial encounter with the
Other is with someone that is wholly other, and not merely a bit different from me. This
notion of an absolute other with whom I am nevertheless (asymmetrically) related has
been criticized by John Caputo, who questions whether this relation (even if it is one of
command-and-response) nevertheless implies a prior commonality. In other words,
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perhaps the Other is not so different from me, after all.235 A relation with an absolutely
Other would be impossible as there would be no basis upon which to meet: "Either there
can be an encounter with the Other, in which case the Other is not entirely Other; or the
Other is entirely Other, in which case it cannot be encountered."
Perhaps Levinas's understanding of "Otherness" should be read within the context of his
critique of ego-centered subjectivity. The Other is absolutely Other in relation to the ego,
which, prior to this encounter, believes itself to be sovereign and to encompass
everything important within itself. The alterity of the Other issues forth as a command
that rends the ego's self-satisfaction and complacency asunder and takes it hostage. After
summarizing the salient themes in Levinas's thought, this chapter will conclude with an
examination of Levinas's notion of non-intentional consciousness, for perhaps it is N-I-C
as an "internal Other" that allows the ego to enter into relation with an absolute Other.
Levinas's phenomenology of non-intentional consciousness is also similar in a number of
striking ways to Hans Loewald's account of primary process mentation. Levinas's notion
of alterity will be examined presently.
235 Ibid., 1 00. Davis cites John Caputo, Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics ofObligation with
Constant Reference to Deconstruction (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 80-
1.
236 Colin Davis, "Lévinas at 100," Paragraph 29. vol. 3 (2006): 100.
Levinas's Critique of Philosophy
The following section will examine Levinas's critique of the totalizing thinking that he
identifies with traditional philosophy. His phenomenology of the inter-human encounter
and the need to preserve the alterity ofthe other will also be considered, along with his
juxtaposition of what he terms the Greek (ontological) and the Hebrew (ethical)
perspectives. Lévinas is arguing for ethics as First Philosophy, and he develops this
argument in part through his analysis of the biblical story of Cain and Abel. We will see
how Lévinas juxtaposes the underdeveloped subjectivity of Cain with the maternal role,
which he understands (from the point of view of the mother) as the exemplar of the fully
ethical relation. In this connection, the theme of the ethical requirement to answer for
one's "place in the sun" (i.e., one's self-assertion as an autonomous I) will be introduced.
In Existence andExistents (first published in French in 1947), Lévinas elaborates the
process by which totalizing thought- the radical reduction of the other to the same that
characterizes Western philosophy— takes place. The two terms from the title of the
work— existent and existence— are defined in the introduction:
The difference between that which exists [the existent] and its existence itself,
between the individual, the genus, the collective, God, beings designated by
substantives, and the event or act of their existence, imposes itself upon
philosophical reflection- and with equal facility disappears from its view. It is as
though thought becomes dizzy pouring over the emptiness of the verb to exist,
which we seem not to be able to say anything about, which only becomes
intelligible in its participle, the existent, that which exists.238
There is that which exists independently of the knower/observer— the objects in the
world— which Lévinas refers to as the existent. Then there is the same object after it has
come to be known (comprehended) by the knower. What happens when this encounter
takes place? The knower encounters the existent initially as something other to itself, but
the act of comprehending it strips the existent of its particularity— of its otherness— and
reduces it to the same as the knower. This occurs because the existent becomes "known"
to the knower via its appropriation/reduction to a neutral third term. Lévinas claims that it
is this reduction of the other to the same that is shattered in the genuine ethical relation:
Does not that summons to responsibility destroy the forms of generality in which
my store of knowledge, my knowledge of the other man, represents the latter to
me as similar to me, designating me instead in the face of the other as responsible
with no possible denial, and thus, as the unique and chosen one?239
In the realm of thought, this can mean that (in the non-ethical relation) the existent loses
its particularity and becomes the member of an abstract general. This appropriation also
occurs in the realm of sensation, where "sense is that by which what is exterior is already
adjusted to and refers to what is interior."240 Or, this appropriation can occur through the
third term of Being, and it is Heidegger's ontology that becomes the target of an
This recalls Martin Heidegger's opening remarks on the phenomenology of Being in the first section of
Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Maiden, MA: Blackwell
Publishing, 1962), 24-8.
Emmanuel Lévinas, Existence and Existents, trans. A. Lingis (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1988), 17.
239 Emmanuel Lévinas, Alterity and Transcendence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1 999), 26-7.
Emmanuel Lévinas, Existence and Existents, trans. A. Lingis (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1988), 47.
especially fierce critique by Lévinas. Heidegger describes dasein ("being-in-the-
world") with an appeal to an ontological finality to which all objects in the world are
subordinated, and Lévinas questions this emphasis on instrumentality:
Seeing objects as "material"- in the sense that we speak of "war material"- he has
included them in the care for existing, which for him is the very putting of the
ontological problem... [But] not everything that is given in the world is a tool.242
Eaglestone summarizes Lévinas' s critique in the following manner:
IfI understand myself as a being who has Being (already reflectively but
unreflective, already an implicit philosophy absorbed with my mother's milk;
ideas are at their most powerful when we do not recognize that they are there), I
am led to believe that any other existent must have Being as I do, and is, in this
key way at least, the same as me.243
This reduction of the other to the same thus occurs, as it were, "behind the scenes,"
without our prior realization. This is what Lévinas means when he says that this process
"imposes itself upon philosophical reflection- and with equal facility disappears from its
view."244
This totalizing metaphysic is, for Lévinas, the essential characteristic ofphilosophy, or
what he terms (since the origins of modern philosophy can be traced back to ancient
241 "...Heideggerian ontology, which subordinates the relationship with the Other to the relation with Being
in general, remains under the obedience to the anonymous, and leads inevitably to another power, to
imperialist domination, to tyranny." Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity (The Hague/Boston/London:
Martinus Nijhoff publishers, 1979), 46-7.
242 Emmanuel Lévinas, Existence and Existents, trans. A. Lingis (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1988), 42-3.
243 Robert Eaglestone, "Postmodernism and ethics against the metaphysics of comprehension," in The
Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism, edited by Steven Connor (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), 1 86.
244 Emmanuel Lévinas, Existence and Existents, trans. A. Lingis (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1988), 17.
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Greece) the language of Greek. Truth is equated with that which is present to me and can
thus be gathered up or brought into accord with a totality (i.e. the cosmos). Because this
totality is singular, everything within it is reduced to the same:
To equate truth thus with presence is to presume that however different the two
terms of a relation might appear (e.g., the Divine and human) or however
separated over time (e.g., into past and future), they can ultimately be rendered
commensurate and simultaneous, the same, contained in a history that totalizes
time into a beginning or an end, or both, which is presence. The Greek notion of
being is essentially this presence.
In other words, once a philosophical system is in place, the "real" or the "true" is only
that which can be appropriated into Being. The history of the West reveals the violence
and, ultimately, the annihilation to which the human Other (i.e., the Jew, the Roma) has
been subjected, and this consequence of ontological thinking is what fuels Levinas's
(post-Shoah) critique and gives it its sense of urgency.
While philosophy gives rise to a totalizing ontology (an egology, as it were) that reduces
the other to the same, there is an alternative approach to meaning and truth, a different
way of encountering the other that preserves its integrity and particularity. Lévinas terms
this alternative tradition of encounter the Hebrew (i.e. the biblical), and it is the realm of
ethics:
The interhuman realm can thus be construed as a part of the disclosure of the
world as presence. But it can also be considered from another perspective- the
ethical or biblical perspective that transcends the Greek language of intelligibility-
245 Emmanuel Lévinas, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Lévinas," in Face to Face with Lévinas, edited by
Richard Cohen (Albany: SUNY Press; 1986), 19.
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as a theme ofjustice and concern for the other as other, as a theme of love and
desire, which carries us beyond the infinite being of the world as presence.
In juxtaposing ethics and ontology, Lévinas is arguing that the former is prior to the
latter, that "man's ethical relation to the other is ultimately prior to his ontological
relation to himself (egology) or to the totality of things that we call the world
(cosmology)."247 For Lévinas, ethics is therefore First Philosophy.
This ethical relation is expressed in a responsibility to the Other that is without
limit in the sense that it can never be satisfied— the debt, as it were, can never be fully
repaid. Furthermore, it is a debt that is timeless in the sense that it did not originate in a
temporal decision or act of will on the part of an autonomous "I" (bound, in Kant's
terminology, by space and time, the a priori forms of existence). Rather, it is a debt that
precedes the very existence of the self, and the authentic (ethical) self only emerges via
its subordination to the Other, i.e. in the effort to satisfy the debt. Because it precedes my
existence as a self, the freedom of the other cannot issue from me as an act of my will. It
is not derivative (and thus reduce-able to the same):
The unlimited responsibility in which I find myself comes from the hither side of
my freedom, from a "prior to every memory," an '^ulterior to every
accomplishment," from the non-present par excellence, the non-original, the
anarchical, prior to or beyond essence. The responsibility for the other is the locus
in which is situated the null-site of subjectivity, where the privilege of the
question "Where?" no longer holds.248
246 Ibid., 20.
247 Emmanuel Lévinas, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Lévinas," in Face to Face with Lévinas, edited by
Richard Cohen (Albany: SUNY Press, 1 986), 21 .
248 Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise Than Bring Or Beyond Essence (The Hague/Boston/New York:
Martinus N ijhoff Publishers, 1981), 10.
In order to elaborate this difficult notion of an unlimited responsibility that precedes the
assertion of agency by an autonomous self, Lévinas turns to the Biblical story in the Book
of Genesis of Cain's murder of his brother, Abel. Lévinas does not seek religious
sanction for his argument, nor does the story itself serve as a form ofphilosophical proof
or justification: rather, he uses the story as a springboard for philosophical inquiry.249 The
Biblical story serves to frame a discussion about responsibility that would otherwise be
difficult to initiate "given the essentially Greek nature ofphilosophical language" and the
fact that the "Greek" and the "Hebrew" discourses remain distinct: "the translation of
biblical wisdom into the Greek language remains unfinished."250
Claire Elise Katz addresses this theme of a responsibility that is prior to freedom and
choice in her essay, "Raising Cain: The Problem of Evil and the Question of
Responsibility."251 Her examination of Levinas's use of the story of Cain and Abel is
instructive, and will help to clarify these difficult facets ofhis thought.
Katz's article explores the problem of evil with reference to Levinas's claim that "[It is]
through evil that suffering is understood."252 Whereas theodicy has traditionally
attempted to rationalize evil (in the sense, for example, of the 'for our sins, we are
punished' line of reasoning), Lévinas regards the source of evil as
"A philosophical truth cannot be based on the authority of a verse. The verse must be
phenomenologically justified. But the verse can allow for the search for a reason. This is the sense in which
the words 'you are a Jewish philosopher' are acceptable for me. It irritates me when one insinuates that I
prove by means of the verse, when sometimes I search by way of the old ancient wisdom. I illustrate with
the verse, yes, but I do not prove by means of the verse." Emmanuel Lévinas, "Interview with Francois
Poirie," in Is It Righteous To Be?, edited by Jill Robbins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 62.
Emmanuel Lévinas, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Lévinas," in Face to Face with Lévinas, edited by
Richard Cohen (Albany: SUNY Press. 1986), 19.
251 Claire Elise Katz, "Raising Cain: The Problem of Evil and the Question of Responsibility,"
Crosscurrents 55 (Summer 2005): 215-233.
252 Emmanuel Lévinas, "Useless Suffering," in Entre Nous, translated by Michael Smith and Barbara
Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
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The inability to be attuned to the other. This kind of evil, the capacity to be so
detached from humanity that one cannot see one's own responsibility in the order
of things is, one might say, the precondition of all other evil.253
The essay begins by examining Levinas's treatment of the story of Cain and Abel, with
an emphasis on his depiction of Cain's detachment from the rest ofhumanity. Although
concerned with Cain's murder ofhis brother, Lévinas is even more concerned with
Cain's famous reply to God's question concerning Abel's whereabouts: "Am I my
brother's keeper?" (Genesis 4:9) This reply is indicative of Cain's inability to assume
responsibility for his actions, and it also speaks to his general detachment from humanity:
This is why in the dialogue between God and Cain- 'Am I my brother's
keeper?'— rabbinical commentary does not regard the question as a case of
simple insolence. Instead it comes from someone who has not yet experienced
human solidarity and who thinks (like many modern philosophers) that each
exists for oneself and that everything is permitted.254
Cain's lack of attunement to the other— what Lévinas terms his "sober coldness"255—
indicates that his subjectivity is underdeveloped. He cannot yet respond to another,
although his defensive response to God "indicates a space for doing so."256
Katz follows this discussion of Cain and Abel with Levinas's treatment of the theme of
maternity, which he juxtaposes with the undeveloped subjectivity of Cain. The maternal
is thus presented as "the epitome of an unmediated relationship characterized by a pre-
253 Claire Elise Katz, "Raising Cain: The Problem of Evil and the Question of Responsibility,"
Crosscurrents 55 (Summer 2005): 215-6.
Emmanuel Lévinas, Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Sean Hand (Baltimore: The John
Hopkins University Press, 1990), 36-7.
255 Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence (The Hague/Boston/New York:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), 10.
256 Claire Elise Katz, "Raising Cain: The Problem of Evil and the Question of Responsibility ,':
Crosscurrents 55 (Summer 2005): 216.
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reflective response [which] is for Lévinas the example par excellence of responsibility
and response to the other."257 [italics in the original]
The story of Cain and Abel is instructive for Lévinas on a number of counts. First of all,
the murder of Abel occurs prior to the handing down on Sinai of the Torah, which
contains the codified command "Thou shalt not murder." One could therefore argue that
Cain's actions did not violate any pre-existing moral norm. Furthermore, it is unclear that
anyone had ever experienced death until that point. There is certainly no mention of
Adam or Eve or Cain or Abel experiencing death, and so it is at least possible that Cain
did not realize that Abel would die as a result of his actions. In any case, as we
nevertheless wish to hold Cain accountable for his actions (and this is certainly the
position of the rabbinic expositors of this story), then his responsibility must be
understood as deriving from an obligation that is prior to any decision, action, or
knowledge, and which does not arise out of Cain's freedom:
For Lévinas, there is a notion of response that he names the ethical; and this
response precedes what we have normally come to understand as the ethical:
codified rules for behaviour that imply knowledge ofwhat is expected and the
freedom to do otherwise...We are claimed by the other and we have no choice in
this obligation.258
Our responsibility for the other is not concerned with our knowledge of a moral law, nor
is it a by-product of our freedom to make a choice with respect to such laws; rather, for
Lévinas the issue is one of "response or attunement to the other, to be in a relationship
Ibid., 216.
Ibid., 219-20.
with the other as called to respond. The ethical as response is the pre-condition of any
possibility of an ethical relation."259
Cain's subjectivity is therefore not fully developed because he is unable to respond to
God's question in a way that reveals responsibility to another. This biblical story was
clearly a source of inspiration for Levinas's account of the face to face relation, which he
regards as signifying the ethical:
Levinas's conception of the ethical is not intended to give us a new set of rules or
guidelines that would tell us what to do. He understands the ethical as a response
[i.e. to the face of the other] that occurs at the pre-cognitive, pre-epistemic, pre-
ontological level, rather than at the level of rational discourse, moral education, or
abstract moral rules.260
If Levinas's account insists on the asymmetry of the ethical relation (i.e. the primacy of
other), this relation is nevertheless complicated by the presence ofthe third person (thus
introducing the political dimension and necessitating a consideration ofjustice).261
As we have seen, Lévinas makes it clear that the true ethical relation cannot be
systematized (i.e. reduced to yet another theory of the ethical, such as deontology or
utilitarianism). The relation between the two terms (self and other) cannot be stated in a
formal system (such as Martin Buber's "I-Thou" relation) as this would necessitate a
critical vantage point outside the relation from which I could observe and define it. The
very foundation for such an exercise in abstraction is shattered in the exposure to the
1L/IU., ,¿.¿.?..
260 Ibid., 221.
"...I am always dealing with a multitude of persons, and consequently, these relations between persons
and the context of the situation have to be taken into account. That is what limits, not my responsibility, but
my action, modifying the modalities of my obligations." Emmanuel Lévinas, "Interview with Francois
Poirie/' in Is It Righteous To Be?, edited by Jill Robbins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 55.
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other. The ethical relation is prior to every freedom (i.e. to the assertion of will by an
autonomous, calculating self) and is the source of authentic subjectivity in the form of the
one-for-the-other.
It signifies outside of all finality and every system, where finality is but one of the
principles of systematization possible. This responsibility appears as a plot
without a beginning, anarchic... In responsibility the same, the ego, is me,
summoned, provoked, as irreplaceable, and thus accused as unique in the supreme
passivity of one that cannot slip away without fault.262
If Cain lacked a fully developed subjectivity because of his inability to be attuned to the
other, then the maternal relation to the developing fetus— at least from the viewpoint of
the mother— cannot be anything but ethical for Lévinas. Lévinas uses maternity as a
metaphor for the ethical because the maternal relation occurs, as it were, prior to
cognition and prior to choice. The mother does not choose to feed the fetus that is
gestating within her body (although she may choose to make efficacious adjustments to
her diet). Rather, she eats and the fetus automatically derives the necessary nutrients from
her meal. Of course, the mother could refuse to eat at all thereby killing the fetus (and
perhaps herself as well), but this would be widely regarded as pathology.
In Otherwise Than Being Lévinas notes that one can only be for the other because we are
beings that eat; in other words, we can only offer food because we require food for
ourselves in order to survive: "Thus, it is only when one can give the bread from one's
mouth that one can be for the other. The bread from one's mouth signifies the giving over
of one's very existence."263
262 Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence (The Hague/Boston/New York:
Martinus NijhofT Publishers, 1981), 35-6.
263 Claire Elise Katz, "Raising Cain: The Problem of Evil and the Question of Responsibility,"
Crosscurrents 55 (Summer 2005): 223. Katz cites Levinas's Otherwise Than Being, 74.
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This giving of the bread from one's mouth is not chosen, in the sense that one makes a
calculated decision after thoughtful deliberation. Rather, it is a form of responsibility
"which arrives in the form of sensibility, [and] is vulnerability and contact; it is an
unchosen exposedness to the other."264 This responsibility is characterized as maternity
for Lévinas, which is a "gestation of the other in the same" and "bears even responsibility
for the persecuting by the persecutor." It is pre-reflective, for "rather than a nature, earlier
than nature, immediacy is this vulnerability, this maternity, this pre-birth or pre-nature in
which the sensibility belongs."265
Katz points to the swelling belly and stretched skin during pregnancy, as
representing Levinas's conception of the ethical relationship. While the fetus is gestating,
the pregnant mother cannot help feeding the child inside her, to give the bread from one's
mouth. Maternity from the point of view of the mother is thus, for Lévinas, the premiere
example ofbeing claimed by another and responding to a call that is prior to choice. It is
"alterity in the same...psyche in the form of the hand that gives even the bread from its
own mouth.. .here the psyche is the maternal body."266
This relationship between mother and child is presented by Lévinas as the most powerful
possible bond between humans, second only to a relationship with God.267 However,
despite Katz's position, Levinas's image of the maternal is problematic on at least two
Claire Elise Katz, "Raising Cain: The Problem of Evil and the Question of Responsibility,"
Crosscurrents 55 (Summer 2005): 223.
265 Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence (The Hague/Boston/New York:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), 75-6. Cited by Claire Elise Katz, 223.
266 Ibid., 67. Cited by Claire Elise Katz, 224.
In Totality and Infinity, published in 1961, Lévinas initially described the ethical relation in terms of
paternity. Otherwise than Being: or, Beyond Essence, was published twelve years later in 1 98 1 .
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counts: First, it idealizes the mother-child bond and motherhood in general, and, second,
it essentializes women.268
Lévinas seems to regard sacrifice as a descriptive, rather than a prescriptive, element of
motherhood. If we regard Lévinas' s treatment ofmaternity as descriptive rather than
normative, then we may conclude that maternity entails a conception of sacrifice, one that
is extreme on both the giving and receiving ends. The maternal figure (and it bears
repeating that Lévinas is using maternity as a metaphor) is thus portrayed as the most
developed case of subjectivity, in stark contrast to the disconnectedness of Cain: "The
maternal figure cannot but say 'here I am' to her child; she is, in fact, always already
responding to her."269
We might compare the ego that is content in its own being, that has not yet questioned its
right to be, with Cain and his cool detachment from humanity. Lévinas refers frequently
in his writings to this (unethical) state, and the harm that it necessarily inflicts on others.
To be more precise, in carving out and claiming my own freedom and autonomy, I
necessarily limit and restrict the other: "I repel and send away the neighbor through my
very identity, my occupying the arena of being; I then have always to reestablish
peace." Lévinas identifies this theme of repelling the neighbor via the assertion of self-
A feminist reading of Levinas's work reveals a number of serious difficulties, including his use of male
normative language; his (largely uncritical) use of androcentric Jewish texts; and his association of the
feminine with the Other in his analyses of the erotic relationship. There are many feminist readings of
Lévinas, as well as many disagreements about his relevance for feminist thought in general.
269 Claire Elise Katz, "Raising Cain: The Problem of Evil and the Question of Responsibility,"
Crosscurrents 55 (Summer 2005): 225.
270 Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence (The Hague/Boston/New York:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), 137.
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identity in the philosophies of Pascal (positively) and Heidegger (negatively), both of
whom he frequently cites in this connection:
My being-in-the-world or my 'place in the sun', my being at home, have not these
also been the usurpation of spaces belonging to the other man whom I have
already oppressed or starved, or driven into a third world; are they not acts of
repulsing, excluding, exiling, stripping, killing? Pascal's 'my place in the sun'
marks the beginning of the image of the usurpation ofthe whole earth.271
If Pascal was opposed to taking one's "place in the sun," then for Heidegger it was a
necessary step in the movement towards authenticity (i.e. being-towards-death). Lévinas
critiques and inverts this theme in Heidegger by arguing that authentic subjectivity can
only occur when I question my own being and ask myself whether my being is justified.
It is not the confrontation with the inevitability ofmy own death that imparts
authenticity.272 Instead, for Lévinas, it is the refusal to be complicit in the death of the
other, along with my willingness to substitute myself for them, that is the mark of
authentic subjectivity:
The lis the very crisis of the being of a being [l 'être de l'etani] in the human. A
crisis of being, not because the meaning of this verb (in its semantic secret)
remains to be understood and is an appeal to ontology, but because, being myself,
I already ask myself whether my being is justified, whether the Da ofmy Dasein
is not already the usurpation of someone's place.273 [italics in original]
271 Emmanuel Lévinas, "Ethics as first philosophy," in The Lévinas Reader, edited by Sean Hand (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1989), 82.
"My death, always premature, may check the being that qua being perseveres in its being, but in
anguish, this scandal does not shake the good conscience of being, nor the morals based on the inalienable
right of the conatus, which is also the right and the good conscience of freedom." [italics in the original]
Emmanuel Lévinas, Alterity and Transcendence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 22.
27j Emmanuel Lévinas, "Philosophy and Transcendence," in Alterity and Transcendence, translated by
Michael B. Smith (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 28.
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Levinas's account of subjectivity
This section will examine Lévinas' s conception of subjectivity, which radically departs
from the traditional Liberal-humanist conception of an autonomous I as the locus of
meaning and of the authentically human. He also presents a very different conception of
what it means to be a unique self. The theme of responsibility will be examined in this
connection, along with Levinas's understanding ofwhat he terms "bad conscience" and
the significance that he attributes to death (which must mean for him, the death of the
other). Levinas's conception of the face as signifying the ethical relation will also be
developed in this section.
In his elaboration of the ethical relationship, Lévinas is arguing for a radical
reformulation (in fact, nothing short of a complete reversal) of the Western philosophical
conception of subjectivity, of Descartes's thinking "I" as the sole or even primary locus
ofmeaning:
The way I appear is a summons. . .The uniqueness ofthis ego, this I, is not due to
a unique trait of its nature or its character; nothing is unique, that is, refractory to
concepts, except the I involved in responsibility.274
The other is prior to me, and I am summoned to authentic subjectivity via my exposure to
and responsibility for the other. My uniqueness and individuality derive solely from my
non-replaceability with regard to the command that issues forth from the face of the
other, and this completely inverts the Liberal humanist conception of the (pre-existing)
autonomous I as the locus of meaning. The command from the other is addressed to me,
274 Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence (The Hague/Boston/New York:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981): 138-9.
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and nobody else can take my place (hence my uniqueness). My subjectivity emerges in
response to this command. This is a radical reversal of the manner in which one, within
modernity, normally conceives of uniqueness as deriving from one or multiple unique
characteristics (or a unique configuration of characteristics) attributed to an individual
ego. The positing of uniqueness to an autonomous I in the manner described above, is a
necessary step in Pascal's "usurpation of the whole earth" (i.e. reduction of the other to
the same). In other words: I identify myself with a unique ego, and as I am confronted by
the alterity of the neighbor that threatens to destroy the false foundation upon which this
uniqueness is erected, I must reduce her otherness to the same in order to preserve and
safeguard my identity. Taken to its extreme, this process leads to the development of
totalizing systems of thought that are solipsistic.
Lévinas further elaborates this notion of the threat to my self-identity and uniqueness that
results from my exposure to the other in Alterity and Transcendence:
The natural conatus essendi of a sovereign /is put in question before the face of
the other, in the ethical vigilance in which the sovereign / recognizes itself as
'hateful,' and its place in the sun 'the prototype and beginning of the usurpation
ofthe whole earth.'275 [italics in original]
My (false) sense of being a unique "I," a self-contained and self-sufficient ego possessed
of unique characteristics, is thus called into question (elsewhere, Lévinas uses more
forceful language to describe the experience) in the face of the other. I must answer for
the death of the other (i.e. the displacement/reduction that occurs when I assert my own
freedom) and accept responsibility by refusing to be complicit in this death:
275 Emmanuel Lévinas, "Philosophy and Transcendence," in Alterity and Transcendence, translated by
Michael B. Smith (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 32-3.
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The death of the other man puts me on the spot, calls me into question, as if I, by
my possible indifference, became the accomplice ofthat death, invisible to the
other who is exposed to it; and as if, even before being condemned to it myself, I
had to answer for that death of the other, and not leave the other alone to his
deathly solitude.
Subjectivity is therefore, in Lévinas' s account, inextricably linked to responsibility for
the other. We are (or rather, become) authentically human to the extent that we set aside
our self-interestedness (which is the 'natural' state of affairs) and become for-the-other.
Lévinas explicitly relates this notion of subjectivity to a critique of the traditional
Western philosophical conceptions of subjectivity, such as those posited by Descartes and
Kant:
Proximity, difference which is non-indifference, is responsibility. It is a response
without a question, the immediacy ofpeace that is incumbent on me. It is the
signification of signs. It is the humanity ofman not understood on the basis of
• · 977
transcendental subjectivity.
Bad Conscience and Death
Lévinas discusses bad conscience, which is the self that is self-satisfied, and introduces
the notion of the significance ofdeath as it relates to the spontaneous formation of
subjectivity as a response to the calling-forth (the command) that is implicit in the face
the Other. As we have noted with reference to Heidegger's notion of dasein, for Lévinas
2,6 Ibid., 24-5.
277 Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence (The Hague/Boston/New York:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), 139.
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it is not the confrontation with my own death that imparts authenticity, but rather the
confrontation with the death of the other. Exposure to the other necessitates a response, a
questioning and subordination of the self, the acceptance of a limitless responsibility:
Bad conscience that comes to me from the face ofthe other, who, in his mortality,
tears me from the solid ground on which I, a simple individual, place myself and
persevere naively, naturally, in my position. Bad conscience that puts me in
question. A question that does not await a theoretical response in the form of
information. A question that appeals to responsibility, which is not a practical last
resort, offering consolation for the failure ofknowledge, incapable of equaling
being.278
Lévinas therefore reformulates Heidegger's notion of the significance of the relationship
between the death of the self and authenticity. The face of the other awakens a concern
for the death of the other person, and I am an ethical (and for Lévinas, an authentic)
subject to the extent that I respond to that concern. For Lévinas, Heidegger's being-
toward-death cannot give rise to an ethical relation with the other. Rather, the most we
can claim is that it initiates the end of the preoccupation with the self that precludes a true
ethical relation with the other (a relation that, as we have seen, is for Lévinas commanded
by exposure to the face of the other). Lévinas develops this line of thinking with
reference to Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of affectivity {Befindlichkeit) in
Being and Time, in which emotion is always both the emotion of something and for
oneself (i.e. fear of the wolf and fear about my own death). There is thus a return to
oneself and anguish for one's own mortality. However, my preoccupation with the death
of the other, my concern that they not die alone, disturbs this preoccupation with myself.
It does not simply return to a fear for my own mortality, but rather
278 Emmanuel Lévinas, "Philosophy and Transcendence," in Alterity and Transcendence, translated by
Michael B. Smith (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 28-9.
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It overflows the ontology of Heidegger's Dasein and his good conscience of being
with respect to that being itself. There is an ethical awakening and vigilance in
this affective disturbance. Heidegger's being-towards-death marks, indeed, for a
being, the end of his being-with-respect-to-that-being-itself, and the scandal of
970
that end, but in that end no scruple about being awakens, [italics in original]
Once again, for Lévinas it is through the exposure to the face of the other that my self-
interest is overturned and my (ethical) concern for the death of the other is awakened. We
shall see how the face is the core term that signifies the ethical in Levinas's thought.
The Face
Levinas's elaboration of the phenomenology of the face is of central importance in his
discussion of responsibility. He is not concerned primarily with the face in its plastic
form (i.e. with the aesthetic features of a particular visage), but rather with what the face
signifies. For Lévinas the face speaks, and what is conveyed is both the vulnerability and
mortality of the other, and the command to not let her die alone. The exposure to the face
of the other shatters my preoccupation with myself, which is for Lévinas the precondition
for the totalizing thinking that violently reduces the other to the same:
without substituting eschatology for philosophy. . .we can proceed from the
experience of totality back to a situation where totality breaks up, a situation that
conditions [i.e. stands beyond and commands] the totality itself. Such a situation
is the gleam of exteriority or of transcendence [which Lévinas also terms
"infinity"] in the face of the Other.280
Emmanuel Lévinas, Alterity and Transcendence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 25-6.
280 Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (The Hague/Boston/London:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), 24-25.
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In what way can the face of the other be said to "speak" for Lévinas? The exteriority or
transcendence conveyed by the face does not announce itself in the form of a
propositional structure which can be taken up (intuited) and appropriated by the mind that
perceives it, for it would then become part of a totalizing philosophy and reduced to the
same. In other words, it would lose its transcendent character and become immanent.
Instead, for Lévinas the face "signifies," which is to say that it conveys a meaning "that is
taught by presence" and is "irreducible to evidence" (i.e. to a sensible or intellectual
intuition), and this presence (which is commanding) "dominates him who welcomes
it."281 In short, the infinite announces itself to me via the face of the other person, and this
exposure to an irreducible otherness shatters my preoccupation with my own being
(which until then had seemed self-sufficient and to encompass everything).
My preoccupation with the perseverance ofmy own being (which, in its naked
self-interestedness, corresponds to the Darwinian notion of the survival of the fittest
within the theory of evolution) is thereby overturned through my exposure to the face of
the other, which awakens a concern for their death. For Lévinas, to the extent that I
respond to the call/command inherent in the face of the other, I become a responsible
(ethical) subject and thus fully human:
But that face facing me, in its expression- in its mortality- summons me, demands
me, requires me: as if the invisible death faced by the face of the other- pure
alterity, separate, somehow, from any whole- were 'my business.' As if, unknown
by the other whom already, in the nakedness of his face, it concerns, it 'regarded
me' before its confrontation with me, before being the death that stares me,
myself, in the face.282
Emmanuel Lévinas, Alterity and Transcendence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 24-5.
The face is therefore the core term that signifies the ethical for Lévinas, to which he will
later include the notion of proximity.283
The face-to-face relation serves a foundational role in Levinas's philosophy. As
we have seen, Lévinas situates the ultimate source for the authentically human (i.e.
ethical) self outside of the self (in the exposure to the face of the other), for to situate it
inside the self would be to inculcate yet another philosophy of the same (an egology). If
the ultimate source of my own being and all that I perceive is located within me, then
every philosophical investigation that I undertake will ultimately lead to a reductive form
of subjectivism, i.e. back to myself.
The Face and Religion
Just as the face-to-face relation is the foundation of what it means to be authentically
human for Lévinas, so is it the original and authentic locus of infinity and of God:
The work ofjustice— the uprightness of the face to face— is necessary in order
that the breach that leads to God be produced... hence metaphysics is enacted
where the social relation is enacted— in our relations with men...The Other is not
the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is
the manifestation of the height in which God is revealed. . .It is our relations with
men. . that give to theological concepts the sole signification they admit of.284
God cannot be comprehended or thematized philosophically or theologically, because
this would be to reduce him to the same, i.e. make him part of a totalizing metaphysics
that destroys his transcendence. Lévinas dismisses such efforts as a "forever primitive
Claire Elise Katz, "Raising Cain: The Problem of Evil and the Question of Responsibility,"
Crosscurrents 55 (Summer 2005): 224. See also Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond
Essence (The Hague/Boston/New York: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), 75-98.
2 4 Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (The Hague/Boston/London:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), 78-79.
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form of religion." Lévinas takes up this critique of the efforts to thematize the divine in
his essay "God and Philosophy," in which he invokes Descartes's analysis of the idea of
the infinite. I have within me an idea of infinity, but the infinite, by its very definition,
exceeds or overflows the thought that seeks to contain it. In short, in trying to think the
infinite (i.e. God) I reach towards something that I can never fully grasp or limit, and this
breaks up the totality of the "I think" (which, as we have seen, believes itself to
encompass everything within it):
The idea of God, the cogitatum of a cogitano which to begin with contains that
cogitatio, signifies the non-containedpar excellence.. .It overflows every
capacity; the 'objective reality' of the cogitatum breaks up the formal reality of
the cogitatio. This perhaps overturns, in advance, the universal validity and
primordial character of intentionality.286 [italics in the original]
The thinking self is thus passive with respect to the idea of the infinite, the original locus
ofwhich is the face-to-face relation. Lévinas speaks ofthis passivity as a "putting of the
Infinite into thought" in which the thinking self is interrupted by that which it cannot
contain, and this points to another (non-intentional) form of consciousness:
The idea of the Infinite, Infinity in me, can only be a passivity of consciousness. Is
it still consciousness? ... An 'idea put into us'— does this stylistic turn suit the
subjectivity of the cogito? ... The putting into us of an unincludable idea
overturns that presence to self which consciousness is, forcing its way through the
barrier and checkpoint, eluding the obligation to accept or adopt all that enters
from the outside, [italics in the original]
285 Ibid., 79.
286 Emmanuel Lévinas. "God and Philosophy," in The Lévinas Reader, edited by Sean Hand (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1989), 173.
287IWd., 174-175.
In other words, our understanding of what it means to be conscious is shattered (Lévinas
speaks of it as a "trauma of awakening" of a consciousness which is "not awakened
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enough") by the idea of the infinite, the locus of which is the face-to-face relation.
Non-intentional consciousness, the meaning of the face and Levinas's account of
subjectivity; are all examined in David Parry's recent article289 in the psychoanalytic
periodical, Existential Analysis. Of particular relevance to the present examination is
Parry's analysis of the role that non-intentional consciousness serves in Levinas's project.
The Phenomenology of Non-intentional Consciousness
This final section will examine Levinas's phenomenology of non-intentional
consciousness as an important component in his conception of alterity and what it means
to be a responsible self. In order to better understand the significance of this theme and
its role in Levinas's thought, it will be situated within the broader framework of his
critique of philosophy and totalizing thinking. Lévinas develops his phenomenology of
non-intentional consciousness with reference to Husserl's notion of intentionality, and so
a critique of the latter concept will be presented as well. Lastly, we will examine non-
intentional consciousness and its connection to the Levinasian notion (borrowed from
Pascal) that we necessarily displace the other when we take our place in the sun, i.e.
assert ourselves as autonomous beings.
^8 Ibid., 175.
289 David Parry, "Ethics as First Philosophy and its Implications for Psychotherapists and Counsellors,"
Existential Analysis 19, vol. I (January 2008): 156-175.
David Parry examines Levinas's conception of non-mtentional consciousness and its
relationship with intentional consciousness and elaborates the ways in which this
relationship has striking similarities with our relationship with the Other. Both of these
relationships make us first and foremost ethical beings.
Parry explores Levinas's claim in "Ethics as First Philosophy" that "In the face of the
other man I am inescapably responsible and consequently the unique and chosen one." °
As we have seen, for Lévinas our first and central concern is with ethics, and it is thus
prior to any other form ofphilosophy. This ethical concern is awakened via our exposure
to the other. Parry misreads Lévinas as stating that the mortality of the other awakens in
me a fear ofmy own mortality, and this shared fear of death bridges the distance between
us:
The Other calls us to him/her and to ourselves because we can see their fate (and
they can see ours); and in this mood we can see our own fate, death. It is through
the dawning of our shared fate that despite our separateness we are neighbours
and our affinity emerges.
Parry's analysis reduces the other to the same. In fact, Lévinas rejects this reading (which
is closer to Heidegger's analysis) and argues instead that there is no return to myself, but
rather an overturning of self-concern and a summons to responsibility that issues forth
from the (mortality of the) other. This overturning of self-interest is connected to
Levinas's understanding of non-intentional consciousness.
290 Emmanuel Lévinas, "Ethics as first philosophy," in The Lévinas Reader, edited by Sean Hand (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1989), 84.
291 David Parry, "Ethics as First Philosophy and its Implications for Psychotherapists and Counsellors,"
Existential Analysis 19, vol. 1 (January 2008): 156.
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The importance that Lévinas attributes to his phenomenology of non-intentional
consciousness is clarified with reference to his critique of traditional philosophical
thinking. In "Ethics as First Philosophy," Lévinas provides an account ofthinking as a
solitary activity undertaken by a self that is satisfied in its (apparent) self-sufficiency and
freedom:
This [thinking] is a regal and, as it were, unconditioned activity, á sovereignty
which is possible only as solitude, an unconditioned activity, even if limited for
man by biological needs and by death.
This account of knowledge recalls Franz Rosenzweig' s description of the "old thinking"
which he juxtaposes with a relational, language-based "New Thinking" in his essay "The
New Thinking."293 This (old thinking) knowledge appropriates the otherness of things
and reduces them to the same whereby they become knowable (as objects of knowledge).
However, Lévinas adds that "thought as knowledge is already a labour of thought." In
other words, we create it, although we are forgetful of this act. Once again recalling
Rosenzweig, thought as knowledge is also an activity associated with solitude. Plato's
dialogues merely took the form of actual conversations. In fact, they represented the
reflections of a solitary philosopher. Lévinas adds that, "the wisdom of first philosophy is
[therefore] reduced to self consciousness."
292 Emmanuel Lévinas, "Ethics as first philosophy," in The Lévinas Reader, edited by Sean Hand (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1989), 77.
293 Franz Rosenzweig, "The New Thinking," translated by Barbara E. Galli and Alan Udoff (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1998).
294 Emmanuel Lévinas, "Ethics as first philosophy," in The Lévinas Reader, edited by Sean Hand (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1989), 77.
Lévinas calls into question this equation ofknowledge and wisdom that is emblematic of
the history of Western philosophy. However, he sees in the phenomenological method of
Husserl the seeds of a philosophy that can overturn itself, and in this connection he
invokes and critiques Husserl' s notion of intentionality in order to go beyond knowledge
and to comprehend being.296 It is via his analysis and critique ofHusserl that Lévinas
develops his phenomenology of non-intentional consciousness, and it is to this critique
that we now turn our attention.
Lévinas begins by looking at Husserl' s notion of an "originary, non-theoretical
intentionality" which the latter isolated "from the active emotional life of
consciousness."297 For Husserl, thoughts are intentional because they are aimed at
something concrete, i.e. objects. However, these thoughts are themselves implanted,
unsuspectingly, within horizons that provide them with meaning. Husserl' s
phenomenological method299 aims at describing these horizons, and he interprets them in
turn as thoughts aiming at objects, i.e. as intentional. Lévinas rejects Husserl's
characterization of these horizons as intentional, since the radical exteriority with which
Lévinas is concerned overflows objectifying thought and thus cannot be reduced to
296 In 1928-9 Lévinas went to Freiburg to take classes with Husserl for two semesters and had the
opportunity to meet with him socially. Lévinas also gave French lessons to Mme. Husserl at their home.
297 Emmanuel Lévinas, "Ethics as first philosophy," in The Lévinas Reader, edited by Sean Hand (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1989), 78.
298 "An existent is comprehended in the measure that thought transcends it, measuring it against the horizon
whereupon it is profiled. Since Husserl the whole of phenomenology is the promotion of the idea of
horizon, which for it plays a role equivalent to that of the concept in classical idealism; an existent arises
upon the ground that extends beyond it, as an individual arises from a concept." [italics in the original]
Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity (The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1 979),
44-5.
299 "jnjs [Husserl's] Transcendental Reduction suspends all independence in the world other than
consciousness itself, and causes the world to be rediscovered as noema. As a result it leads- or ought to
lead- to full self-consciousness affirming itself as absolute being, and confirming itself as an /that, through
all possible 'differences,' is identified as master of its own nature as well as the universe and able to
illuminate the darkest recesses of resistance to its powers." [italics in the original] Emmanuel Lévinas,
"Ethics as first philosophy." in The Lévinas Reader, edited by Sean Hand (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989),
79.
150
intentionality. Nevertheless, Lévinas retains the phenomenological method, since "what
counts is the idea ofthe overflowing of objectifying thought by a forgotten experience
from which it lives."300 This "forgotten experience" is the radical alterity of the other, the
good beyond being that I can approach (but never become identical with) in moving
toward the other person.
Levinas's objections to Husserl's theory of transcendental reduction mirror those of
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who noted that Husserl's method of epoche (whereby I suspend
my presumptions about the ultimate nature of things so that I may describe 'pure'
phenomena, i.e. the aforementioned horizons in which our thoughts are embedded)
ignores the fact that we are embodied beings. In other words, I am inescapably present in
and a part of the world by virtue ofhaving a body, and I cannot abstract myself away
from it (as with Husserl's transcendental move).301 An additional difficulty with this
supposedly pure form of consciousness is that, when it becomes an object of reflection
itself (and thus intentional) and "affirms itself as self-consciousness and absolute being"
there remains a form of consciousness that is non-intentional (i.e. does not have an
object) "as though it were a surplus somehow devoid ofany wilful aim."
The explanatory power of intentionality has therefore been overestimated by Husserl. If a
non-intentional consciousness is present in every intentional act, then there is an aspect of
our experiences that transcend respresentation and intentionality.
300 Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity (The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus N ijhoff Publishers,
1979), 28.
301 Emmanuel Lévinas, "Ethics as first philosophy," in The Lévinas Reader, edited by Sean Hand (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1989), 79.
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Lévinas seeks to explore this notion of non-intentional consciousness and notes that it is
usually (prematurely) dismissed as a form ofpre-reflective consciousness whose
intentionality will be discerned once it is properly reflected upon: "The obscure context
of whatever is thematized is converted by reflection... into clear and distinct data, like
those which present the perceived world. . ."303 Through his examination ofnon-
intentional consciousness, Lévinas is expanding our horizons of what it means to be
conscious. He begins by asking what the implications might be for the confusion between
non-intentional and reflective consciousness, and whether or not we are justified in
positing a distinction between the two:
Might there not be grounds for distinguishing between the envelopment of the
particular in the conceptual, the implicit understanding of the presupposition in a
notion, the potentiality ofwhat is considered possible within the horizon, on the
one hand, and, on the other hand, the intimacy of the non-intentional within what
is known as pre-reflective consciousness and which is duration itself?
This passage by Lévinas recalls René Descartes' s response to an objection that was raised
about his Discourse on the method ofrightly conducting reason and seeking the truth in
the sciences. Descartes had noted that, when directed towards itself, the human mind did
not perceive itself to be anything other than a thinking thing (i.e. an object in the world).
The objection was that "it does not follow that its [the human mind's] nature or essence
consists only in its being a thinking thing, where the word 'only' excludes everything else
that could be said to belong to the nature of the soul."305 Descartes replied that he was
making an observation about perception, and not about the underlying truth of the matter.
303 Ibid., 80.
304 Ibid., 80.
305 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, translated and edited by John Cottingham
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7.
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In a similar vein, Lévinas starts, in the passage cited above, by directing our attention to
the manner in which, upon reflection, our intentional consciousness is drawn to our
1??
thinking self, "as if the thinking ego (moi) appeared in the world and belonged to it."
[italics in the original] However, as in Descartes's response, Lévinas questions whether
the notion of intentionality is adequate to the task ofexplaining the complexities and
richness of consciousness.
Lévinas then reasons that intentional consciousness is accompanied by a non-intentional
variety of consciousness. He asks whether "the 'knowledge' ofpre-reflective self-
consciousness really know[s]?" In other words, is it in any sense active? Lévinas
responds in the negative, and notes that non-intentional consciousness is pure passivity. It
is not passive in the sense of one who is thrown unwillingly into a set of circumstances
outside of their control (i.e. Heidegger's geworfenheit) and yet remains aware of their
predicament, but rather it is passive as (temporal) duration itself, the unfolding of which
occurs totally outside of any form of intentionality:
This duration remains free from the sway of the will, absolutely outside all
activity of the ego, and exactly like the ageing process which is probably the
perfect model of passive synthesis, a lapse of time no act of rememberance,
reconstructing the past, could possibly reverse.307
I am aware that I am getting older, and I may intentionally reflect on the process for a
variety of purposes (i.e. in order to seek to re-capture an experience of youth, to plan for
the future, and so forth). However, as Lévinas is pointing out, this reflection in no way
306 Emmanuel Lévinas, "Ethics as first philosophy/' in The Lévinas Reader, edited by Sean Hand (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1989), 80.
307 Ibid., 80. Cited by David Parry, 161.
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touches or influences the passage ofphysical time. Temporality thus signifies something
that cannot be reduced or fully taken in by thought as intentionality, as there always
remains a surplus that is otherwise-than-being:
The implication of the non-intentional is a form of mauvaise conscience: it has no
intentions, or aims, and cannot avail itself of the protective mask of a character
contemplating in the mirror of the world a reassured and self-positing portrait,
[italics in the original]
In other words, this non-intentional consciousness is non-seeking (as in, not directed
solely towards something in the world) and has no justification (in the sense of utility) for
its existence. From the perspective of intentional consciousness, this makes it a threat, or,
from the perspective of the ego, what Lévinas calls bad conscience. It is as though this
passivity stands as a corrective to the (supposed) supremacy and self-sufficiency of the
ego and an affirmation of its limits:
In its non-intentionality, not yet at the stage of willing, and prior to any fault, in
its non-intentional identification, identity recoils before its affirmation. It dreads
the insistence in the return to self that is a necessary part of identification. This is
either mauvaise conscience or timidity; it is not guilty, but accused; and
responsible for its very presence.309 [italics in the original]
For Lévinas, this is our originary way of being and its presence serves to remind the ego
of the latter's "ambiguous or enigmatic" quality and thus to question itself. He seems to
be arguing that, with the emergence of the ego, this originary way of being was displaced
and/or appropriated in the sense of Pascal's usurpation of the whole earth. There is thus a
308 Emmanuel Lévinas, "Ethics as first philosophy," in 7"Ae Lévinas Reader, edited by Sean Hand (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1989), 81.
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highly ambivalent, ifnot antagonistic, relationship between intentional and non-
intentional consciousness. But it remains to be seen how, if at all, this relationship is
connected to the relationship with the external other.
As the ego asserts its identity and non-intentional consciousness is displaced, the
latter becomes, as it were, an internal other. We are thus, in a very immediate and
profound manner, already exiled from ourselves. Lévinas explicitly links the presence of
non-intentional consciousness with the biblical notion of the outsider: "This [non-
intentional consciousness] creates the reserve of the stranger or 'sojourner on earth', as it
says in the Psalms, the countryless or 'homeless' person who dare not enter in." In
Deuteronomy 1 0: 1 8 we are told that God executes justice for the orphan, the widow, and
the stranger (or foreigner) in our midst. We are thus commanded to care for them as well.
In making a link to the Psalms, Lévinas seems to be drawing a connection between the
plight of our non-intentional consciousness, which is not at home within the realm of the
ego-centered psyche, and that of the external other for whom we are (infinitely)
responsible. David Parry is therefore justified in asking whether our intuitive grasp of the
predicament of the other as an outsider is linked to our relationship with our own non-
intentional consciousness.
As we have seen, the presence ofnon-intentional consciousness represents a
threat to the ego's position of centrality and (supposed) self-sufficiency. Lévinas
characterizes the ego as hateful because, in affirming itself, it disowns and/or attempts to
appropriate this (non-intentional) facet of consciousness that eludes appropriation. In
310Ibid., 81.
311 David Parry, "Ethics as First Philosophy and its Implications for Psychotherapists and Counsellors,"
Existential Analysis 19, vol. 1 (January 2008): 161.
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other words, I try to kill it, to usurp its place in order to safeguard myself. In a similar
vein, in saying "I," I have usurped the place of the external other.
For Lévinas, in becoming a self I already stand accused, as this freedom has
necessarily come at the expense of the other. I am complicit in her death, even though
this crime did not result from a decision that was consciously willed. Lévinas' s
phenomenology of non-intentional consciousness helps to explain how it is that this
crime occurs, as it were, behind the scenes, without being chosen.
How should I respond to this accusation and to the profound sense of persecution that
accompanies it? For Lévinas, the only authentic response is to accept responsibility for
the plight of the other, to subordinate my needs to the other to the point of substituting
myself for them. This responsibility begins by a questioning ofmy right to be in the first
place: "One has to speak, to say /, to be in the first person, precisely to be me (moi). But,
111
from that point, in affirming this me being, one has to respond to one's right to be."
[italics in the original]
This encounter with the other therefore constitutes a "summons to responsibility [that]
destroys the formulas of generality by which my knowledge {savoir) or acquaintance
(connaissance) of the other man re-presents him to me as my fellow man." [italics in
the original] The "formulas of generality" recall Lévinas' s description of totalizing
3,2 "This accusation can be reduced to the passivity of the self only as a persecution, but a persecution that
turns into an expiation. Without persecution the ego raises its head and covers over the self. Everything is
from the start in the accusative." Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans.
AlphonsoLingis (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 112.
313 Emmanuel Lévinas, "Ethics as first philosophy," in The Lévinas Reader, edited by Sean Hand (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1989), 82.
3,4 Ibid. 84.
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thinking in Existence and Existeras, in which everything that we encounter is reduced to
the same (and thereby appropriated) via a neutral third term. However, the encounter with
the other violently shatters315 this preoccupation with the self; I become her hostage, and,
as we have already seen, she is the origin of my authentic (i.e. responsible) subjectivity
and uniqueness.
How does Lévinas relate these themes to his phenomenology of non-intentional
consciousness? The moment the ego becomes aware of its need to justify its own being
via exposure to the face of the other, then a crisis occurs within its own house, i.e. in
relation to its own originary way of being (that was unconsciously displaced).
It is likely that Parry sees a stronger correlation between our relationship with our non-
intentional consciousness and with the other person than does Lévinas, and he seems to
emphasize the role of internal conflict within the psyche over the inter-human encounter.
The danger with Parry's reading is that, given the proximity of our own non-intentional
consciousness in relation to the (human) other (i.e. it is always with us, while the human
other may be distant), his formulation runs the risk of becoming yet another Philosophy
of the Same (i.e. self-oriented). Lévinas takes great care to emphasize that the disruption
of the ego occurs via exposure/proximity to the other; it cannot happen simply through
self-reflection or exposure to (some aspect of) ourselves.316 This is the danger inherent in
any reading of Levinas's philosophy, where the desire to explicate and clarify (and
simplify?) leads to a systematization of his thought and a return to a Philosophy of the
315 "[The ethical relation]... is imposed upon the I beyond all violence by a violence that calls it entirely into
question." Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity (The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1979), 47.
316 "The idea of infinity hence does not proceed from the I, nor from a need in the I gauging exactly its own
voids; here the movement proceeds from what is thought and not from the thinker...The idea of Infinity is
revealed [in the face-to-face relation], in the strong sense of the term." [italics in the original] Emmanuel
Lévinas, Totality and Infinity (The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), 61-2.
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Same. In all fairness to Parry, he is reading Lévinas in order to determine the lessons that
his thought might hold for psychotherapists, who are engaged in their daily practice in
face-to-face encounters with their patients. In other words, his is an engaged, and not
merely theoretical, reading of Lévinas.
Levinas's alternative formulation of subjectivity; his notion of anteriority; and the
emergence of responsibility and ethics from the inter-human encounter; will be explored
in the next chapter with reference to Hans Loewald's developmental account of
consciousness from its original (primary) form to the differentiated secondary form. Both
thinkers will also be read against the feminist and postmodern insights that have been
elaborated in the previous chapters.
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Chapter Five: Comparing and Contrasting Loewald and Lévinas
I have a very great suspicion with regard to the practice ofpsychoanalysis and to
its abuses. The non-knowledge that characterizes the ethical relation of which I
was speaking has a proper, positive meaning of humiliation and abnegation. It is
respect, not repression; nor is it simple ignorance. But if the concept of the
unconscious were to signify a lived mental experience which is not reducible to
re-presentation and to the present, thus giving it all the significations of
temporality, then it suits me fine.317
I am definitely not a Freudian; consequently, I don't think that Agape comes from
Eros. But I don't deny that sexuality is also an important philosophical problem;
the meaning of the division of the human into man and woman is not reducible to
a biological problem...Thirty years ago I wrote a book called Time and the Other
in which I thought that the feminine was alterity itself; I do not retract that, but I
have never been a Freudian. In Totality and Infinity, there is a chapter on Eros,
which is described as love that becomes enjoyment, whereas my view of Agape,
which starts from responsibility for the other, is grave.
An Apology, or a Reflection on some methodological concerns
This project has been deliberately framed as an interdisciplinary conversation between
theoretical perspectives, in which each discipline is read critically against the others.
However, given Lévinas' s apparent antipathy towards Freudian psychoanalysis that is
expressed in the preceding quotations, is there a reasonable basis for comparing his
thought with that of Hans Loewald, a post-Freudian who nevertheless retained and
transformed the Freudian conceptual vocabulary until his death in 1993? There are good
reasons (not the least of which is the fact that both were pupils of Heidegger) for bringing
317 Emmanuel Lévinas, "Being-for-the-Other," in Is It Righteous To Be?, edited by Jill Robbins (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2001), 118.
318 Emmanuel Lévinas, "Philosophy, Justice, and Love," in Is It Righteous To Be?, edited by Jill Robbins
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 200 1 ), 1 74.
319 Jane Flax employed this method of framing a project in her Thinking Fragments. I am indebted to her,
as well as to Michael Oppenheim, who utilizes a similar approach in his Jewish Philosophy and
Psychoanalysis: Narrating the Interhuman (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006).
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these two important thinkers into a dialogue with each other, but certain precautions are
necessary in order to avoid the trap of reductionism. My reading of these distinct
discourses has been strategically focused on the theme of moral responsibility, and this
will facilitate the identification of common ground as well as questions and concerns that
are not shared. The project is thus critically comparative in its method, but it is also
reconstructive in the sense that it will not merely take stock of the shortcomings
identified with each discipline, but will advance interpretations that address the lacunae
that have been identified. However, this presentation is necessarily partial and
inconclusive. In reading for the theme of moral responsibility, certain features ofthese
highly complex discourses are brought to the forefront, while other, significant trends
fade to the background. For instance, the theme of the divine is rarely addressed in this
study, although it is prominent in Lévinas' s writings (especially in his so-called Jewish
work). Furthermore, my own interests and concerns necessarily influence my reading of
the materials, although every effort has been made to provide a balanced presentation.
My reading is thus contestable, which is as it should be. By inviting others to work
through the material on their own and to arrive at their own conclusions, any closure is
provisional and the dialogue remains (at least potentially) open-ended. By deliberately
circumscribing the goals of this project (i.e. I do not claim that my reading is exhaustive
or arrives at the singular truth, although I do believe it to be fruitful) I avoid the trap of
reductionism.320
320 For an excellent discussion of these and other issues that arise in inter-disciplinary analyses, please see
Michael Oppenheim, "Introduction: An Apology" in Jewish Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: Narrating the
Interhuman (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 1-23.
Chapter Outline
This chapter will undertake such a comparison with the aim ofbringing into focus and
clarifying important facets of Levinas's thought that have either received inadequate
attention or have been misunderstood. In particular, I will focus on the respective
accounts of subjectivity in Loewald and Lévinas with an emphasis on the significance of
guilt, persecution, and atonement in their conceptions of the human. In a similar vein, I
will examine what each thinker means by responsibility. I will then read the two thinkers
against the feminist and postmodern critiques/insights that were elaborated in earlier
chapters. In effect, this chapter will present a critical dialogue among these different
discourses.
The Ego is Hateful
Lévinas has termed the ego "hateful" because it asserts itself at the expense of the other.
In carving out the space for my autonomy and freedom— for my subjective sense of
self— I necessarily restrict and limit the freedom of the other. Furthermore, I seek to
displace/disown my own non-intentional consciousness, which Lévinas characterizes as
our originary (i.e. pre-reflective) state ofbeing. In order to safeguard this sense of
autonomy and freedom, I deny the otherness of those that I encounter and reduce them to
the same, thereby subjugating them to myself. It does not really matter if this subjugation
occurs "behind the scenes" (i.e. without my being consciously aware of it) because the
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harm that it causes is real and apparent. Lévinas traces the outrages of the twentieth
century to this type of totalizing thinking.
From Primary to Secondary Process Mentation
Loewald's developmental account of subjectivity provides some possible illumination of
Levinas's claim that we assert ourselves at the expense of the other. For Loewald, we
start life as part of an undifferentiated mother-infant matrix or dyad. We initially have no
sense of self and other; inside and outside; past, present or future; and so forth. Loewald
is asserting the ontogenetic priority of the other over the self, and he terms this way of
experiencing the world (which he regards as a form of thinking or mentation), primary
process. Gradually, via the mediating efforts of the parental figures, we begin to
experience ourselves as separate (though still connected) entities. Loewald terms this
increasingly differentiated way of experiencing the world, secondary process mentation.
As we move from primary to secondary ways of experiencing the world, the ego
struggles to maintain the sense of connectedness or unity associated with earlier
configurations, and these (newer) configurations must take novel forms as our
experiences become more complex and differentiated. We experience our lives as
meaningful when primary and secondary processes are integrated, when these
connections to less differentiated configurations are active and alive, and the absence of a
vibrant connection can lead to neurosis and psychosis.
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Murdering the other to become a self
For both Lévinas and Loewald, the assertion of the self as autonomous and free entails a
crime. Levinas's phenomenology of the face reveals the command inherent in the visage
of the other to not abandon them to their fate and allow them to die alone. To do so is to
be complicit in their murder. We can only atone for this crime by subjugating ourselves
to the other, by making ourselves their hostage, by taking on a limitless responsibility for
which no one else can be substituted; in other words, by asserting their absolute ethical
priority. Given the content that is conveyed by the face of the other, it should come as no
surprise that Lévinas characterizes the self (ego) as persecuted and guilty, as having to
atone.
For Loewald, the movement from primary to secondary processes also entails the crime
of murder. Although the parental figures help to mediate this movement, they never let go
without a struggle. On the psychic plane, we kill something in our parents as we assert
our independence, and this murder results in a sense of guilt and a requirement to atone.
This atonement takes the form of superego development, whereby we internalize part of
our parents as our moral conscience and thereby assign them a place ofprominence and a
form of immortality. In the terminology of Loewald, this entails an internalization or
narcissistic transformation of oedipal object relations, where the superego makes up for
and is a restitution of these relationships. In other words, this atonement entails a
substitution (of the previous parent-infant relationship for the post-Oedipal mature intra-
psychic structural relations).
163
As adults, the Oedipal drama continues to play out in our relationships with
others, and this can often entail feelings of persecution and guilt (it is in this connection
that Freud spoke of the superego as persecuting the ego). In such situations, atonement
entails reconfiguring the primary-secondary process relations in creative, novel ways in
order to keep the connections active and to respond to the external stimuli (i.e. to the
demands of our relations with others). This reconfiguration requires one to unseat the
ego, as it were, from its feelings of prominence and of being complete. To the extent that
primary process experiences transcend the self they reflect, from the perspective of the
ego, the other (or rather, the self-other unity) that is at the core; in other words, they
assert the priority of both the internal object/other (i.e. the superego and non-intentional
consciousness) and of the external other (i.e. other people).
Murder is therefore at the heart of both Levinas's and Loewald's account of subjectivity.
An important difference between the two accounts is that Loewald consistently
characterizes our emancipation from our parents and the sense of freedom and autonomy
that accompanies secondary-process mentation, in positive terms. Emancipation is
something desirable (provided it is also accompanied by guilt and accepting
responsibility/owning up), and the failure to fully emancipate is characterized in terms of
pathology (i.e. psychosis, which is an excess of primary process). At the same time, the
failure to maintain a vibrant link between primary and secondary ways of experiencing
can lead to sickness, as when Loewald asserts that "we know madness that is the madness
of unbridled rationality."321 As we have seen, Lévinas views the assertion of the freedom
of the ego in negative terms, because it leads to a sense of self that is inauthentic and
Hans Loewald, " Man as Moral Agent," in Psychoanalysis and the History ofthe Individual (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 56. Cited in Carolyn Saari, "Editorial," Clinical Social Work Journal
24, no. 4 (Winter 1998): 348.
morally repugnant. For Lévinas, we only become authentic subjects— in other words,
fully human— to the extent that we enter into an asymmetrical ethical relation with the
other. Although Lévinas and Loewald's positions are not as diametrically opposed as one
might think, the differences in emphasis are nevertheless real and significant.
The Maternal Relation
Lévinas and Loewald both emphasize the importance of the maternal relationship. At
times for Lévinas, the relation between mother and fetus (and later mother and baby)
represents, from the point of view of the mother, the ethical relation par excellence. The
mother gives herself completely to the developing fetus, offering even "the food from her
mouth" (i.e. the developing fetus is nourished by her body) and this giving-over is pre-
reflective. In other words, it does not result from a choice made after thoughtful
deliberation and acted upon via an assertion of the will. As we have seen, for Lévinas the
ethical relation can never be reduced to such a calculation; it is prior to choice and
timeless, i.e. it precedes the appearance of a temporal self that is capable of such
reflection.
For Loewald, the mother-infant matrix is the original dyad from which the self gradually
develops. This matrix is undifferentiated, and this primary-process way of experiencing
remains with us throughout our lives. As we have seen, the challenge that we face in
order to live a meaningful life is to maintain this connection between primary and
secondary processes, in order to invest the present with the vitality and sense of being
connected that characterized our earliest ways of experiencing. While Loewald does not
explicitly utilize the language of ethics when speaking of the maternal relation, the
mother's priority to the infant (she brings her into the world) and her role in promoting
secondary-process development (via the reflection to her child ofmore complex forms of
psychic organization) are forcefully asserted. For Loewald, it is the development of
secondary process mentation that makes it possible for us to own up (in other words, to
take responsibility) for our lives. An important feature of this responsibility is the
recognition and acceptance of the fact that we are the original locus ofmuch of what we
experience in terms of powerlessness and persecution at the hands of others. In other
words, we are often complicit in creating relationship dynamics that will passively (i.e.
unconsciously) repeat less-differentiated ways ofexperiencing our earliest (Oedipal)
conflicts, and it is only when we own up to our role in creating such conflicts that they
can be remembered (i.e. consciously experienced via reformulation in new, more
differentiated forms) instead of merely acted-out. In this sense our responsibility is still
connected with (unconscious) agency, which is different from how Lévinas conceives of
responsibility. However, because these less-differentiated ways of experiencing are pre-
conscious (in the sense that they occur before we are autonomous and self-reflecting),
owning up still entails taking responsibility for things not freely and consciously chosen.
On the one hand, this way of owning-up resonates with Levinas's claim that we are
already guilty and responsible as soon as we can say "I." On the other hand, this account
seems at odds with Levinas's notion of the ethical as being irreducible to a system of
thought or post-reflective calculation (i.e. utilitarianism or Kantianism), since it is
elaborated in the fully differentiated language of secondary-process mentation and
Loewald connects responsibility with (an unconscious form of) agency. However, the
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fact that such deliberation entails and incorporates (especially within the analytic
encounter) a powerful affective (i.e. pre-reflective or unconscious) dimension, gives it a
greater affinity to Levinas's model of the ethical than those moral philosophical systems
that have no place for the (so-called) irrational.
This consciousness that is not mine
Both Lévinas and Loewald assign great importance to the notion of an originary way of
being that is very different from what we usually think of as self-consciousness. As we
have seen, Lévinas introduces the idea ofnon-intentional consciousness through his
critique of Husserl's notion of intentionality. Non-intentional consciousness is not
directed toward objects in the world; it has no apparent purpose or utility; nor is it merely
reducible to some earlier form ofreflective self-consciousness (since it is not
consciousness ofanything). It is pure passivity, and as such it is not complicit in the
reduction of the other to the same that characterizes self-consciousness. Levinas's
phenomenology of this non-intentional consciousness is undertaken in part to show us
that what we normally think of as (self-) consciousness, does not exhaust the possibilities
of what it means to be conscious. He is using the phenomenological approach in the
service of a philosophical project in which philosophy "un-thinks" itself. Non-intentional
consciousness is thus an internal other, and it is displaced and obfuscated via the
assertion of the prominence of the ego in a manner that is analogous to the reduction of
the external other to the same. On this reading, our ego is hateful not only because it does
violence to the external other (as emphasized by Lévinas), but also because it comes at
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the expense of our own originary way of being. However, for Lévinas, it is only through
exposure to the external other (as opposed to self-reflection) that we can discern the
traces of our own non-intentional consciousness.
Loewald also discusses the importance of an originary way of being in his
thought, and he terms it primary process mentation. As we have seen, primary process
experiences are undifferentiated: they have no sense of inside/outside, self/other, past,
present or future. Loewald based his notion of primary process upon his interpretation of
Freud's late statement in Civilization and its Discontents (1930) that some people (but
not Freud himself) had reported experiencing an "oceanic feeling" in which the
aforementioned differentiations were absent. Primary process takes the place of Freud's
concept of the unconscious and the Id (although Loewald also utilizes these terms). An
important difference is that, for Freud, the goal ofpsychoanalytic practice was to shine
the light of consciousness on the darkness of the unconscious, to expand the
circumference of the ego and re-enforce the functions appropriate to it. This goal was
encapsulated in Freud's famous dictum, "where id was, there ego shall be." For Loewald,
primary process experiences were not to be displaced in the service of the ego; rather, the
dialectical relation between primary and secondary processes was to be maintained and
strengthened, in order that our present could be made meaningful. The maintenance of
this connection required that novel, creative configurations could be fashioned at
increasingly differentiated levels of psychic organization, in response to changing
external demands (i.e. our relations with others). All the while, our original (pre-
reflective) feelings of connectedness were to be maintained. Loewald' s model of primary
and secondary processes is more relational than the Freudian model of the psyche. For
Loewald, primary process mentation is our originary way of being and it is relational m
origin (although the original self-other dyad is undifferentiated), and our secondary
process experiences (to which he assigns rational reflection, the scientific perspective,
etc) follow later.
To the extent that non-intentional consciousness and primary process experiences are
other than and (frequently) at odds with the (self-reflective, rational) functioning of the
ego, they play similar roles for Lévinas and Loewald. Both are also linked to our
experience of relation with others. For Lévinas, this feature is less developed, in that he
does not explicitly posit a one-to-one connection between the ego's displacement of non-
intentional consciousness and its displacement of the external other. An important
difference between the two concepts is that Loewald's primary process has far more
content assigned to it; Loewald has a great deal to say about its origins and functioning,
and this content forms the core of his theoretical edifice. Lévinas avoids assigning
positive content to non-intentional consciousness; because it is without intention, it is
also without any functions of its own. The assignation of content would result in the
systematization that leads to the totalizing thinking that he is critiquing. The true ethical
relation for Lévinas is prior to any system or content, and he avoids compromising this
stance by deliberately circumscribing his phenomenology of non-intentional
consciousness.
We saw at the start of this chapter that Lévinas objected to psychoanalysis
precisely because the Freudian notion of the unconscious reduced the ethical relation to
just such a systematic content. Does Loewald's re-configuration of the Freudian
terminology suffer the same fate, or is his primary process "a lived mental experience
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which is not reducible to re-presentation and to the present, thus giving it all the
significations of temporality?" Clearly, Loewald is elaborating a highly systematized
theoretical framework that allows him to discuss and map elusive notions such as the
development of subjectivity, meaning, responsibility, and our relations with others. From
a Levinasian perspective, it could be argued that he is thus guilty of reducing the face-to-
face ethical relation to a system or content, thus depriving it of its ethical force. However,
Loewald' s primary process is very much a "lived experience" and the ongoing need for
the development ofnew configurations in order to maintain the relation between primary
and secondary ways of experiencing suspends closure indefinitely. In other words, for
Loewald we are forever engaged in a movement and counter-movement (this process
may be likened to the unfolding of a theme in a symphony through increasingly complex
movements) towards meaning that gives our lives "all the significations of temporality"
(i.e. avoids the reification of the ego and rationality in the name of a hierarchical system
that assigns value according to some fixed, and thus a-temporal, criteria). This
movement toward the meaningful is undertaken in order that we may own up, i.e. become
responsible selves in our relations with others.
Feminist Insights
When we problematize Lévinas and Loewald in terms of gender, what do we find?
Levinas's account of subjectivity and responsibility is troubling on a number of fronts, as
many feminist thinkers have held. By failing to analyze for gender differences in his
322 Loewald likens taking responsibility to making music from a score. See Jonathan Lear, "Introduction,"
in Hans W. Loewald, The Essential Loewald (Hergerstown, Maryland: University Publishing Group, Inc.,
2000), xxxviii (note 41).
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phenomenology of the self-other relation and subjectivity, Lévinas shows evidence of the
androcentric bias of the totalizing philosophy that he is critiquing. When he does refer to
the feminine, it is often as a symbol of otherness in relation to a masculine norm (i.e. the
female is both similar to, and yet different in profound ways and thus irreducible, to the
male). His discussion of maternity as symbolizing (from the mother's perspective) the
ethical relation; possibly essentializes women in their biological role. Lévinas also uses
male-normative language, and cites traditional religious texts without accounting for their
androcentric bias.
In this project, we have focused on Levinas's account of the ego as hateful, as persecuted
and needing to atone for the displacement of the other that inevitably occurs as soon as
we can say "I," i.e., even before we assert our freedom and autonomy via willed action.
We have also seen that authentic human subjectivity is measured for Lévinas in relation
to the extent to which we respond to the call inherent in the face of the other (i.e. that we
assert the absolute ethical priority of the other over the self). How does Levinas's account
of subjectivity compare with the feminist insights into the construction of gender and
subjectivity in patriarchal societies that we have examined in previous chapters?
32j See for instance Luce Irigaray, "The Fecundity of the Caress," in Face to Face with Lévinas, edited by
Richard A. Cohen (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986) and "Questions to Lévinas on the Divinity of Love," in Re-
Reading Lévinas, translated by Margaret Whitford, edited by Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, ] 991).
171
Lévinas and Feminist accounts of the subject
Luce Irigaray's studies of language use revealed the difficulty that many women
had (compared to the males who took part in the study) of saying "I," in other words, of
seeing and asserting themselves as subjects within a patriarchal social-linguistic context.
She concluded from this that adult women maintain closer ties to the pre-oedipal
experiential realm and are thus more capable (than men) of discovering or
accommodating the other, provided that they can also say "I" and assert themselves as
subjects. What does this mean for Lévinas' s account of subjectivity? On the one hand, it
could be taken to mean that women who have internalized patriarchal norms (in Hilde
Lindemann Nelson's terminology, who suffer from damaged identities ) are inherently
more ethical than males, by virtue of their difficulty in asserting themselves as
autonomous individuals. This is a troubling notion, since it appears to endorse oppressive
patriarchal norms, at least insofar as they produce women who are (more) ethical
according to Levinas's definition. On the other hand, Irigaray has identified the ability to
say "I" and assert oneself as an autonomous subject as a requirement in entering into
relationships that accommodate (i.e. do not do violence to) the other. This insight
contradicts Levinas's account of the "I" as hateful and (necessarily) destructive of the
other. Should we conclude that Levinas's characterization of the ego as hateful only
applies to the patriarchal ego (i.e. to the ego of men living in patriarchal societies)? Or
would Lévinas have reached different conclusions had his phenomenology of the face
and the ethical relation taken account of gender? We have seen that Lévinas also
324 Hilde Lindemann Nelson. Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair (Ithaca & New York: Cornell
University Press, 2001), 20.
172
characterizes the ego as persecuted and as needing to atone. The feminist thinkers that we
have examined might argue that these feelings were the result of the internalization of
oppressive norms. For example, Hilde Lindemann Nelson would read these feelings of
persecution and guilt as evidence ofmorally degrading self-identities that deny us the
status of fully accountable moral agents. In order to be responsible, i.e. to be capable of
taking responsibility for our actions, we would have to (at least partially) dislodge these
defective self-narratives and replace them with identity-constituting counterstories that
portray us as fully developed moral agents. On this account, contrary to the Levinasian
model, the ego is persecuted and guilty through no fault of its own, but rather due to
oppressive social norms.
Levinas's critique of totalizing thinking provides a useful corrective and supplement (as
he speaks ofjustice entering into later reflections) to views that are based exclusively on
an equality/justice perspective. The latter excludes, for instance, the care perspective
elaborated by Gilligan andNoddings. However, a closer look at Levinas's position
reveals that he provides few resources upon which to ground a feminist critique. It should
therefore come as no surprise that many feminist theorists have responded to Levinas's
project with ambivalence.
325 See, for instance, Simone De Beauvoirs brief critique of Levinas's masculine perspective in The Second
Sex (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), xxii. See also Stella Sandford, "Lévinas, feminism and the
feminine,7' in The Cambridge Companion to Lévinas, edited by Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 139-160. This is a common theme in many feminist
critiques of Levinas's thought.
Loewald and feminism
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On a whole, Loewald's developmental account of subjectivity fares better than Levinas's,
even though elaborating such an account was not Levinas's intention. Although Loewald
focuses on the maternal dimension of the feminine and is thus vulnerable to claims that
he essentializes women, his account avoids most of the phallocentric excesses of the
Freudian model. Loewald does not privilege the Oedipal to the exclusion of the pre-
oedipal, and he assigns to the mother326 a preeminent role in the development of
secondary process mentation in the child (which is the realm of rationality). Furthermore,
his account of our infantile relations to the mother and father are highly nuanced and
avoid the strict binary oppositions of the Freudian account. Finally, Loewald does not
privilege as healthy or meaningful a reified account of the ego as hyper-rational and
devoid of affect, but rather argues for a self in which the connections between primary
and secondary process experiences are vibrant and alive. Loewald's account of superego
development as a response to the psychic crime ofparricide, is a powerful analytical tool
with which to critique feminist models of subjectivity such as the one proposed by
Lindemann Nelson. In other words, it challenges feminist thinkers to include, in a manner
proposed by Jane Flax, the role of the unconscious (or primary process mentation) in the
development of gender and female identity in Western culture. While Lindemann Nelson
attributes feelings such as guilt and persecution solely to oppressive social norms that
have been internalized, Loewald's model indicates that, at least in the Western context,
such feelings are the inevitable by-product of becoming a human self. They are even
326 But not just to the mother: Loewald does not exclude the possibility that the primary caretaker can be
male.
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desirable, at least to the extent that they accompany the development of a conscience that
presses us to own up and take responsibility for our actions. We might even argue that the
absence of such feelings altogether could be read as a sign of serious psychological
problems such as sociopathy.
Because Loewald's understanding of a meaningful life entails a dialectical
relation between primary and secondary process experiences, his developmental account
can be used to criticize hierarchical developmental models (such as Kohlberg's) that
privilege a stereotypically masculine set of attributes as the highest and most desirable
stage. Given the ongoing importance in adult psychic life that Loewald attributes to
primary process experiences (which is the realm of affect), his account may compliment
ethical models that assign a preeminent role to feelings.
Nel Noddings's ethics of care comes to mind in this regard. Loewald's careful
analysis of our ambivalent feelings toward our earliest caretakers, provides a useful
corrective to Noddings's account of caring, which tends to minimize the potentially
destructive aspects of these relationships. Jane Flax has also articulated the need for such
a corrective to this lacuna in the ethics of care. An important difference between
Loewald's developmental account and the ethical models articulated by Noddings and
Lindemann Nelson, is that the latter are concerned to a far greater extent with the impact
of the overarching societal norms on the development of subjectivity. This is an
important corrective to Loewald's account, which does not expand its analysis to include,
in a systematic manner, the societal contexts that shape and frame our earliest
relationships. Although he has been careful to explicitly situate his account within
Western cultural contexts, it is reasonable to inquire as to how subjectivity might develop
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differently within other (non-Western) cultural contexts, and what impact this might have
on our understanding ofwhat it means to be responsible.
Arti Dhand has drawn on the sources of the Indian epic tradition to expound a
conception of the family that transcends the narrow, nuclear framework in the West. In
her account of the ideal Indian family, all people that we encounter are to be regarded and
respected as family members, to whom we have binding social obligations that supercede
our individualistic goals. This ethic of self-negation is similar to Lévinas' s account in that
both regard self-interest as incommensurate with a genuine concern for others.
Furthermore, both posit responsibility as preceding our individual freedom and capacity
for self-reflection. However, a major difference is that Dhand grounds her ethics in a
systematic account of the Indian dharma sources (including the Ramayana and the
Mahabharata), whereas Lévinas refuses to situate his ethical relation within any system.
An interesting feature of the epic sources upon which Dhand' s account is based, is the
absence of descriptions of feelings of guilt and persecution as major motivating factors
among the primary characters. For example, Rama, the hero of the Ramayana who is
revered as the perfect man and the avatar (incarnation) ofVishnu, is not conflicted due to
feelings of guilt or persecution.327 On the contrary, he is motivated solely by duty
(dharma) and never hesitates to act with certainty, even when faced with conflicting
dharmic responsibilities. He consistently sets aside his self-interest for the sake of his
extended family members and the people that he governs, even when doing so involves
327 Rama voluntarily exiles himself to the forest for fourteen years in order to uphold his fathers
rajadharma, even though this causes his father to die from grief. After his father's death, Rama's widowed
mother pleads with him in vain to return to the kingdom to claim his rightful place on the throne. Rama also
banishes his faultless and pregnant wife, Sita, to exile in the forest in order to quell the gossip among his
subjects concerning her faithfulness to Rama. Although Rama's actions can be justified within the ancient
worldview of the Ramayana, my young Western students are consistently baffled and disturbed by his
choices. For them, these actions would produce an insufferable burden of guilt.
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making tremendous sacrifices. Within the extended familial framework of the Indian
societal context, it is a fear of shaming one's family and thus compromising their status,
that motivates behavior. Shame is thus a very powerful constituent of identity within so-
called collectivistic cultures.328 Because one is automatically expected to sacrifice their
self-interest for the greater good, there is little direct evidence that guilt (originating
either from an original psychic crime or a displacement of the other) plays a significant
role in the development of a self. The accounts of guilt and persecution in the Loewaldian
and Levinasian accounts of subjectivity are thus to be situated within a Western cultural
context.329
Postmodern insights
This notion of a non-Western ethics and developmental account of the subject that calls
into question Western assumptions on these issues, recalls the postmodern critique, which
has sought to map and recover that which has been traditionally excluded in the history of
Western thought and civilization. What does a postmodern critique of the models of
subjectivity and responsibility advanced by Lévinas and Loewald reveal?
328 The line dividing guilt from shame has not been fully standardized. Nevertheless, shame usually refers
to the feelings associated with a public loss of face where social or cultural values have been transgressed,
whereas guilt feelings arise from a violation of internal values. Freud characterized shame as a
stereotypically feminine characteristic and associated it with so-called penis envy (which, from a
phallocentric perspective, is a sense of embarrassment about alleged genital deficiency). "Shame, which is
considered to be a feminine characteristic par excellence but is far more a matter of convention than might
be supposed, has as its purpose, we believe, concealment of genital deficiency." [italics in the original]
Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, edited and translated by James Strachey
(New York/London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1965), 117.
329 Even within the Mahabharata, in which the heroes are far from perfect, guilt does not appear to play a
significant role. When Arjuna hesitates on the battlefield as he looks across at his relations and realizes that
he must fight and kill people with whom he grew up, it is not guilt but fear of violating dharma that causes
him to throw down his bow. According to the laws of dharma, killing one's relatives is a sin that results in a
rebirth in hell.
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Levinas's critique of totalizing thinking has much in common with postmodernism, and
Jacques Derrida has forcefully argued that this critique underlies most responsible work
in postmodernism.330 In his valorization of the other, his radical critique of the
autonomous self, and his resistance toward every attempt to systematize the ethical
relation, Lévinas has anticipated many of the central themes that have been a prominent
feature in postmodern theorizing. Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to characterize
Lévinas solely as a postmodern thinker, and bringing him into a dialogue with
postmodern discourses will reveal important differences.
The self-other relation
We have seen that Lévinas is deeply concerned with the violence that is done to the other
when the ego asserts its freedom and autonomy. By positing the ethical relation as
asymmetrical and insisting that authentic subjectivity derives from the subjection of the
self to the other, Levinas's critique undermines the foundation upon which the Western
philosophical edifice has traditionally been grounded.331 Foucault is also concerned with
the violence that has been done to the other via the prominence of subject-centered
reason, and while he does have an ethics, he does not (like Lévinas) assert the primacy of
330 See, for example, Jacques Derrida, "Adieu," in The Work ofMourning, edited by Pascale-Anne Brault &
Michael Naas (Chicago & London: The University ofChicago Press, 2001), 197-209.
331 Levinas's notion of an asymmetrical self-other relation has been the object of Demda's early critique,
which posits an even more fundamental (prior) symmetry inherent in the understanding of the Other as"alter ego " See Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of EmmanuelLévinas," in Writing and Difference, translated by Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1978) 79-1 53 In the same essay, Derrida argues that Lévinas has reintroduced metaphysics (or rather,failed'to escape the language of Being) via an embrace of empiricism: "But the true name of this inclination
of thought to the Other, of this resigned acceptance of incoherent incoherence inspired by a truth moreprofound than the "logic" of philosophical discourse, the true name of this renunciation of the concept, ofthe a prioris and transcendental horizons of language, is empiricism... Ky taking this project to its end, hetotally renews empiricism, and inverses it by revealing it to itself as metaphysics." (151).
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ethics as first philosophy. Rather, Foucault is interested in mapping the genesis and
transformations of power, and argues that power is inextricably linked with knowledge.
In other words, our received understanding of what it means to be a self (i.e. as free,
autonomous, and rational) masks the violence that has been done to those who have been
marginalized because they do not conform to this understanding (for instance those who
have been diagnosed as mentally ill). At the same time, these normative definitions have
served to entrench institutional arrangements that promote certain groups of specialists
(i.e. psychiatrists and doctors, pharmaceutical executives) to positions of authority. In
writing his genealogies of these power relations, Foucault seeks to show that they are
contingent (as opposed to necessary) and thus creates critical space within which one
may resist the abuses ofpower.
If ethics is central for Lévinas, it only became an explicit concern for Foucault in his later
work.332 Like Lévinas, Foucault does not believe that an authentic ethics can be based on
the humanistic, autonomous subject, since he views it as a construct that masks relations
of domination. However, unlike Lévinas, Foucault does not posit a normative alternative
to this humanistic self. If knowledge and power are inextricably linked and relations of
domination are to be resisted, then it is difficult to see how Foucault can account for the
agency of his own writings. In other words, where is the locus of the agency that initiates
genealogical researches in order to uncover so-called marginalized or subjugated
knowledges333 and use them in the service of an emancipatory criticism? There is no
332 We find, for instance, an explicit concern with Ethics in Foucault's elaboration of what he terms "bio-
power/' Prominent Liberal thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, and
Richard Rorty, all deny the possibility of a concept of freedom and, thus, moral agency, in their reading of
Foucault's philosophical approach. See Sergei Prozorov, Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty (Burlington,
VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007), 25-6.
333 See Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas
Debate, edited by Michael Kelly (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1994), 17-46.
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command inherent in the face of the other for Foucault, and no trace of an Absolute Other
(i.e. the Infinite or God) that can be discerned in the asymmetrical ethical relation
between self and other.
The Face and Le Regard
Lévinas' s phenomenology of the face and of the ethical relation is foundational, although
he repeatedly stressed that the ethical relation itself cannot be systematized. The face
speaks for Lévinas, but this saying cannot be reduced to a said (i.e. systematized) without
depriving it of its ethical force. The command in the face is, first and foremost, to be
obeyed. Foucault has no such foundation for his critique upon which to erect an
alternative. For him, the gaze {le regard) from without is malevolent, because it assigns
to us a fixed and, ultimately, reductive designation. As we are always capable of
being/experiencing more, such designations are oppressive and must be resisted. For
Foucault, the psychiatric gaze (as it is directed at the patient) is a model for such
oppressive constructions of identity.
There are interesting parallels and differences between Levinas's account of the
Face and Foucault' s account of Ie regard. For both thinkers, exposure to the other is
experienced as a form of violence and oppression. For Lévinas, the face of the other
rends my ego asunder and shatters my sense of self-satisfaction; I am turned into a
hostage. For Foucault, le regard fixes me with an oppressive identity and draws me into
an abusive power system, thereby limiting my otherwise limitless potential for self-
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expression and experience. However, for Lévinas the ego that is shattered in the
encounter with the other is a false, inauthentic, hateful self. It is a self that is already
complicit in the reduction and domination of the other. It must be violently torn apart in
order for it to be substituted with authentic subjectivity (in the form of submission to the
other). For Foucault, the self that is subjected to le regarais already an authentic self in
the sense that it is (potentially) unlimited. It is hard to imagine how such a limitless self
could be complicit in the violence that is done to the other, since the oppression of the
other at my expense presupposes a "me" that is clearly defined and, thus, capable of
being evaluated as superior. In classical psychoanalytic terms, we might re-describe
Levinas's account of subjectivity as a radical valorization of the superego at the expense
of the ego, whereas Foucault valorizes the id at the expense of the superego. In both
cases, the notion of ego that emerges differs dramatically from the autonomous, rational
self envisioned by humanism.
The account of the self in Lévinas and Foucault
Another difference between Lévinas and Foucault relates to their understanding of the
autonomous self or ego. For Foucault, this reason-centered humanistic self is a contingent
construct. As such, it is little more than a fiction, albeit a dangerous fiction that is capable
of great violence. Lévinas, however, refers to the way of being appropriate to this self-
interested ego as the natural state of affairs. When we operate according to the
imperatives of the ego, we are participating in the fight for survival that characterizes all
life, and which is readily discernible in the animal kingdom. The ego is therefore not
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contingent for Lévinas. However, we only become authentically human (as opposed to
merely reasoning animals) when we disregard the imperatives of the ego (i.e. go against
nature) and subordinate ourselves to the other in the ethical relation.
Loewald's proto-postmodern subject
If one conceives of a theoretical continuum with modernism and postmodernism at either
extreme, then Hans Loewald would likely be situated closer to the postmodern pole. The
self that he posits in his developmental account of subjectivity is inherently relational,
and it continues to be shaped in adulthood by relations with others. Loewald does not
valorize the reason-centered ego as the pinnacle of psychological health, but argues rather
that a meaningful life is to be found via the ongoing dialectical relation between primary
and secondary process ways of experiencing. Loewald' s subject is a work-in-progress, in
the sense that closure is always provisional and new, creative self-configurations must
constantly be formulated in response to changing external stimuli (although these new
formulations may occur, as it were, behind the scenes). As we have seen, Loewald also
explicitly situates his account within the Western cultural context, and thus avoids
making the kind of universal claims that are the target ofpostmodern and post-colonial
critiques. Nevertheless, important differences can be identified between Loewald and
postmodern accounts of subjectivity.
In drawing upon and situating his account of subjectivity within the Freudian
conceptual vocabulary, Loewald is arguably complicit in a psychoanalytic "grand
narrative" and is thus vulnerable to the postmodern critiques that have been leveled at
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such narratives.334 In Loewald's defense, he is aware of these issues and openly identifies
when he is addressing meta-theoretical issues. In other words, he deliberately situates his
thought within over-arching theoretical frameworks, which implies a recognition that
such frameworks are not exhaustive (i.e. they provide but one potential account of the
way things are). This deliberate placing-in-perspective avoids many of the distortions that
inevitably arise when such theorizing occurs behind-the-scenes. Nevertheless, Loewald is
theorizing within (and breaking with) the classical psychoanalytic framework and as such
he can be read in terms of the power relations (i.e. between analyst and analysand) that
his discipline reinforces. And while Loewald has occasionally questioned Freud's views
of the therapist, analysts who have been influenced by Loewald have made theoretical
moves that have brought them even closer to important facets of the postmodern critique.
Roy Schaffer335 has written extensively on reinterpreting psychoanalytic theories within a
narrative (hermeneutic) framework, while Stephen Mitchell336 has (re-) conceptualized
the analyst-patient dynamic within fully relational terms.
334 Roy Schaffer abandoned the Freudian vocabulary of Loewald— his teacher and PhD supervisor— in
favor of a new and, ostensibly, less reductive and deterministic "action language' for psychoanalysis.
335 Roy Schaffer, Retelling a Life: Narration and Dialogue in Psychoanalysis (USA: Harper-Collins, 1 992).
336 Stephen Mitchell, Relationality: From Attachment to lntersubjectivity (Hillsdale NJ: The Analytic Press,
2000) and Can Love Last? The Fate ofRomance Over Time (New York & London: W.W. Norton &
Company, 2002). Mitchell explicitly credits Loewald with opening the door, via his reinterpretation of
classical Freudian theory, to this fully relational move.
183
Conclusion
What does it mean to be morally responsible? As we have traced this theme through a
variety of discourses, some salient features ofmoral responsibility have come into focus.
Our examination of feminist ethics, and especially the so-called caring perspective,
situates the (gendered) self within an interpersonal relational web of competing caring
commitments. Postmodern analysis deconstructs the self as well and, like the feminist
critique, inquires into the transpersonal, historical and institutional (third-person)
discourses that give rise to our experiences of interiority and individualism. This placing-
in-perspective of the humanistic self undermines all moral systems that are founded upon
a conception ofthe reason-centered "I" that conceal (repress) the influence of the realm
of affect and the (so-called) irrational. The primacy of this affective realm (literally, as
primary process) is taken up in the developmental psychoanalytic account of Hans
Loewald, who elaborates the central and ongoing role of guilt and atonement in the
formation of a responsible self.
Guilt and atonement are also central to the conception of subjectivity advanced by
Emmanuel Lévinas. Lévinas' s critique of the reason-centered "I" is every bit as radical as
the de-centered postmodern self, and yet (unlike Foucault) he posits an alternative
conception that cannot but be ethical. This self is summoned to a (limitless) responsibility
through proximity to the other, and this obligation is only mitigated by the presence of
the third (i.e. a plurality of others). As in Loewald' s account, the ego (as self-contained
and inauthentic humanistic "I") is torn asunder via an experience of trauma. However,
whereas Loewald (following Freud) seeks to identify the ultimate causes of this trauma
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(i.e. to unconscious forces that have been inadequately integrated into conscious life),
Lévinas traces (literally, as they only exist as traces) their unfolding and assigns their
origins to the beyond-being, i.e. to that which always is directed away from the self and
can never be formalized in a system.
The Centralitv of the Other
As we have seen, the discourses that we have examined stress the primacy of the other
over against the self. The Caring perspective as elaborated by Nel Noddings posits a
relational self in which our moral obligations are derived from the web of social
relationships that characterize our lives. Although our obligations originate in the claims
made upon us by others, Noddings nevertheless posits a reciprocal relation between self
and other when she identifies the potential for mutuality as the criteria for arranging our
caring commitments hierarchically. In other words, we should privilege those claims that
originate from sources (i.e. proximate) where the potential for relationship is greatest. We
have seen that this aspect of the theory has come under criticism, precisely because it
reintroduces a calculation of self-interest (and thus excessive partiality?) that undermines
the ethical primacy of the other.
Hans Loewald's developmental psychoanalytic account of subjectivity also stresses the
primacy of the other over the self. We begin life as part of an undifferentiated infant-
mother matrix, in which we have no experience of inside-outside, self-other, past-present-
future, and so forth. As we develop we gradually begin to experience increased degrees
of differentiation until such a time as we achieve a sense of self as distinct from others.
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However, the original sense of unity never disappears entirely; rather, we strive to
integrate that sense of (primary process) connectedness on increasingly complex
(secondary process, differentiated) levels of complexity. The continuing existence of the
primary process way of experiencing the world is attested to via the repetition-
compulsion phenomenon, which manifests itself (often pathologically) within our
everyday relationships and (therapeutically) within the transference relationship in the
analytic context. Primary process ways of experiencing that have not been integrated into
consciousness (i.e. into more complex psychical arrangements) are passively repeated,
which is to say, acted out. As these experiences become integrated, they are actively
repeated, which is to say, remembered. In stressing the terms active and passive
repetition, Loewald frames the phenomenon within the volitional realm. As experiences
that can be (potentially) brought under some measure ofconscious control, we are
responsible for them. On this reading, we are thus responsible even for choices that we
did not make, i.e. for infantile ways of experiencing that we did not choose and yet which
continue to shape our experiences.
These primary process experiences derive from our original connectedness with
the other, and represent (and least with reference to our experience of being a distinct
self) traces of an internal Other. They are traces in the sense that our experience of them
is always oblique; they are revealed to us (if ever) only via their manifestation in our
relations with others.
The ethical primacy of the other is central to Levinas's conception of subjectivity and to
his identification of ethics as first philosophy. Like Loewald, Lévinas identifies the
irreducible other (i.e. the good-beyond-being) via the experiential traces that are left
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behind via the (traumatic) encounter between self and human other. If our everyday
consciousness is always consciousness ofsomething (i.e. of some discreet content), then
it is intentional. However, Lévinas identifies examples of non-intentional consciousness
(such as insomnia) that disrupt the self in its self-satisfaction and point toward the other.
The experience of the command inherent in the face before me, to not let her die alone
(which Lévinas equates with the Biblical commandment, "Thou shalt not kill!") is a
powerful signifier of this ethical relationship. The other is always before me, and the debt
can never be fully paid.
A de-centered Self
As we have seen, the various discourses that we have examined all posit a self that is, to
varying degrees, no longer the primary locus of meaning. The (gendered) self of the
feminist critique is inherently relational, and the attributes that were previously valorized
via their association with the reason-centered "I" of humanism, have been identified as
Patriarchal norms and re-situated within a plurality of (non-hierarchical) values. The
caring perspective thus identifies a feeling (i.e. caring), rather than impartial reason, as
the foundation for ethics. The postmodern critique posits a self that is so radically de-
centered, that is in unclear how it can serve as the basis of its own critique, much less for
a reason-centered ethics. Foucault's ethics of resistance refuses all attempts directed from
without (or self-directed, however this is conceived, from within) to impose constraints
on identify, preferring instead a vague notion of freedom and potentiality. On this
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reading, we are always capable ofbeing more than we believe ourselves to be. While
Foucault directs his critique primarily toward the so-called psychiatric gaze and its
corollaries (i.e. towards the other as the source of limitations on the self), his critique also
mitigates our capacity to refuse the other. How can we privilege a self that is indefinable?
How can we rely upon a rationality that is a contingent construct and the product of
abusive power relationships, in order to mitigate the demands made upon us by others?
While it is difficult to construct a coherent positive ethics that derives solely from the
postmodern critique (those who argue that we should privilege marginalized discourses
merely for their own sake have a lot of work to do), the critique is nevertheless crucial
because it asks us to question that which has traditionally gone unquestioned (i.e. because
it was regarded as natural or a Divine Verity and so forth). In deconstructing the tools
(i.e. instrumental reason) with which philosophy has traditionally constrained the claims
made upon the self by others, the postmodern critique clears the way for a potentially
limitless responsibility towards the other.
We have seen that Loewald posits a dialectical relation between primary and
secondary ways of experiencing, and in this way he removes the conception of a fully
independent, reason-centered self from its place of prominence. In fact, he equates this
form of reified, disconnected rationality with pathology, as when he says, "we know
madness that is the madness of unbridled rationality." What implications does Loewald's
de-centered conception of the selfhave for our notion of moral responsibility? For
Loewald, our feelings of guilt and persecution derive from the psychic crimes of parricide
and incest that inevitably accompany our development as a distinct self. As such, we, and
we alone, are ultimately responsible for our own persecution, and the onus is on us to
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"own up" (i.e. atone). This atonement entails a questioning of the self as a means of
initiating the task of reconfiguring the relationship between primary and secondary ways
of experiencing in novel (and generally more complex) ways. Perhaps it is in this sense
that Lévinas claims that we are even responsible for the persecution to which we are
subjected at the hands of the other. As with Loewald, Lévinas argues that we commit a
crime simply by asserting ourselves as a distinct I, i.e. by claiming our place in the sun.
This claiming of a separate space inevitably occurs at the expense of the other and thus
constitutes a crime for which I must answer and atone. Lévinas does not identify the
superego as the locus of our feelings of guilt and persecution, for to do so would be to
employ the language of the same (i.e. of systems) to speak of the irreducible other (i.e.
the good-beyond-being). Nevertheless, what Lévinas prescribes by way of owning up-
an initial questioning of my right to be— recalls the displacement of the ego that is part-
and-parcel of the analytic process.
There are, of course, important differences between the Loewaldian and
Levinasian account of moral responsibility. If in the psychoanalytic context closure is
always provisional— reification of the self/ego is not the therapeutic goal— therapy
does, in most cases, come to a conclusion. This is not to say that the demands of the
superego can ever be fully satisfied, but at a certain point separation from and
renunciation of the analyst becomes possible and helpful. Hopefully, the (now former)
analysand will no longer be inundated by feelings of persecution and guilt, but rather will
have the tools to deal with such feelings in an authentic (and healthy) manner should they
arise again.
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No such goal is envisaged in the Levinasian account of moral responsibility. The ethical
duties are endless and yet they cannot be deferred. The debt to the other can never be
paid, and the only mitigating factor in the extent to which I subordinate myself, is the
presence of the third (i.e. of more than one other person/neighbor). It is as though, using
Loewald's psychoanalytic language, the demands of the superego can never be assuaged,
and so we are engaged in a never-ending, yet futile, effort to minimize the damage. As
the boat takes on water, the best that one can hope for is to continuously bail out water.
The holes can never be filled, and so the ship will forever be on the verge of sinking.
However, this is not a form of (endless) self-punishment that evades our having to own
up and take responsibility, but rather the very essence of responsibility itself.
How might we account for these differences in Loewald and Lévinas' s accounts? For
Lévinas, the ego is always and inevitably hateful. It does violence to the other by
reducing it to the same, and is motivated solely by self-interest in the Darwinian sense.
There is no dialectical relation for Lévinas between self and other; there can only be a
(inauthentic, hateful) relation of dominance or an ethical relation of absolute
subordination. As we have seen, Loewald conceives of the self-other relation in
dialectical terms. The successful integration of primary (as internal other) and secondary
modes of mentation produces meaning in a life, thus potentially opening up a range of
loving relationships with (external) others. For Lévinas, love can only flourish when the
self obeys the commandment inherent in the face before me ("thou shalt not kill!") to not
allow the other to die alone.
Perhaps these differences might be attributed to the differences in emphasis in the
Jewish philosophical and psychoanalytic discourses. A full examination of these
differences lies outside the parameters of this project.
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